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Electronically Filed Supreme Court SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX 13-JUN-2025 08:04 AM Dkt. 23 OP
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I
---o0o---
PETER J. WINN and WESTMINSTER REALTY, INC., Respondents/Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
WADE BRADY and KATHERINE T. BRADY, individually and as trustees of the WADE K. BRADY FAMILY TRUST; CONTEMPORARY KAMAʻAINA, LLC; WESTMINSTER REALTY, INC. as trustee of the 2806 KOLEPA PLACE TRUST DATED DECEMBER 14, 2010; ERIC L. KEILLOR; and ERIC S. HART, Respondents/Defendants-Appellees,
and
JAMES E. SPENCE and BEVERLY C. SPENCE, Petitioners/Intervenors-Appellees,
STEPHEN R. SPENCE and VALORIE A. SPENCE, Respondents/Intervenors-Appellees. ___________________________________________________________
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CASE NO. 2CC121000087)
JUNE 13, 2025
RECKTENWALD, C.J., McKENNA, EDDINS, AND DEVENS, JJ., AND CIRCUIT JUDGE KUBOTA IN PLACE OF GINOZA, J., RECUSED *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
OPINION OF THE COURT BY DEVENS, J.
This appeal raises the question of whether the holder of a
recorded judgment lien has a protected property interest
pursuant to Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (HRS) § 636-3 (2016). We
answer this question in the affirmative. We further address the
due process notice requirements owed to a junior judgment
lienholder prior to an execution sale. We hold that such a
lienholder is entitled to notice consistent with due process
pursuant to article I, section five of the Hawaiʻi Constitution.
However, due to the potential impact of our decision on prior
and pending execution sales, and considering the substantial
prejudice to the intervenors, this decision, requiring that
notice consistent with due process be provided to junior
judgment lienholders who recorded judgments pursuant to
HRS § 636-3, shall apply prospectively only.
I. BACKGROUND
This case concerns a property on Maui (Haleakalā Highway
Property or the Property) in which Wade Brady owned a 50%
interest. In 2010, Beverly and James Spence (the Spences)
obtained a default judgment against Wade Brady and his wife,
Katherine Brady, (the Bradys) in the amount of $152,350.62 in
the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit (circuit court). 1 On
1 The Honorable Joel E. August presided.
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March 9, 2011, the Spences recorded a judgment lien against Wade
Brady’s 50% interest in the Haleakalā Highway Property with the
Bureau of Conveyances (BOC).
After the Bradys failed to satisfy their debt, the Spences
obtained a writ of execution pursuant to HRS Chapter 651 on the
Haleakalā Highway Property which authorized the execution sale
of the Property to satisfy the Spences’ judgment. 2
Prior to the execution sale, the independent civil process
server in charge of the Haleakalā Highway Property’s public
auction advertised and posted the sale by publication pursuant
to and in compliance with HRS § 651-43 in four places: the
Haleakalā Highway Property, the Makawao Public Library, Hoapili
Hale (the location of the circuit court), and the Makawao Post
Office. HRS § 651-43 required the posting of written or printed
notice in three conspicuous places within the district where the
subject property was located, but did not require personal
notice to be served on any lienholders. HRS § 651-43 (2016).
Wade Brady’s 50% interest in the Haleakalā Highway Property
was sold to the Spences via Haleakalā Estate Properties, LLC for
$25,001.00 at a confirmation hearing held on April 30, 2015,
after the Property had sold at public auction on February 3,
2 The Honorable Rhonda I.L. Loo granted this motion and the subsequent order confirming the sale of the Property to the Spences via Haleakalā Estate Properties, LLC. 3 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
2015. At the time of the sale, there were multiple encumbrances
on the Property, which included two senior mortgages, the
Spences’ judgment lien, and a junior judgment lien recorded by
Peter J. Winn and Westminster Realty, Inc. (the Winn parties). 3
The Winn parties did not receive personal or actual notice of
the execution sale by public auction of the Haleakalā Highway
Property.
On June 3, 2015, the circuit court filed an order
confirming the sale and conveyance of Wade Brady’s 50% interest
in the Haleakalā Highway Property “free of all liens that are
subsequent and/or junior to the lien of the Final Judgment,
which is the judgment under which the Property has been sold in
this case.” The Spences and their relatives subsequently
acquired the other 50% interest in the Property, and, according
to the record, are the current titleholders of the entire
parcel.
On February 6, 2013, approximately two years after the
3 At the time of the execution sale, there were four liens encumbering the Property: a senior mortgage in the amount of $595,000.00 held by Finance Factors, Ltd.; a second senior mortgage in the amount of $592,000.00 held by Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), as a nominee for First Hawaiian Bank; the Spences’ judgment lien; the Winn parties’ judgment lien; and an additional, subsequent judgment lien held by the Spences. According to the title report filed by the Winn parties, the mortgage held by Finance Factors, Ltd. no longer encumbered the Property as of May 30, 2017. However, the $592,000.00 mortgage loan executed with MERS, as a nominee for First Hawaiian Bank, remained, and the Spences executed a subsequent mortgage loan on the Property in the amount of $623,500.00 with MERS, as a nominee for Mangum Mortgagem Inc., d.b.a. Pacific Home Loans. 4 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Spences recorded their judgment with the BOC and before the
execution sale of the Property, the Winn parties also recorded a
judgment lien against Wade Brady’s 50% interest in the Haleakalā
Highway Property after they obtained a default judgment against
the Bradys for $951,591.51, plus attorney fees and costs
totaling $4,091.90.
The Bradys failed to satisfy their debt with the Winn
parties, and on May 23, 2017, two years after Wade Brady’s 50%
interest in the Haleakalā Highway Property was sold at auction
to the Spences, the Winn parties filed a motion requesting that
a writ of execution be levied on the Haleakalā Highway Property.
The circuit court initially granted the Winn parties’
motion. 4 However, the Spences intervened and filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order granting the Winn parties’ writ of
execution on the Property. Subsequently, the Winn parties filed
a motion to amend the first writ of execution on the Property.
At the hearing on the Winn parties’ motion, the circuit
court concluded that the Winn parties were not entitled to
actual notice of the Haleakalā Highway Property’s execution
sale, the Winn parties’ judgment lien on the Property
extinguished in 2015, and the Winn parties had “sat on [their]
rights for many years.” Accordingly, the circuit court granted
4 The Honorable Rhonda I.L. Loo presided.
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the Spences’ motion for reconsideration of the Winn parties’
writ on the Property, and denied the Winn parties’ motion to
amend their writ of execution on the Property.
The Winn parties appealed the circuit court’s order to the
Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA). The Winn parties argued
that as junior judgment lienholders, they held a
constitutionally protected property interest in the Haleakalā
Highway Property pursuant to HRS § 636-3, and that the execution
sale deprived the Winn parties of their due process when it
extinguished their lien without being afforded personal or
actual notice of the public auction. The Winn parties argued
that the statutory requirement of notice by publication was
insufficient and that due process required “personal notice” of
the Haleakalā Highway Property’s sale.
The ICA vacated the circuit court’s order and held that the
Winn parties’ recorded judgment lien against Wade Brady’s 50%
interest in the Property, pursuant to HRS § 636-3, “created a
property interest in the Haleakalā Highway Property.” Winn v.
Brady, 153 Hawaiʻi 433, 436, 541 P.3d 653, 656 (App. 2023).
Thus, the Winn parties were “entitled to notice consistent with
due process when the Spences conducted the execution sale of the
Haleakalā Highway Property under HRS Chapter 651.” Id. The ICA
concluded that the notice by publication of the execution sale
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pursuant to HRS § 651-43 was insufficient to satisfy due
process, and under these circumstances, the Winn parties were
entitled to personal notice of the sale. Id. at 441, 541 P.3d
at 661.
The Spences filed an application for writ of certiorari,
which this court accepted.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Constitutional Questions
Questions of constitutional law are reviewed “de novo,
under the right/wrong standard.” In re Hawaiʻi Elec. Light Co.,
145 Hawaiʻi 1, 11, 445 P.3d 673, 683 (2019) (citation omitted).
“This court reviews questions of constitutional law by
exercising our own independent constitutional judgment based on
the facts of the case.” Protect and Pres. Kahoma Ahupuaʻa Ass’n
v. Maui Plan. Comm’n, 149 Hawaiʻi 304, 311, 489 P.3d 408, 415
(2021) (citation omitted).
B. Interpretation of a Statute
“Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law
to be reviewed de novo under the right/wrong standard.” Acad.
Lab. United v. Bd. of Regents Univ. of Hawaiʻi, 153 Hawaiʻi 202,
207, 529 P.3d 680, 685 (2023) (citation omitted).
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III. DISCUSSION
A. Junior Lienholders are Entitled to Notice Consistent with Due Process in Execution Sales
1. A Writ of Execution is a State Action
The Spences argue that the execution sale of the Haleakalā
Highway Property did not constitute a state action, and
therefore, the sale did not implicate the Winn parties’ due
process rights. We disagree with the Spences’ contention and
hold that an execution sale of a debtor’s property is a state
action subject to procedural due process protections.
In Hawaiʻi, the threshold question “[i]n evaluating the need
for procedural due process guarantees” is whether “essentially
governmental functions are involved in substance[.]” Kekoa v.
Sup. Ct. of Hawaiʻi, 55 Haw. 104, 107, 516 P.2d 1239, 1242
(1973). Here, the circuit court authorized the sale to satisfy
the Spences’ judgment, and, while the auction was advertised and
held by an independent civil process server, a judicial order
authorized and confirmed the sale of Wade Brady’s interest in
the Property. As the execution sale was judicially authorized,
the sale of the Property was clearly a state action subject to
the due process clause.
The Spences also argue that based on the language of
HRS § 651-1(c), which provides that “[n]othing in this chapter
shall be construed to make an independent civil process server a
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law enforcement officer, sheriff, or deputy sheriff, or an
employee or agent of the department of law enforcement or the
State,” the sale was not a state action. HRS § 651-1(c) (2016).
However, HRS § 651-1(c) does not preclude or limit the
judiciary’s role in execution sales. To the contrary, in
obtaining a writ of execution on the Haleakalā Highway Property,
the Spences sought and obtained the circuit court’s approval to
execute on their judgment lien and to force the sale of the
Property. Thus, the writ of execution levied by the Spences was
a state action, and the creditors with interests secured by the
Property were entitled to notice consistent with due process.
2. A Judgment Lien Pursuant to HRS § 636-3 is a Constitutionally Protected Property Interest
We agree with the ICA’s determination that the Winn
parties’ recorded judgment lien pursuant to HRS § 636-3 created
a constitutionally protected property interest in the Haleakalā
Highway Property “within the meaning of the due process clauses
of the federal and state constitutions[.]” 5 Protect and Pres.
Kahoma Ahupuaʻa Ass’n, 149 Hawaiʻi at 312, 489 P.3d at 416
(quoting Sandy Beach Def. Fund v. City Council of City & Cnty.
5 This court has adopted the “state-constitution first approach” to constitutional interpretation. State v. Wilson, 154 Hawaiʻi 8, 14, 543 P.3d 440, 446 (2024). We accordingly “interpret the Hawaiʻi Constitution before its federal counterpart.” Id. at 13, 543 P.3d at 445. “Only if the Hawaiʻi Constitution does not reach the minimum protection provided by a parallel federal constitutional right should this court construe the federal analogue.” Id. 9 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
of Honolulu, 70 Haw. 361, 376, 773 P.2d 250, 260 (1989)).
Whether a judgment lien pursuant to HRS § 636-3 creates a
property interest is a question of first impression for this
court. In Bank of Hawaii v. Shinn, this court noted that
“HRS § 636-3 grants a judgment creditor an automatic lien on any
real property of the judgment debtor.” 120 Hawaiʻi 1, 4 n.8, 200
P.3d 370, 373 n.8 (2008) (emphasis added). However, this court
did not address whether HRS § 636-3 created a property interest
“within the meaning of the due process claus[e].” See Protect
and Pres. Kahoma Ahupuaʻa Ass’n, 149 Hawaiʻi at 312, 489 P.3d at
416 (citation omitted).
HRS § 636-3 provides, in relevant part, that,
[a]ny money judgment, order, or decree of a state court or the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii shall be a lien upon real property when a copy thereof, certified as correct by a clerk of the court where it is entered, is recorded in the bureau of conveyances.
HRS § 636-3 (emphasis added).
In their briefing to the ICA, the Spences cited to Lindsey
v. Kainana and In re Estate of Lopez, two cases that stand for
the proposition that a judgment does not create a lien on a
debtor’s property. Lindsey v. Kainana, 4 Haw. 165, 168-69 (Haw.
Kingdom 1879); In re Estate of Lopez, 19 Haw. 620, 623 (Haw.
Terr. 1909). However, as the ICA correctly noted, the precursor
to HRS § 636-3 was adopted after our decisions in Kainana and
Estate of Lopez, and therefore those decisions are inapposite.
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1913 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 32, § 1 at 36.
The “fundamental starting point for statutory-
interpretation is the language of the statute itself.” Panado
v. Bd. of Trs., Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 134 Hawaiʻi 1, 11, 332 P.3d
144, 154 (2014) (quoting First Ins. Co. of Hawaii v. A&B Props.,
126 Hawaiʻi 406, 414, 271 P.3d 1165, 1173 (2012) (citations
omitted)). “[W]here the statutory language is plain and
unambiguous, our sole duty is to give effect to its plain and
obvious meaning.” Id. “[I]mplicit in the task of statutory
construction is our foremost obligation to ascertain and give
effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be
obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute
itself.” Id. “Only when there is an ambiguity in a statute are
we to resort to other methods of statutory interpretation.”
Barker v. Young, 153 Hawaiʻi 144, 149, 528 P.3d 217, 222 (2023).
The plain language of HRS § 636-3, which states that a
recorded judgment “shall be a lien upon real property,” clearly
intends for a recorded judgment to be an “automatic” lien on
real property. HRS § 636-3; see Shinn, 120 Hawaiʻi at 4 n.8, 200
P.3d at 373 n.8. The legislative history of HRS § 636-3 further
supports this reading. The Senate Standing Committee report for
the precursor to HRS § 636-3 specifically noted that the purpose
of the bill was to “protect the judgment creditor from a quick
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sale by his debtor.” S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 113, in 1913
Senate Journal at 630-31. Thus, both the language and purpose
of HRS § 636-3 clearly demonstrate that the legislature intended
for judgment holders to be entitled to protections of their
interest in a debtor’s property after properly recording a
judgment.
This decision is consistent with other jurisdictions with
similar statutes that have likewise held that a judgment lien
constitutes a protected property interest. See New Brunswick
Sav. Bank v. Markouski, 587 A.2d 1265, 1275-77 (N.J. 1991); In
re Upset Sale, Tax Claim Bureau of Berks Cnty., 479 A.2d 940,
944 (Pa. 1984); Cent. Tr. Co. v. Spencer, 535 N.E.2d 347, 349
(Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
For these reasons, we agree with the ICA and affirm that
HRS § 636-3 creates a property interest for judgment creditors
who have recorded said judgments with the BOC, and this property
interest is constitutionally protected under the Hawaiʻi
Constitution.
B. The Spences’ Compliance with HRS § 651-43 Did Not Satisfy Due Process
If there is a property interest, this court must address
“what specific procedures are required to protect it.” Protect
and Pres. Kahoma Ahupuaʻa Ass’n, 149 Hawaiʻi at 312, 489 P.3d at
416 (quoting Sandy Beach, 70 Haw. at 376, 773 P.2d at 260).
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“The basic elements of procedural due process of law require
notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner before governmental deprivation of a
significant property interest.” Sandy Beach, 70 Haw. at 378,
773 P.2d at 261.
It is undisputed that the Spences complied with the
statutory notice requirements under HRS § 651-43. The civil
process server published notice of the public auction of the
Haleakalā Highway Property in four places: (1) the Makawao
Public Library; (2) Hoapili Hale; (3) the Makawao Post Office;
and (4) the Haleakalā Highway Property.
HRS § 651-43 provides,
Advertisement for sale. The officer shall, after levy, advertise for sale the property levied upon, whether real or personal, for thirty days, or for such time as the court shall order, by posting a written or printed notice in three conspicuous places within the district where the property is situated, and if on the island of Oahu, by advertisement thereof at least three times in one or more newspapers published in Honolulu.
We agree with the ICA that in the instant case, with our
recognition that HRS § 636-3 provides a constitutionally
protected property interest, the Spences’ compliance with
HRS § 651-43 alone was not sufficient to satisfy due process
principles under the specific facts and circumstances of this
case.
As established by this court in Klinger v. Kepano, “[a]n
elementary and fundamental requirement of due process . . . is 13 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections[.]” 64
Haw. 4, 10, 635 P.2d 938, 942 (1981) (quoting Mullane v. Cent.
Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).
The ICA correctly held that notice by publication pursuant
to HRS § 651-43 was insufficient to satisfy the Winn parties’
due process rights as the Spences knew, or reasonably should
have known, that the Winn parties held a recorded junior
judgment lien against the Haleakalā Highway Property as of 2013,
two years prior to the 2015 execution sale. Further, the status
report listing the encumbrances on the Property included a
notice of the Winn parties’ recorded judgment lien.
The Spences did not make a showing that it was either
impractical or impossible to provide notice beyond publication.
To the contrary, Peter Winn’s declaration asserts that he
received phone calls from Beverly Spence prior to the execution
sale of the Haleakalā Highway Property expressing the Spences’
desire to obtain Wade Brady’s interest in the Property and their
knowledge of the Winn parties’ judgment. Beverly Spence does
not contest Peter Winn’s assertions that she had Peter Winn’s
contact information and that she telephoned him prior to the
execution sale but did not inform him that the sale was taking
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place.
Under these circumstances, and applying the standard
articulated by this court in Kepano, we agree with the ICA that
personal notice to the Winn parties was required as the Spences
knew, or reasonably should have known, of the Winn parties’
judgment lien, and further, based on the record, it is
undisputed that the Spences had Peter Winn’s contact information
prior to the execution sale. 6
C. This Ruling Shall Apply Prospectively Only
For the first time, this court construes and recognizes
HRS § 636-3 as creating a property interest subject to
constitutional protections pursuant to the due process clause.
Because our recognition that HRS § 636-3 provides a
constitutionally protected property interest constitutes a new
rule, we exercise our discretion and hold that the application
of our ruling today shall apply prospectively only. See League
of Women Voters of Honolulu & Common Cause v. State, 150 Hawaiʻi
182, 207, 499 P.3d 382, 407 (2021). We diverge here from the
ICA’s decision and reverse the ICA’s reinstatement of the Winn
6 In certain cases, notice by publication may be sufficient for due process, but in general, notice by publication has been found sufficient only when other forms of notice are not practicable or possible. Eto v. Muranaka, 99 Hawaiʻi 488, 498, 57 P.3d 413, 423 (2002) (“Under Hawaiʻi law, while ‘such notice is disfavored[,]’ due process is not violated when notice is made by publication, when, ‘in appropriate circumstances, notice by publication alone might be the only reasonable possible or practicable warning.’”) (quoting Kepano, 64 Haw. at 10, 635 P.2d at 942). 15 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
parties’ lien on the Haleakalā Highway Property.
Although “judicial decisions are assumed to apply
retroactively,” “[w]hen a judicial decision announces a new
rule, this court may, in the exercise of its discretion,
determine that the interests of fairness preclude retroactive
application.” Id. (citations omitted). We are mindful of the
impact this ruling may have on land titles acquired via an
execution sale in which notice was not provided to junior
judgment lienholders. Therefore, in order to “mitigate such
impact,” and in consideration of the Spences’ reliance on
HRS § 651-43 that only required notice and advertisement of the
sale by publication with which the Spences complied, we hold
that the applicability of our ruling today shall be restricted
to cases where the writ of execution has been filed after the
date of this decision. See Kepano, 64 Haw. at 15, 635 P.2d at
946.
In deciding whether this court should exercise its
discretion and apply a new rule prospectively, this court
considers “(a) the purpose of the newly announced rule, (b) the
extent of reliance . . . on the old standards, and (c) the
effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive
application of the new standards.” League of Women Voters of
Honolulu, 150 Hawaiʻi at 207, 499 P.3d at 407 (quoting State v.
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Jess, 117 Hawaiʻi 381, 401-02, 184 P.3d 133, 153-54 (2008)).
“The purpose of weighing these factors is to evaluate whether
according retrospective application to a new rule would result
in substantial prejudice.” Id. If application of the new rule
will result in substantial prejudice, “the inequity may be
avoided by giving the guiding principles prospective application
only.” Id. (quoting Catron v. Tokio Marine Mgmt., Inc., 90
Hawaiʻi 407, 411, 978 P.2d 845, 849 (1999) (citation omitted)).
Applying this framework to the present case, the Spences
reasonably relied on the requirements provided in HRS Chapter
651, specifically HRS § 651-43, which does not specify that
junior judgment lienholders are entitled to special statutory
notice. HRS § 651-43 was enacted in 1859 and has not been
amended since 1886. CC 1859 § 1023. While the Spences either
knew or should have known of the Winn parties’ junior judgment
lien, the execution sale of the Haleakalā Highway Property took
place ten years ago, and the Spences reasonably relied on the
express statutory language and publication notice requirements
that existed at the time of the sale.
We also weigh the extent of any prejudice to the parties if
our holding were applied to the instant case. Based on Peter
Winn’s declaration, it is evident from the record that the Winn
parties knew, or reasonably should have known, of the Spences’
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judgment against the Bradys, of Wade Brady’s 50% interest in the
Haleakalā Highway Property, and of the Spences’ intention to
obtain Wade Brady’s interest in the Property. Yet the Winn
parties did not move to execute on the Property until 2017—
despite the Winn parties obtaining a writ of execution on a
different Maui property jointly owned by Peter Winn and the
Bradys (the Kolepa Property) in an effort to satisfy the Winn
parties’ judgment. It was only after the Spences executed on
the Haleakalā Highway Property, and the Spences and their
relatives had acquired full title to the Property, that the Winn
parties took action and motioned for a writ of execution on the
The Winn parties asserted that Katherine Brady’s bankruptcy
proceeding contributed to the delay in seeking an execution sale
of the Property. However, the record shows that the bankruptcy
proceeding created minimal delay. For example, in June 2013,
approximately two months after Katherine Brady filed her notice
of bankruptcy in the circuit court, the bankruptcy court lifted
the stay on the aforementioned Kolepa Property, and the Winn
parties filed a motion for a writ of execution to be levied upon
the Kolepa Property.
Furthermore, the Spences filed their writ of execution on
the Haleakalā Highway Property in December 2014, more than two
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years before the Winn parties sought a writ of execution on the
same property.
Since the execution sale, the Spences (along with their
relatives Stephen and Valorie Spence) have engaged in additional
transactions to obtain sole control and ownership over the
Property. Reinstating the Winn parties’ lien on the Property
would greatly prejudice the Spences, considering their reliance
on the finality of the circuit court’s prior order, which
confirmed the sale “free” of subsequent or junior liens, and
their efforts after the execution sale to obtain joint title to
the entire property with Stephen and Valorie Spence.
Based on the equities and the Spences’ reliance on
HRS § 651-43, we exercise our discretion in deciding the effect
of holding for the first time that, pursuant to HRS § 636-3, a
recorded judgment constitutes a property interest subject to due
process protections. Aware of the impact of today’s decision on
past public auctions pursuant to writs of execution, this
decision shall apply prospectively only.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the ICA correctly held that a junior
judgment lienholder with a recorded judgment pursuant to
HRS § 636-3 is entitled to notice subject to constitutional due
process protections, and under the circumstances of this case,
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the Winn parties were entitled to personal notice of the
execution sale. However, the ICA erred in applying this rule to
the instant case. Based on the Spences’ reliance and the
substantial prejudice reinstating the Winn parties’ lien on the
Property would pose to the intervenors, we hold that this
decision shall apply prospectively to writs of execution filed
after the date of this opinion.
Therefore, we reverse the ICA’s January 18, 2024 Judgment
on Appeal vacating the circuit court’s October 11, 2017 Order
Granting Intervenors James E. Spence, Beverly C. Spence,
Stephen R. Spence, and Valorie A. Spence’s Motion for
Reconsideration of Order Granting Judgment Creditors Peter J.
Winn and Westminster Realty, Inc.’s Ex Parte Motion for First
Alias Writ of Execution.
Aaron R. Mun /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald (Joseph A. Stewart and Reece Y. Tanaka also /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna on the briefs) for petitioners James E. Spence /s/ Todd W. Eddins and Beverly C. Spence /s/ Vladimir P. Devens Lance Collins for respondent Peter J. Winn /s/ Peter K. Kubota and Westminster Realty Inc.