Wiley, J.
This matter is before the court on an appeal from summary judgment of the Huron County Common Pleas Court, Probate Division. The factual issues are not in dispute.
Ralph V. Mann, the decedent herein, died testate on February 19, 1981. His will provided,
inter alia,
that his surviving spouse, Florence R. Mann, appellee herein, would receive twenty-five percent (a one-fourth share) of his residuary estate. Surviving the testator, other than his spouse, are these three emancipated children. Each of the children is the natural child of both the testator and his surviving spouse.
Appellee-spouse, pursuant to R.C. 2107.39, elected to take against her late husband’s will. On September 23, 1983, the co-executors of testator’s will, Charles J. Mann and Carol A. Wink-elfoos, filed a declaratory judgment action in the probate court, asking that court to determine appellee-surviving spouse’s rights under R.C. 2107.39 and 2105.06. Named as defendants in this declaratory judgment action were testator’s surviving spouse, Florence R. Mann, and testator’s surviving children, Lucille M. Jones, Carol A. Winkelfoos, and Charles J. Mann.
The probate court entered judgment on October 25, 1983, which judgment relevantly states:
“The question raised by this complaint for declaratory judgment is what deductions should be made from the gross estate of the decedent in determining the net estate from which a surviving spouse may elect to take a fractional share where the surviving spouse elects to take against the will of the decedent. In particular, this case questions whether the $30,000.00 provided for the surviving spouse by O.R.C. 2105.06(B) [sic] is a deduction from the gross estate for this purpose.
“This Court agrees with and adopts and extends the rationale of
In re Green,
63 O[.]Misc[.] 44 [sic] [17 O.O.3d 388], and finds that the automobile provided under O.R.C. 2113.532, and the $5,000.00 statutory allowance provided under O.R.C. 2117.20, unless barred by the will, should be deducted from the gross estate in computing a surviving spouse’s interest under 2105.06. Further this Court finds that if the surviving spouse did not receive the $30,000.00 provided to her by O.R.C. 2105.06(B)
[sic] as a deduction from the gross estate, the surviving spouse would be in a lesser position than if the decedent had died intestate, and that the effect would constitute a partial disinheritance of a surviving spouse. This Court finds that the legislative intent of O.R.C. 2107.39 is that this statute be liberally construed against allowing the writing of a will to fully or partially disinherit a surviving spouse. It is therefore found that the $30,000.00 provided to the surviving spouse by O.R.C. 2106.06(B) [sic] be deducted from the gross estate before determining the net estate, and the surviving spouse’s fractional share thereof, under the provision[s] of O.R.C. 2105.06 and 2107.39.
“Therefore this Court hereby enters a declaratory judgment that the surviving spouse in this case is entitled pursuant to O.R.C. 2105.06 and 2107.39, to distribution of $30,000.00 and a one-third (Vs) fractional share of the estate remaining thereafter.”
It is this judgment from which appellants-co-executors now appeal, presenting as their sole assignment of error:
“The Court erred in adjudging that a surviving spouse, pursuant to an election to take against the will of the deceased spouse, is entitled to $30,000.00 and one-third of the net estate.”
This assignment of error raises two questions regarding the probate court’s judgment which our research indicates have not yet been definitively answered: first, when a surviving spouse elects to take against the deceased spouse’s will, does the electing spouse receive the share of the deceased spouse’s estate which said surviving spouse would have otherwise received if the decedent had died intestate; and second, is the first $30,000, which a surviving spouse receives pursuant to the statute of descent and distribution, R.C. 2105.06, a charge against and deduction from the gross estate similar to a surviving spouse’s statutory allowance pursuant to R.C. 2117.20?
Prior to 1976, the statute of descent and distribution, R.C. 2105.06, relevantly provided that when a person died intestate having title to any personal or real property, and was survived by a spouse and more than one child or their lineal descendants, said property was to descend as follows:
“(C) If there is a spouse and more than one child or their lineal descendants surviving,
one third to the spouse
and the remainder to the children equally, or to the lineal descendants of any deceased child, per stirpes.”
(Emphasis added.)
Similarly, R.C. 2107.39, which is the statute concerning the right of a spouse
to elect to 'take against the deceased spouse’s will, materially stated that the probate court was to issue a citation to the surviving spouse whereby the surviving spouse was “* * * to elect whether to take under the will or under section 2105.06 of the Revised Code.
If such spouse elects to take under such section, such spouse shall take not to exceed one half of the net estate
* * *.”
(Emphasis added.)
Effective January 1,1976, however, both R.C. 2105.06 and 2107.39 underwent significant substantive changes. Under the amended R.C. 2105.06, where there exists a surviving spouse and more than one child or their lineal descendants of an intestate decedent, and where the surviving spouse is the natural or adoptive parent of one or more of the decedent’s children, the surviving spouse is to receive
“thefirst thirty thousand dollars
* * *
plus one-third of the balance of the intestate estate. * *
(Emphasis added.) The remainder of the decedent’s intestate estate is to be shared equally among decedent’s children or amongst their
lineal descendants or among the lineal descendants of any deceased child, per stirpes. R.C. 2105.06(C).
R.C. 2107.39 also has undergone a significant substantive change as of January 1, 1976.
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Wiley, J.
This matter is before the court on an appeal from summary judgment of the Huron County Common Pleas Court, Probate Division. The factual issues are not in dispute.
Ralph V. Mann, the decedent herein, died testate on February 19, 1981. His will provided,
inter alia,
that his surviving spouse, Florence R. Mann, appellee herein, would receive twenty-five percent (a one-fourth share) of his residuary estate. Surviving the testator, other than his spouse, are these three emancipated children. Each of the children is the natural child of both the testator and his surviving spouse.
Appellee-spouse, pursuant to R.C. 2107.39, elected to take against her late husband’s will. On September 23, 1983, the co-executors of testator’s will, Charles J. Mann and Carol A. Wink-elfoos, filed a declaratory judgment action in the probate court, asking that court to determine appellee-surviving spouse’s rights under R.C. 2107.39 and 2105.06. Named as defendants in this declaratory judgment action were testator’s surviving spouse, Florence R. Mann, and testator’s surviving children, Lucille M. Jones, Carol A. Winkelfoos, and Charles J. Mann.
The probate court entered judgment on October 25, 1983, which judgment relevantly states:
“The question raised by this complaint for declaratory judgment is what deductions should be made from the gross estate of the decedent in determining the net estate from which a surviving spouse may elect to take a fractional share where the surviving spouse elects to take against the will of the decedent. In particular, this case questions whether the $30,000.00 provided for the surviving spouse by O.R.C. 2105.06(B) [sic] is a deduction from the gross estate for this purpose.
“This Court agrees with and adopts and extends the rationale of
In re Green,
63 O[.]Misc[.] 44 [sic] [17 O.O.3d 388], and finds that the automobile provided under O.R.C. 2113.532, and the $5,000.00 statutory allowance provided under O.R.C. 2117.20, unless barred by the will, should be deducted from the gross estate in computing a surviving spouse’s interest under 2105.06. Further this Court finds that if the surviving spouse did not receive the $30,000.00 provided to her by O.R.C. 2105.06(B)
[sic] as a deduction from the gross estate, the surviving spouse would be in a lesser position than if the decedent had died intestate, and that the effect would constitute a partial disinheritance of a surviving spouse. This Court finds that the legislative intent of O.R.C. 2107.39 is that this statute be liberally construed against allowing the writing of a will to fully or partially disinherit a surviving spouse. It is therefore found that the $30,000.00 provided to the surviving spouse by O.R.C. 2106.06(B) [sic] be deducted from the gross estate before determining the net estate, and the surviving spouse’s fractional share thereof, under the provision[s] of O.R.C. 2105.06 and 2107.39.
“Therefore this Court hereby enters a declaratory judgment that the surviving spouse in this case is entitled pursuant to O.R.C. 2105.06 and 2107.39, to distribution of $30,000.00 and a one-third (Vs) fractional share of the estate remaining thereafter.”
It is this judgment from which appellants-co-executors now appeal, presenting as their sole assignment of error:
“The Court erred in adjudging that a surviving spouse, pursuant to an election to take against the will of the deceased spouse, is entitled to $30,000.00 and one-third of the net estate.”
This assignment of error raises two questions regarding the probate court’s judgment which our research indicates have not yet been definitively answered: first, when a surviving spouse elects to take against the deceased spouse’s will, does the electing spouse receive the share of the deceased spouse’s estate which said surviving spouse would have otherwise received if the decedent had died intestate; and second, is the first $30,000, which a surviving spouse receives pursuant to the statute of descent and distribution, R.C. 2105.06, a charge against and deduction from the gross estate similar to a surviving spouse’s statutory allowance pursuant to R.C. 2117.20?
Prior to 1976, the statute of descent and distribution, R.C. 2105.06, relevantly provided that when a person died intestate having title to any personal or real property, and was survived by a spouse and more than one child or their lineal descendants, said property was to descend as follows:
“(C) If there is a spouse and more than one child or their lineal descendants surviving,
one third to the spouse
and the remainder to the children equally, or to the lineal descendants of any deceased child, per stirpes.”
(Emphasis added.)
Similarly, R.C. 2107.39, which is the statute concerning the right of a spouse
to elect to 'take against the deceased spouse’s will, materially stated that the probate court was to issue a citation to the surviving spouse whereby the surviving spouse was “* * * to elect whether to take under the will or under section 2105.06 of the Revised Code.
If such spouse elects to take under such section, such spouse shall take not to exceed one half of the net estate
* * *.”
(Emphasis added.)
Effective January 1,1976, however, both R.C. 2105.06 and 2107.39 underwent significant substantive changes. Under the amended R.C. 2105.06, where there exists a surviving spouse and more than one child or their lineal descendants of an intestate decedent, and where the surviving spouse is the natural or adoptive parent of one or more of the decedent’s children, the surviving spouse is to receive
“thefirst thirty thousand dollars
* * *
plus one-third of the balance of the intestate estate. * *
(Emphasis added.) The remainder of the decedent’s intestate estate is to be shared equally among decedent’s children or amongst their
lineal descendants or among the lineal descendants of any deceased child, per stirpes. R.C. 2105.06(C).
R.C. 2107.39 also has undergone a significant substantive change as of January 1, 1976. The probate court is still to issue a citation to a surviving spouse whereby the surviving spouse is “to elect whether to take under the will or under section 2105.06 of the Revised Code.” R.C. 2107.39. Significantly, however:
<<* * * y the spouse elects to take under section 2105.06 of the Revised Code, the spouse shall take not to exceed one-half of the net estate
unless two or more of the decedent’s children or their lineal descendants survive, in which case the spouse shall take not to exceed one-third of the net estate.”
(Emphasis added.)
The probate court reasoned that the legislative intent of R.C. 2107.39 was to prohibit one’s spouse from partially or
totally disinheriting the other spouse. To effectuate this legislative purpose, the probate court held that the first $30,000 provided for in R.C. 2105.06(G) is, as is the $5,000 statutory allowance provided in R.C. 2117.20, a charge against and deduction from the gross estate. As such, a surviving spouse would not be in a lesser position if the surviving spouse elected to take against a deceased spouse’s will than if the decedent had died intestate. The probate court further reasoned that the intent and purpose of R.C. 2107.39 is to place a surviving spouse in the same position that the surviving spouse would have been in if the deceased spouse had died intestate. Thus, pursuant to the probate court’s reasoning, the $30,000 provided for in the statute of descent and distribution, R.C. 2105.06, is to be deducted from the gross estate. We disagree.
In discussing the right to inherit property, it is paramount to remember that the right to inherit is neither an inherent nor a natural right; rather, it is a right which the legislature creates and confers by statute. As such, the right to inherit is necessarily subject to legislative control and restriction. See
Kirsheman
v.
Paulin
(1951), 155 Ohio St. 137, 140 [44 O.O. 134];
Ostrander
v.
Preece
(1935), 129 Ohio St. 625, 631. “It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that sections and acts are
in pari materia
and should be construed together when they relate to the same matter * *
Volan v. Keller
(1969), 20 Ohio App. 2d 204, 206 [40 O.O.2d 286]. Since both R.C. 2105.06 and 2107.39 concern the devolution of property of descendants, they necessarily relate to the same subject matter and, consequently, are to be construed together.
In re Estate of Tertel
(Feb. 3, 1984), Lucas App. No. L-83-286, unreported. With these principles foremost in mind, we proceed with our analysis.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has defined the term “net estate,” as used in R.C. 2107.39, as “that portion of the estate remaining after satisfaction of all the indebtedness of the decedent and the obligations against the estate * * *.”
Weeks
v.
Vandeveer
(1968), 13 Ohio St. 2d 15, 20 [42 O.O.2d 25]. See
Campbell
v.
Lloyd
(1954), 162 Ohio St. 203 [55 O.O. 102]. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has stated in
Weeks
at 20 and
Lloyd, supra,
at 205-206, that:
“* * * [T]he words ‘net estate’ as used in Section 10504-55, General Code [R.C. 2107.39], describe the same property as do those words of Section 10503-4, General Code [R.C. 2105.06] Revised Code, which describe the property to be distributed and to descend and pass pursuant to the provisions of the latter statute.”
Although both the
Weeks
and
Lloyd
decisions were rendered prior to the 1976 revisions of R.C. 2105.06 (which added,
inter alia,
the language “the first thirty thousand dollars”) and of R.C. 2107.39, we conclude that these decisions support the proposition that
distribution made pursuant to R.C. 2105.06 is to be made from the net estate.
The probate court relied upon the rationale of
In re Green
(1980), 63 Ohio Misc. 44 [17 O.O.3d 388], to support the position that the first $30,000 provided for in R.C. 2105.06(C) is to be deducted from the gross estate. In
Green,
the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, Probate Division, held that the value of an automobile taken by a surviving spouse pursuant to R.C. 2113.52 is not an asset of the estate and that the $5,000 statutory allowance provided for in R.C. 2117.20 should be deducted from and charged against the value of the gross estate prior to computing a surviving spouse’s interest pursuant to R.C. 2105.06.
We agree with the
Green
decision and endorse it as an accurate statement of the law. The automobile which a surviving spouse is entitled to receive is expressly excluded by statute from being an asset of the estate.
R.C. 2113.532. Further, the statutory allowance permitted by R.C. 2117.20
is to be deducted from the gross estate prior to determining a surviving spouse’s distributive share under R.C. 2105.06. Support for this position lies not only in the fact that R.C. 2117.20 is contained in R.C. Chapter 2117, presentment of claims against the estate, but also in that the spouse’s allowance is expressly delineated as an estate debt in R.C. 2117.25.
Accordingly, the probate court’s reliance on the
Green
rationale as support for the proposition that the first $30,000 provided for in R.C. 2105.06, just as the $5,000 statutory allowance,
provided for in R.C. 2117.20, is to be deducted from the gross estate, is misplaced.
Applying the rationale of the Supreme Court in both
Weeks
and
Lloyd, supra,
we hold that the first $30,000 to which the surviving spouse is entitled pursuant to R.C. 2105.06(C) is a distribution which is to be made from the net estate rather than a charge against or deduction from the gross estate.
We determine that R.C. 2107.39 permits a surviving spouse to take
no more
than one-third of the net estate when a surviving spouse, pursuant to the statute, elects to take against a deceased spouse’s will and where two or more of the decedent’s children, or their lineal descendants, survive. Further, a surviving spouse’s statutory right to a “forced share” of the deceased spouse’s estate cannot be characterized as a “liability of the decedent” or of the estate so as to constitute a claim against the estate. See
In re Cole’s Estate
(1982), 120 Mich. App. 539, 549, 328 N.W. 2d 76, 81. The legislature, in enacting R.C. 2107.39, has provided a surviving spouse with the option of electing to take
the increased intestate share to the extent that said share does not exceed one-half of the net estate or, if two or more of the decedent’s children or their lineal descendants survive, one-third of the net estate.
See Page’s Ohio Revised Code Annotated (1976), Comment to R.C. 2107.39.
Admittedly, that share of a deceased spouse’s estate to which a surviving spouse is entitled may indeed be less when a will exists and the surviving spouse chooses to elect against it than when a deceased spouse dies with no will at all. As stated earlier, however, the right to inherit is neither natural nor inherent; rather, it is subject to legislative control and restriction.
Appellant’s sole assignment of error is found well-taken. The judgment of the Huron County Common Pleas Court, Probate Division, is reversed. Pursuant to App. R. 12(B), and rendering the judgment which the probate court should have rendered, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the surviving spouse Florence R. Mann, having chosen to elect against her deceased husband’s will, shall receive her statutory share, pursuant to R.C. 2105.06(C), to the extent that it does not exceed one-third of the net estate. The cause is remanded to the Huron County Common Pleas Court for execution of the judgment herein rendered and assessment of costs.
Judgment reversed.
Handwork and Resnick, JJ., concur.
Wiley, J., retired, of the Sixth Appellate District, was assigned to active duty under authority of Section 6(C), Article IV, Constitution.