Winkler v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: January 27, 2025
• Docket: 2:23-cv-00703
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6

7 GEOFF WINKLER, Case No. 2:23-cv-00703-GMN-NJK 8 Plaintiff(s), Order 9 v. [Docket No. 94] 10 WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., 11 Defendant(s). 12 Pending before the Court is nonparty Matthew Beasley’s motion to quash or limit a 13 deposition subpoena. Docket No. 94. Defendant Wells Fargo filed a response in opposition. 14 Docket Nos. 98, 100. No reply was filed. The motion is properly resolved without a hearing. See 15 Local Rule 78-1. For the reasons discussed below, the motion is DENIED. 16 I. BACKGROUND 17 This case arises out of an alleged Ponzi scheme run by Matthew Beasley and Jeffrey Judd. 18 Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 1, 27. Beasley is a lawyer, see id. at ¶ 1, and is currently on pretrial detention 19 in a related criminal case, see United States v. Beasley, No. 2:23-cr-00066-JAD-DJA (D. Nev.). 20 Plaintiff brings various state law claims against Defendant Wells Fargo related to its handling of 21 Beasley’s IOLTA account. See, e.g., Docket No. 1 at ¶¶ 179-225. 22 On July 9, 2024, the Court granted Wells Fargo’s unopposed motion to depose Beasley 23 while in custody. Docket No. 61. Wells Fargo initially sought to conduct that deposition on 24 September 12, 2024, see Docket No. 98-1 at ¶ 2, but it was rescheduled for October 22, 2024, see 25 id. On October 7, 2024, Beasley filed the instant motion to quash. Docket No. 94. 26 II. SEALED MATERIAL 27 Wells Fargo filed a redacted brief on the public docket, Docket No. 98, along with an 28 unredacted version under seal, Docket No. 100. Wells Fargo also filed an exhibit under seal. See 1 Docket No. 98-1 at 30 (placeholder for Exhibit D); see also Docket No. 100-1. The parties now 2 stipulate that secrecy is not warranted for this information. See Docket No. 127 at 17. 3 Accordingly, the unredacted versions will be unsealed. 4 III. STANDARDS 5 “[B]road discretion is vested in the trial court to permit or deny discovery.” Hallett v. 6 Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 7 (1998). Discovery is limited to any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or 8 defense and is proportional to the needs of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also ATS Prods., 9 Inc. v. Champion Fiberglass, Inc., 309 F.R.D. 527, 530 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (the scope of third-party 10 discovery is subject to the same limitations). 11 “The discovery process in theory should be cooperative and largely unsupervised by the 12 district court.” Sali v. Corona Reg. Med. Ctr., 884 F.3d 1218, 1219 (9th Cir. 2018). Nonetheless, 13 a non-party subject to a discovery subpoena may move the court in the place where compliance is 14 required for an order quashing or modifying that subpoena. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3). The movant 15 seeking to quash the subpoena bears the burden of showing why that discovery should not be 16 permitted. Goodman v. United States, 369 F.2d 166, 169 (9th Cir. 1966). “Even in the context of 17 a nonparty deposition, a ‘strong showing’ is required before a party will be denied entirely the 18 right to take that deposition.” V5 Techs. v. Switch, Ltd., 2019 WL 7489860, at *1 (D. Nev. Dec. 19 20, 2019). 20 IV. ANALYSIS 21 In this case, Beasley raises a host of arguments and none of them is persuasive for the 22 reasons articulated by Wells Fargo in response. 23 First, Beasley argues that service of the subpoena was ineffective because an attendance 24 fee was not tendered. Docket No. 94 at 4. As noted by Wells Fargo, however, the fee need not be 25 26 27 28 1 tendered for persons who are incarcerated at the time they provide testimony. 28 U.S.C. § 1821(f).1 2 Accordingly, the Court is not persuaded that a fee must be tendered for Beasley’s deposition. 3 Second, Beasley argues that the subpoena should be quashed or limited because the 4 questioning may veer into attorney-client privileged subjects. Docket No. 94 at 4-5; see also id. 5 at 6 (arguing the deposition should be limited to questions about Beasley’s declaration). As 6 explained by Wells Fargo, however, the Receiver has largely waived any privilege held by the 7 subject entities. See, e.g., Docket No. 100-1 at 6. Moreover and significantly, disallowing a 8 deposition is generally not warranted on this ground because privilege issues may be addressed on 9 a question-by-question basis during the deposition. See, e.g., Cardinali v. PlusFour, Inc., 2018 10 WL 7502644, at *4 (D. Nev. Oct. 9, 2018). 11 Third, Beasley argues that the subpoena imposes an undue burden because he is involved 12 with other lawsuits. Docket No. 94 at 5-6. As noted by Wells Fargo, however, conclusory 13 assertions of burden do not suffice. See, e.g., Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Flamingo Trails No. 7 14 Landscape Maint. Ass’n, 316 F.R.D. 327, 334 (D. Nev. 2016). 15 Fourth, Beasley argues that the subpoena raises confidentiality concerns. See Docket No. 16 94 at 6-7. As argued by Wells Fargo, however, such concerns are appropriately addressed vis-a- 17 vis the existing stipulated protective order in this case. See, e.g., Bartech Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Mobile 18 Simple Sols, Inc., 2018 WL 834589, at *2 n.2 (D. Nev. Feb. 12, 2018) (collecting cases).2 19 Fifth, Beasley argues that his deposition must take place in person. Docket No. 94 at 7-8. 20 Particularly after the COVID-19 pandemic, remote depositions have become commonplace and 21 1 The Court has been provided no argument as to whether a pretrial detainee is considered 22 “incarcerated” for purposes of this statutory provision. Depending on the context, the term “incarceration” may encompass not only imprisonment following conviction, but also pretrial 23 detention. See United States v. Lillard, 935 F.3d 827, 834 (9th Cir. 2019). To determine whether pretrial detention is within the scope of “incarceration” for a particular statute, the Court is required 24 to look to the statute as a whole and address the purpose of the provision. See id. The purpose behind Section 1821(f) is that witness fees should not be paid to those persons who, by virtue of 25 their incarceration, already have their expenses paid by the taxpayer. Sublett v. Sheets, 2017 WL 5492516, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 15, 2017). That rationale applies to pretrial detainees the same as 26 it applies to persons imprisoned following conviction. 27 2 Beasley asks that only parties and/or attorneys involved in these matters be permitted to attend the deposition. Docket No. 94 at 7. Wells Fargo responds that it is agreeable to that 28 limitation, Docket No. 100 at 12, so the Court need not opine on that issue, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 29. 1} leave to take remote depositions is granted liberally. See Swenson v. GEICO Cas. Co., 336 F.R.D. 2) 206, 209-10 (D. Nev. 2020). The Court agrees with Wells Fargo that a remote deposition is 3], warranted here. V. CONCLUSION 5 For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Beasley’s motion to quash or limit a 6|| deposition subpoena. Beasley’s deposition must take place no later than February 21, 2025. The 7|| parties must confer with the federal detention officials regarding the procedures for the deposition. 8|| Counsel for Wells Fargo must promptly serve a copy of this order on both Beasley and his criminal 9|| attorneys. 10 Lastly, the Court INSTRUCTS the Clerk’s Office to unseal Docket No. 100 and Docket 11] No. 100-1. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 Dated: January 27, 2025 14 fo A 3 — ~~, Nancy J> e 15 United States Magistrate Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28