Winston Najee Reed v. Warden Zook, et al.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Virginia
• Decided: April 22, 2026
• Docket: 7:25-cv-00444
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 ee onume va FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA apaton. □□□□ ROANOKE DIVISION LAURA A. AUSTIN. CLERK

WINSTON NAJEE REED, ) Plaintiff, Case No. 7:25CV00444

V. OPINION WARDEN ZOOK, et al., JUDGE JAMES P. JONES Defendants. Winston Najee Reed, Pro Se Plaintiff. The plaintiff, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants have violated his constitutional rights by failing to provide personal hygiene items. Upon consideration of Reed’s Complaint, I conclude that it must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1), the court may dismiss any § 1983 action “with respect to prison conditions . . . if the court is satisfied that the action is frivolous, malicious, [or] fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” To state a claim under §1983, a plaintiff must establish that he has been deprived of rights guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States and that this deprivation resulted from conduct committed by a person acting under color of state law. West

v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments and governs “the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the

conditions under which he is confined.” Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993)). Specifically, “the Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to ‘provide humane conditions

of confinement . . . [and] ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.’” Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). But “the constitutional prohibition against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment ‘does not mandate comfortable prisons’” and “ordinary discomfort accompanying

prison life is part and parcel of the punishment those individuals convicted of criminal offenses endure as recompense for their criminal activity.” Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).

To state an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) that the alleged deprivation is objectively “sufficiently serious” and (2) that the prison officials’ state of mind was one of “deliberate indifference” to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

Reed’s claims are insufficient to satisfy the Farmer test. He alleges that his rights were violated by the defendants’ refusal to provide a hygiene pack, including a toothbrush, deodorant, and cleaning supplies, for eight days upon his arrival at the

Wallens Ridge State Prison facility. Federal courts have generally determined that a temporary deprivation of toiletries does not offend the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Trammell v. Keane, 338 F.3d 155, 165 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[d]eprivation of other

toiletries for approximately two weeks—while perhaps uncomfortable—does not pose such an obvious risk to an inmate's health or safety” that the Farmer test is satisfied); Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235 (7th Cir. 1988) (concluding that

denial of soap and toothpaste for ten days did not violate the Eighth Amendment); Dopp v. W. Dist. of Okla., 105 F. App’x. 259, 261 (10th Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (“Being deprived of hygiene products for eight days is not sufficiently serious to implicate the Eighth Amendment.”). I conclude the same given the allegations here.

To the extent that Reed asserts that the prison officials’ failure to provide hygiene items was in violation of his First Amendment free exercise rights, such claims likewise fail. Specifically, Reed states that because of the defendants’ failure

to provide a hygiene pack from May 20, 2025, to May 28, 2025, he “was forced to worship [his] Lord (Allah) with bad breath and odor under [his] armpits which is forbidden in the Religion of Islam.” Compl. Supp. Facts 4, Dkt. No. 1. To state a claim that a defendant violated a plaintiff’s rights under the Free

Exercise Clause of the Constitution’s First Amendment, “a plaintiff must allege that ‘(1) he holds a sincere religious belief and (2) that his religious practice has been substantially burdened by the prison policy or practice.’” Hammock v. Watts, 146 F.4th 349, 365 (4th Cir. 2025) (quoting Firewalker-Fields v. Lee, 58 F.4th 104, 114 (4th Cir. 2023)).

[A] “substantial burden” is one that “put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs,” . . . or one that forces a person to “choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting [governmental] benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning the precepts of her religion . . . on the other hand.”

Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Thomas v. Rev. Bd. Of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). While Reed may hold a sincere religious belief, I cannot find that failure to receive hygiene items for eight days rises to the level of a “substantial burden” under the Free Exercise Clause, particularly where the alleged deprivation was brief. See Ofori v. Fleming, No. 7:20-cv-00344, 2022 WL 3584904, at *7 (W.D. Va. Aug. 22, 2022) (citing Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1278 (11th Cir. 2007) for the proposition that “mere inconveniences” are not a substantial burden under the First Amendment). Finally, to the extent that Reed asserts that his constitutional rights were

violated by the defendants’ alleged mishandling of his complaints and grievances, inmates do not have a constitutionally protected right to participate in a prison grievance procedure. Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994). Consequently,

a jail official’s failure to comply with the jail’s grievance procedure does not violate any constitutionally protected right. Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). To the extent that Reed seeks to hold prison officials liable under § 1983 for

not following the prison’s grievance procedures, I must dismiss such claims. Reed’s Complaint will be dismissed under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

A separate Judgment will be entered. ENTER: April 22, 2026 /s/ JAMES P. JONES Senior United States District Judge