Winnett Knox v. Department of Justice

Merit Systems Protection Board·Decided April 22, 2026·No. DA-0752-22-0199-B-1·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

WINNETT KNOX, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DA-0752-22-0199-B-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DATE: April 22, 2026 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Winnett Knox , Baytown, Texas, pro se.

Patrick D Gregory Sr. , Oakdale, Louisiana, for the agency.

BEFORE

Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman James J. Woodruff II, Member

FINAL ORDER

Both parties have filed petitions for review of the initial decision, which reversed the appellant’s removal on due process grounds after the administrative judge found that the appellant established that she was an “employee” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(B) with Board appeal rights. In the appellant’s petition for review, she primarily discusses the merits of a February 17, 2022 notice of

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

termination. In the agency’s petition for review, it disagrees with the administrative judge’s finding, for purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(B), that the Legal Assistant (LA) position that the appellant had previously held is similar to the Legal Administrative Specialist (LAS) position from which she was separated. Generally, we grant petitions such as these only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that neither party has established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petitions for review. Therefore, we DENY the petitions for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

Regarding the agency’s petition for review, we acknowledge that the LA and LAS positions are graded differently and are in different classification series. Remand Petition for Review (RPFR), File, Tab 2 at 13, 16. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has stated that grade and classification similarities are not dispositive of the nature and character of the work performed in each position. See Jones v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 98 F.4th 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2024). We discern no error in the administrative judge’s finding that the evidence of record establishes that the positions share a similar fundamental character of providing legal support before, during, and after immigration proceedings, and that the duties are sufficiently closely related to make the positions similar for purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(B). Knox v.

Department of Justice, MSPB Docket No. DA-0752-22-0199-B-1, Remand File, Tab 38, Initial Decision at 14. Additionally, while the agency’s argument on review that the training necessary to perform satisfactorily in the LAS position is such that an incumbent could not be interchanged between the positions without undue disruption to the work is relevant to the question of whether the two positions are similar for purposes of section 7511(a)(1)(B), the agency’s support for this argument is confined to its pleading on review, which does not constitute evidence. See Hendricks v. Department of the Navy , 69 M.S.P.R. 163, 168 (1995) (stating that the statements of a party’s representative in a pleading do not constitute evidence). The agency’s petition for review does not provide a basis to disturb the initial decision.

Turning to the appellant’s petition for review, the majority of her arguments relate to the merits of her separation, including (1) that the administrative judge erred in not adjudicating the allegations contained in the February 17, 2022 termination notice; (2) that she was not permitted to engage in discovery on the merits; and (3) that agency officials engaged in prohibited personnel practices and/or violated the merit systems principles in relation to the allegations that formed the basis of the termination notice. RPFR File, Tab 1 at 6-10, 19-20. Because the removal action has been reversed on due proces s grounds, we are unable to examine the merits of that action in this appeal. 2

2 On review, the appellant submits three motions for leave to file an additional pleading. RPFR File, Tabs 5, 9, 13. The Board generally does not permit an additional pleading after the close of the record on review unless the party demonstrates a need for such a pleading, that the requested pleading is new and material, and that it was not readily available before the record closed. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a)(4). In the appellant’s May 31, 2024 motion, which was filed before the close of the record on review, she explains that she was trying to file a supplement to her petition for review. RPFR File, Tab 5. In her September 30, 2024 and January 8, 2025 motions for leave to file an additional pleading, both of which were filed after the close of the record on review, she reiterates that she wishes to file a supplement to her petition for review. RPFR File, Tabs 9, 13. In all of these pleadings, the appellant indicates that she wishes to supplement the list of agency officials whom she had not previously mentioned and who “played a role” in her removal. RPFR File, Tabs 5, 9, 13. Because we affirm the initial

Should the agency take a new constitutionally correct removal action, see Howard v. Department of the Air Force, 118 M.S.P.R. 106, ¶ 7 (2012), the appellant may file an appeal of that action consistent with law and the Board’s regulations.

The appellant’s remaining arguments on review are either outside the Board’s authority or beyond the scope of the instant appeal. For instance, the appellant requests that the Board impose disciplinary action against the relevant agency officials for their role in bringing the now-reversed action. RPFR File, Tab 1 at 9, 11, 13. The Board has no such authority in cases such as this. She also asserts that her Standard Form 50 reflecting the separation was coded incorrectly, which inhibited her ability to obtain Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits following her separation. Id. at 17, 22. While unfortunate, any remedy regarding this claim is outside of the scope of this appeal and beyond the Board’s authority. Finally, she states that, as a result of her separation, she did not receive her step increase or yearly cost-of-living increase, and that the agency did not restore her sick and annual leave. Id. at 10-11. These issues concern the agency’s return of the appellant to the status quo ante and are of the type properly addressed in compliance proceedings. Following this final decision, should the agency fail to comply with the Board’s order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement consistent with applicable law and regulation.

ORDER

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