Winn v. McGeehan
This text of 901 P.2d 926 (Winn v. McGeehan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Defendant tenants appeal from a judgment in a forcible entry and wrongful detainer (FED) action, ORS 105.105 et seq, awarding possession of the premises to plaintiff landlords and denying costs and attorney fees to either party. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
In April 1994, defendants rented a residence from plaintiffs for $800 per month. Seven months into the lease, defendants failed to make their rental payment. Consequently, on October 11/1994, plaintiffs served defendants with notice, pursuant to ORS 90.400(2), that if they did not pay the rent -within 72 hours, plaintiffs would terminate the lease. When defendants failed to pay the rent, plaintiffs filed this FED action. Defendants filed an answer and requested and obtained the court’s order directing payment of rent into the court registry. Thereafter, defendants paid both the October and November rent into the court’s registry.
In their answer, defendants asserted four counterclaims. They first sought injunctive relief and damages pursuant to ORS 90.360(2),1 including reduced rental value, for plaintiffs’ alleged failure to maintain the premises in a habitable condition in violation of ORS 90.320. In particular, defendants alleged that the habitability violations arose from defects in the plumbing, heating system, building and grounds, floors and walls, locks, and electrical wiring. In their second counterclaim, defendants asserted a right to redeem the premises under ORS 90.370(1).2 The third counterclaim [513]*513sought damages for plaintiffs’ alleged retaliatory filing of the FED action in violation of ORS 90.385.3 Finally, in their fourth counterclaim, defendants sought damages, pursuant to ORS 90.360(2), for plaintiffs’ alleged breach of the lease agreement by failing to reimburse defendants for making certain repairs.
After a bench trial, the court entered a judgment, which provided:
“1. Plaintiffs have established a prima facie case for eviction of defendants based on nonpayment of rent.
“2. The Court finds in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants on defendants’ counterclaims on habitability issues in regard to plumbing, heating, the grounds, paint, walls, the front door of the premises, and all other issues which were remedied prior to the rent being withheld in this case.
“3. As regards the defendants’ counterclaim for habitability issues in regard to electrical wiring, the Court finds no [514]*514evidence in the record to establish that the wiring in the residence did not conform to the law at the time it was installed. Further, there is no evidence that the system is not now in working order. Thus, the Court finds in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants on this issue.
“4. The Court finds against defendants and in favor of plaintiffs on the issue of retaliation. The Court finds from the evidence that until October 11, 1994, plaintiffs were willing to accept rent tendered by the defendants, and that the eviction action was not a retaliatory action on the part of plaintiffs.
“5. The Court finds in favor of the plaintiffs and against defendants and orders restitution of the premises for plaintiffs. * * *
“6. The Court finds that the defendants suffered a diminution of rental value in the amount of $800.00. Currently, there is $ 1,600 that was tendered by defendants to the Court. The Clerk of the Court shall release $800 to plaintiffs as and for October rent and the remaining $800 to defendants as and for diminution of rental value.”
The judgment further provided that neither party was entitled to costs or attorney fees under ORS 90.255.4
Defendants assert that the trial court erred in awarding possession of the premises to plaintiffs. Defendants also assert that, because they are entitled to a judgment awarding them possession of the premises, the trial court erred in failing to award them costs and attorney fees.
We do not reach the merits of defendants’ appeal because we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to do so.5 A party may appeal only from a judgment that adjudicates all claims as to all parties or that complies with the requirements of ORCP 67 B.6 Central Oregon Production Credit v. Butler, [515]*51582 Or App 203, 205, 728 P2d 53 (1986). Here, the trial court failed to dispose of defendants’ fourth, breach of rental agreement, counterclaim. Moreover, because the judgment does not contain an express determination that there is no just reason for delaying entry of judgment, it does not comply with the requirements of ORCP 67 B. Thus, the judgment is not appealable. Id.; Parsons v. Henry, 62 Or App 178, 179, 659 P2d 430 (1983).
Nonetheless, under ORS 19.033(4), we may give leave to the trial court to enter an appealable judgment if we determine that:
“(a) At the time of the filing of the notice of appeal the trial court intended to enter an appealable judgment; and
“(b) The judgment from which the appeal is taken is defective in form or was entered at a time when the trial court did not have jurisdiction of the cause * * * or the trial court had not yet entered an appealable judgment.”
From the record before us, we cannot determine whether the trial court intended to enter an appealable judgment notwithstanding the nonadjudication of defendants’ fourth counterclaim. Consequently, ORS 19.033(4) does not apply. Butler, 82 Or App at 205.
Appeal dismissed.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
901 P.2d 926, 136 Or. App. 510, 1995 Ore. App. LEXIS 1211, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/winn-v-mcgeehan-orctapp-1995.