Winter v. Anderson

242 A.D. 430, 275 N.Y.S. 373, 1934 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6085
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedNovember 21, 1934
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 242 A.D. 430 (Winter v. Anderson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Winter v. Anderson, 242 A.D. 430, 275 N.Y.S. 373, 1934 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6085 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1934).

Opinion

Edgcomb, J.

This is a representative action, brought by the plaintiff, a minority stockholder in the Niagara Share Corporation of Maryland, on his own behalf, and for the benefit of other stockholders of said corporation, against the defendants, who are officers, directors and majority stockholders thereof, to recover the damages occasioned by the alleged official misconduct of the individual defendants. The action was tried in equity, and resulted in a judgment dismissing the complaint. Plaintiff appeals.

The Niagara Share Corporation of Maryland was incorporated in June, 1929, with an authorized capital of $10,000,000, consisting [431]*431of 1,000,000 shares of common stock of the par value of $10 each. The capital structure was changed from time to time, so that ultimately there was an authorized issue of 50,000 shares of class A preferred stock of a par value of $100 each, and 4,000,000 shares of common stock of the par value of $5' per share. It is a holding company, and is engaged in the purchase and sale of securities of all kinds. On January 10, 1930, it acquired all the assets of the Niagara Share Corporation of Delaware. This sale was duly ratified and approved by the stockholders of both companies. Thereafter, and from time to time, the Maryland corporation bought various securities, several of which purchases are now attacked by the plaintiff as being conducted and consummated in fraud and bad faith, and as resulting in waste and loss to the defendant corporation.

Before discussing the facts, it may be well to briefly refer to the duty which the individual defendants owed to their corporation. The rule is well settled that the officers and directors of a corporation occupy positions of trust in relation to their company and to its stockholders, and in all their dealings are bound to act with fidelity and in the utmost good faith; they are required to guard and care for the property of the corporation, and to manage its affairs with the same degree of loyalty and devotion that men of average prudence apply to their own personal affairs; they must subordinate their individual and private interests to their duty to the corporation whenever the two conflict. For the violation of such duty, resulting in loss and waste of the corporate assets, they may be made to account in equity to the corporation or to its representatives. (Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N. Y. 157, 165, 166; General Rubber Co. v. Benedict, 215 id. 18; Tri-Bullion Smelting & Development Co. v. Corliss, 186 App. Div. 613, 626; affd., 230 N. Y. 629; Billings v. Shaw, 209 id. 265, 279; Jacobson v. Brooklyn Lumber Co., 184 id. 152, 162.)

A corporate officer or director is not permitted to derive any personal profit or advantage by reason of his position, which is not enjoyed in common by all the stockholders. (McClure v. Law, 161 N. Y. 78, 81; Blake v. Buffalo Creek R. R. Co., 56 id. 485, 491; Pollitz v. Wabash R. R. Co., 207 id. 113, 124.)

Plaintiff insists that these familiar rules, which are based on morality and sound public policy, were violated by the defendants in seven separate transactions, resulting in a loss to the corporation of $66,545,105.19.

Throughout this discussion it must constantly be borne in mind that this rule of liability is limited to the fraudulent, dishonest or collusive acts of the officers or directors, which result in loss to the [432]*432corporation, and cannot be invoked for a mere error of judgment, or lack of efficiency upon their part. Power and authority in the directors to manage and conduct the affairs of the corporation are absolute, so long as they act in accordance with their best judgment and, in the absence of a dishonest purpose, or of fraud, bad faith or negligence so gross as to amount to a breach of trust, their discretion will not be reviewed by the court in an action attacking their conduct. (Schwab v. Potter Co., 194 N. Y. 409; Pollitz v. Wabash B. R. Co., 207 id. 113, 124; Leslie v. Lorillard, 110 id. 519, 532; Liebman v. Auto Strop Co., 241 id. 427, 433, 434; Colby v. Equitable Trust Co., 124 App. Div. 262, 267; affd., 192 N. Y. 535; City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Hewitt Realty Co., 257 id. 62, 67; Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 id. 185, 193; Gamble v. Queens County Water Co., 123 id. 91, 99.)

Upon this subject, listen to the rule as stated by Judge Collin in Pollitz v. Wabash R. R. Co. (207 N. Y. at p. 124): “ Questions of policy of management, expediency of contracts or action, adequacy of consideration, lawful appropriation of corporate funds to advance corporate interests, are left solely to their honest and unselfish decision, for their powers therein are without limitation and free from restraint, and the exercise of them for the common and general interests of the corporation may not be questioned, although the results show that what they did was unwise or inexpedient.”

The rule is also succinctly stated in the following language by Judge Gray in Leslie v. Lorillard (110 N. Y. at p. 532): “ In actions by stockholders, which assail the acts of their directors or trustees, courts will not interfere unless the powers have been illegally or unconscientiously executed, or unless it be made to appear that the acts were fraudulent or collusive and destructive of the rights of the stockholders. Mere errors of judgment are not sufficient as grounds for equity interference; for the powers of those entrusted with corporate management are largely discretionary.”

To properly present the questions raised upon this appeal, it will be necessary to refer in considerable detail to the various transactions complained of, although to do so will greatly prolong this opinion.

The first transaction which is attacked by the plaintiff relates to the payment by the Niagara Share Company of Maryland of bonds of the Schoellkopf Securities Corporation of the aggregate par value of $366,000.

This latter corporation was distinctly a Schoellkopf family affair. At the time of its incorporation in 1910 its stock was entirely owned by the Schoellkopf family. It was organized to hold certain assets of the estate of Jacob F. Schoellkopf, the grandfather of the defendant Jacob F. Schoellkopf, Jr., which could not easily be distributed to the heirs.

[433]*433The Niagara Share Corporation of Delaware, prior to its merger with the Maryland corporation, acquired all the assets of the Schoellkopf Securities Corporation, and assumed all of its outstanding liabilities, including an issue of bonds of the par value of $366,000, due in 1946, and which had been sold to the public. The Maryland corporation, at the time it took over the assets of the Delaware corporation, assumed the payment of these obligations. The bonds were called, and were paid by the Maryland corporation in 1930.

Plaintiff asserts that there was no consideration accruing to the Maryland corporation for its assumption and payment of these bonds, and that its purpose was solely to benefit the Schoellkopf family.

So far as consideration is concerned, the liability of the Schoellkopf Securities Corporation on these obligations was deducted in determining the net worth of its assets, and the amount which the Delaware corporation was to pay for its stock.

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Bluebook (online)
242 A.D. 430, 275 N.Y.S. 373, 1934 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6085, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/winter-v-anderson-nyappdiv-1934.