Winona & St. Peter Railroad v. United States

Supreme Court

Winona & St. Peter Railroad v. United States

165 U.S. 483, 17 S. Ct. 381, 41 L. Ed. 798, 1897 U.S. LEXIS 1989

CourtSupreme Court of the United States

DecidedFebruary 15, 1897

Docket602

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 165 U.S. 483 (Winona & St. Peter Railroad v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Winona & St. Peter Railroad v. United States, 165 U.S. 483, 17 S. Ct. 381, 41 L. Ed. 798, 1897 U.S. LEXIS 1989 (1897).

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Opinion

Mr. Justice Brewer,

after stating. the case, delivered the ■opinion of the court.

The differences between this case and that -referred to in the foregoing statement are these: Anterior to any claim of right by the railroad company, by virtue either of filing its map of definite location or of surveying and staking' upon the ground its line, a preemption filing was placed upon the land which was never cancelled. There remained, therefore, on the recoi’ds until after the certificatioh to the- State a, claim of a right to preempt.' The party making this claim continued in possession by himself or tenant until not only the construction of the railroad, but until after the conveyance by the railroad company to the land company, and so remained in possession until a suit of ejectment-was brought by- the land company, in 1877.

On the strength of these facts the Court of Appeals- was of opinion that the land company could not be considered one purchasing in good faith from the railroad companj^; that it took its conveyance with notice, from possession, of all the rights and claims of the- party so in possession, and therefore that it did, not bring itself within the protecting clauses of the act of March 3, 1887, c. 376, 24 Stat. 556, and there was nothing to stay the right of the government • to have-this certificatioh so.erroneously issued-cancelled. With that conclusion we coiicur. • That the land was erroneously certified is, under the .prior decisions of this coiirt,-not open ■to question; and the.acts of 1887 and 1896 have; as indicated in the opinion in the prior case,, the purpose of -protecting only that party whose purchase from the railroad'company must b.e. considered one in good faith. It is .essential to the ¿protection of these statutes that the party purchasing from *486 the railroad company has no notice by any fact subsequent, to and independent of the certification or patent of any defect in title. Such a purchaser cannot claim to be one in good faith if he has notice of facts outside the’ records of the land department disclosing a prior right. The protection goes only tó matters anterior to the certification and patent. The statute was not intended to cut off the rights of parties continuing after, the certification, and of which at the time of his purchase the purchaser had notice. Only the purely technical claims of the government were waived..

Here the claimant Marshall was in possession; had' been in possession for twenty years; .the land was not wild and vacant land. His- possession' was- under a recorded claim of title, and. under such a claim as forbade the issue- of a patent. In other words,, the.land was erroneously certified. There was, and continued'to be,' an individual claimant for the land. There was no cancellation, on the -records -of- the land départment of- his claim. He continued in possession,, and was in possession, not only when- the certification was made but when the land company purchased. Its purchase,. therefore, was not one made in good faith, and there is nothing disclosed to stay the mandate of the statute for the. adjustment, of the land grant, and. a suit to set aside th& certificate erroneously issued. The ' decree of the Court. of Appeals is - •

Affirmed*-

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Mr. Justice Brewer,

after stating. the case, delivered the ■opinion of the court.

The differences between this case and that -referred to in the foregoing statement are these: Anterior to any claim of right by the railroad company, by virtue either of filing its map of definite location or of surveying and staking' upon the ground its line, a preemption filing was placed upon the land which was never cancelled. There remained, therefore, on the recoi’ds until after the certificatioh to the- State a, claim of a right to preempt.' The party making this claim continued in possession by himself or tenant until not only the construction of the railroad, but until after the conveyance by the railroad company to the land company, and so remained in possession until a suit of ejectment-was brought by- the land company, in 1877.

On the strength of these facts the Court of Appeals- was of opinion that the land company could not be considered one purchasing in good faith from the railroad companj^; that it took its conveyance with notice, from possession, of all the rights and claims of the- party so in possession, and therefore that it did, not bring itself within the protecting clauses of the act of March 3, 1887, c. 376, 24 Stat. 556, and there was nothing to stay the right of the government • to have-this certificatioh so.erroneously issued-cancelled. With that conclusion we coiicur. • That the land was erroneously certified is, under the .prior decisions of this coiirt,-not open ■to question; and the.acts of 1887 and 1896 have; as indicated in the opinion in the prior case,, the purpose of -protecting only that party whose purchase from the railroad'company must b.e. considered one in good faith. It is .essential to the ¿protection of these statutes that the party purchasing from *486 the railroad company has no notice by any fact subsequent, to and independent of the certification or patent of any defect in title. Such a purchaser cannot claim to be one in good faith if he has notice of facts outside the’ records of the land department disclosing a prior right. The protection goes only tó matters anterior to the certification and patent. The statute was not intended to cut off the rights of parties continuing after, the certification, and of which at the time of his purchase the purchaser had notice. Only the purely technical claims of the government were waived..

Here the claimant Marshall was in possession; had' been in possession for twenty years; .the land was not wild and vacant land. His- possession' was- under a recorded claim of title, and. under such a claim as forbade the issue- of a patent. In other words,, the.land was erroneously certified. There was, and continued'to be,' an individual claimant for the land. There was no cancellation, on the -records -of- the land départment of- his claim. He continued in possession,, and was in possession, not only when- the certification was made but when the land company purchased. Its purchase,. therefore, was not one made in good faith, and there is nothing disclosed to stay the mandate of the statute for the. adjustment, of the land grant, and. a suit to set aside th& certificate erroneously issued. The ' decree of the Court. of Appeals is - •

Affirmed*-

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165 U.S. 483, 17 S. Ct. 381, 41 L. Ed. 798, 1897 U.S. LEXIS 1989, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/winona-st-peter-railroad-v-united-states-scotus-1897.

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