Nott J.
This unfortunate species of property is constantly presenting us with cases involving considerations of policy rather than law, and in which little assistance can be derived from authority.
Slavery has existed in almost all countries and in almost all ages of the world.
It existed among the Jews, God’s chosen people, and was sactioned by divine authority.
It has existed in England, in a more abject state than was ever allowed in this country Hallam in his History of the Middle Ages, says, «in England it was very common, even after the conquest to export slaves to Ireland, (2 Vol. 263.) Another writer accuses the Anglo-Saxon nobility of selling their female servants, even when pregnant by them, as slaves to foreigners. And a third says, that the English, before the conquest, were generally in the habit of selling their children and other relations to be slaves in Ireland, without having even the pretext of distress or famine; (Do. in notes.) Villeinage, as it was called in England, was only another name for A villein could not hold property; he [402]*402had no civil rights, except what was allowed by his master, (2 Blackstone, Comm. 934. 1 Hallam 120-2-3-4. 2nd Do. 198,206.)
In Rome, slaves were not less subject to the absolute and despotic will of theii? masters. Atone time, the master h ó the power oí life and death over hem. (Adams’ Antiquities 37.)
It is, from those two sources, the'common and the civil law, if any where, that we are to derive the principles by which questions of this sort aré to be governed. But, altho* we ca . asceitaiu that slavery actually existed in both those countries, yet such was the different situations of their slaves at different periods, that it is not easy to trace the reciprocal duties and liabilities of master and servant: (vide Reeves’ H. Eng. Law. 99.) Even if the task were less difficult, the condition was so different from that of our slaves, that we should profit but little by the research.
. In England a villein had all the privelege of a freeman in respect to all persons except his master. He might maintain actions for personal injuries, and although he might defend himself by a plea of villeinage v> an action brought against him, 1 do not fin'd it any where laid down, that his master was liable for damages resulting to another on account of his trespasses or negligence.
By the civil law, a person was allowed what was called actio noxatis by which a master was made liable for any damage done to another by his slave, such as theft, robbery or any other damage, But he was equally liable for any damage done by his horses, cattle or other animals. He might, however, relieve himself from liability in either case bv delivering up the slave or animal to the party injured and was not held answerable for more than his value: ( ooper’s Justinian 354. 357,passim. 1 Domut 305.) Puffendorf recognizes the correctness of this principle, (book 3. page 6.) The ground of liability according to this author is, that the slave, if free, would have been answerable for [403]*403Ms own act, and the beast in a state of nature would be subject to the will of the injured part: The master therefore, by enslaving the one and domesticating the other, became liable to the extent of their value. Some such notion as this, it seems to be thought by some writers gave rise to the doctrine of deodand which condemned even the instrument by which death was occasioned, to expiate the offence it had committed. Grotius, however, differs in opinion from Puffendorff; he thinks the master not liablefor the act of his servant or beast; but Harbeyrac in his notes, on that author takes a middle course: he thiitlcs the master ought to be answerable for the acts of his slave, but not for those of his beast. ( Grotius Lab. 2. c. 17. 375. yet in none of these cases does the extent of the liability seem to be very well defined.-
Even to this day, the doctrine of the common law, in relation to the subject does not appear to be very well settled. Judge Blackslone says, if a servant by his negligence does any damage to a stranger, the master shall answer for his neglect: Therefore; if a smith’s servant lame a horse while he is' shoeing him an action lies against the master. And upon this principle, says the same author, by the common law, if a servant kept his master’s fire negligently, so that his neigh-bour’s house was burned down, thereby, an action lay against the master, because the negligence happened in his service; otherwise if the servant going along the street with a torch sets fire to his neghbour’s house; for then he is not in his master’s immediate service; (1 Blackstone’s Com. 431.) The same doctrine is laid down in the same vague manner in Noys Maxims c. 44. p. 95.112, and in Doc and Student c. 42. p. 237. And each of these learned authors gives the otherfor authority. But that is too vague and general to constitute any definite rule of decision. In the case of M‘Manus vs. Cricket, 1 East. 106, it was decided after a review of all the cases upon the subject, that a master was not liable for a trespass committed by his servant.
[404]*404Judge Reeves in his treatise on Domestic Relations finds great fault with that decision. He says, there is no cl ¡fíe» rence with respect to the liability of the master between an injury arising from negligence and one occasioned by a diJ réct trespass or tort. And 1. am not prepared to say that 1 ató satisfied that there ought to be any such difference. Judge Reeves seems to consider it as a conceded point, that in England a.master is liable for the negligence of his servant. But I am not satisfied that that question is conclusively settled in England. Most of the cases relied on by that learned judge. Savignac vs. Roome, 6 D. & E. 125. Morley vs. Gaisford, 2 H. Blackcstone 442. Jones vs. Hart 2 Salk. 441. &. Day vs. Edwards, 5 D & E. 648, turned upon the nature of the actions. No question was made with regard to the liability of the master.
Among these confiicting opinions then, we may at least feel ourselves untramelled by authority, if the English decisions could be considered authority on such a question. The importance, however, of this question is not diminished on-that account. It .is, therefore, satisfactory to find that we have a decision of our own directly in point. The case of Snee & Trice, 2 Bay, p. 345 depended upon the same principle as the case now under consideration: in that case the defendant’s negroes had suffered a fire to break out from the field; where they were at work and to burn up the plaintiff’s crib of. corn. The court held that the defendant, was not liable for the negligence, of his servants. The question was decided, upon general principles and not upon the .particular circumstances of the case. Whether the result ot the neglect be the. burning of a corn crib, or the breaking of a cart, the principle must-be the same. That case has always been received as. law, and it would now be unwise to innovate upon a principle which has been so long established. Tradesmen, ferrymen,-, carriers, and others acting in such like capacities are ex-, ceptions to the rule.
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Nott J.
This unfortunate species of property is constantly presenting us with cases involving considerations of policy rather than law, and in which little assistance can be derived from authority.
Slavery has existed in almost all countries and in almost all ages of the world.
It existed among the Jews, God’s chosen people, and was sactioned by divine authority.
It has existed in England, in a more abject state than was ever allowed in this country Hallam in his History of the Middle Ages, says, «in England it was very common, even after the conquest to export slaves to Ireland, (2 Vol. 263.) Another writer accuses the Anglo-Saxon nobility of selling their female servants, even when pregnant by them, as slaves to foreigners. And a third says, that the English, before the conquest, were generally in the habit of selling their children and other relations to be slaves in Ireland, without having even the pretext of distress or famine; (Do. in notes.) Villeinage, as it was called in England, was only another name for A villein could not hold property; he [402]*402had no civil rights, except what was allowed by his master, (2 Blackstone, Comm. 934. 1 Hallam 120-2-3-4. 2nd Do. 198,206.)
In Rome, slaves were not less subject to the absolute and despotic will of theii? masters. Atone time, the master h ó the power oí life and death over hem. (Adams’ Antiquities 37.)
It is, from those two sources, the'common and the civil law, if any where, that we are to derive the principles by which questions of this sort aré to be governed. But, altho* we ca . asceitaiu that slavery actually existed in both those countries, yet such was the different situations of their slaves at different periods, that it is not easy to trace the reciprocal duties and liabilities of master and servant: (vide Reeves’ H. Eng. Law. 99.) Even if the task were less difficult, the condition was so different from that of our slaves, that we should profit but little by the research.
. In England a villein had all the privelege of a freeman in respect to all persons except his master. He might maintain actions for personal injuries, and although he might defend himself by a plea of villeinage v> an action brought against him, 1 do not fin'd it any where laid down, that his master was liable for damages resulting to another on account of his trespasses or negligence.
By the civil law, a person was allowed what was called actio noxatis by which a master was made liable for any damage done to another by his slave, such as theft, robbery or any other damage, But he was equally liable for any damage done by his horses, cattle or other animals. He might, however, relieve himself from liability in either case bv delivering up the slave or animal to the party injured and was not held answerable for more than his value: ( ooper’s Justinian 354. 357,passim. 1 Domut 305.) Puffendorf recognizes the correctness of this principle, (book 3. page 6.) The ground of liability according to this author is, that the slave, if free, would have been answerable for [403]*403Ms own act, and the beast in a state of nature would be subject to the will of the injured part: The master therefore, by enslaving the one and domesticating the other, became liable to the extent of their value. Some such notion as this, it seems to be thought by some writers gave rise to the doctrine of deodand which condemned even the instrument by which death was occasioned, to expiate the offence it had committed. Grotius, however, differs in opinion from Puffendorff; he thinks the master not liablefor the act of his servant or beast; but Harbeyrac in his notes, on that author takes a middle course: he thiitlcs the master ought to be answerable for the acts of his slave, but not for those of his beast. ( Grotius Lab. 2. c. 17. 375. yet in none of these cases does the extent of the liability seem to be very well defined.-
Even to this day, the doctrine of the common law, in relation to the subject does not appear to be very well settled. Judge Blackslone says, if a servant by his negligence does any damage to a stranger, the master shall answer for his neglect: Therefore; if a smith’s servant lame a horse while he is' shoeing him an action lies against the master. And upon this principle, says the same author, by the common law, if a servant kept his master’s fire negligently, so that his neigh-bour’s house was burned down, thereby, an action lay against the master, because the negligence happened in his service; otherwise if the servant going along the street with a torch sets fire to his neghbour’s house; for then he is not in his master’s immediate service; (1 Blackstone’s Com. 431.) The same doctrine is laid down in the same vague manner in Noys Maxims c. 44. p. 95.112, and in Doc and Student c. 42. p. 237. And each of these learned authors gives the otherfor authority. But that is too vague and general to constitute any definite rule of decision. In the case of M‘Manus vs. Cricket, 1 East. 106, it was decided after a review of all the cases upon the subject, that a master was not liable for a trespass committed by his servant.
[404]*404Judge Reeves in his treatise on Domestic Relations finds great fault with that decision. He says, there is no cl ¡fíe» rence with respect to the liability of the master between an injury arising from negligence and one occasioned by a diJ réct trespass or tort. And 1. am not prepared to say that 1 ató satisfied that there ought to be any such difference. Judge Reeves seems to consider it as a conceded point, that in England a.master is liable for the negligence of his servant. But I am not satisfied that that question is conclusively settled in England. Most of the cases relied on by that learned judge. Savignac vs. Roome, 6 D. & E. 125. Morley vs. Gaisford, 2 H. Blackcstone 442. Jones vs. Hart 2 Salk. 441. &. Day vs. Edwards, 5 D & E. 648, turned upon the nature of the actions. No question was made with regard to the liability of the master.
Among these confiicting opinions then, we may at least feel ourselves untramelled by authority, if the English decisions could be considered authority on such a question. The importance, however, of this question is not diminished on-that account. It .is, therefore, satisfactory to find that we have a decision of our own directly in point. The case of Snee & Trice, 2 Bay, p. 345 depended upon the same principle as the case now under consideration: in that case the defendant’s negroes had suffered a fire to break out from the field; where they were at work and to burn up the plaintiff’s crib of. corn. The court held that the defendant, was not liable for the negligence, of his servants. The question was decided, upon general principles and not upon the .particular circumstances of the case. Whether the result ot the neglect be the. burning of a corn crib, or the breaking of a cart, the principle must-be the same. That case has always been received as. law, and it would now be unwise to innovate upon a principle which has been so long established. Tradesmen, ferrymen,-, carriers, and others acting in such like capacities are ex-, ceptions to the rule. In those cases, the master by inviting •rvihavs to repose a confidence in them, becomes security fot [405]*405the faithful performance of their duty and must be answerable for their neglect. Judge Blackstone in illustrating the principle as laid down by him,. (T vol.p. 431,) which has already been alluded to, gives the instance of a smith who lames a horse by shoeing. And if that is the whole extent to which the doctrine is carried in England, then are our decisions conformable to the law of that country. Particular cases of hardship may grow out of the law as thus settled: But we cannot forsee. the extent of the liability which-would spring from, a contrary doctrine. The decision appears to be founded upon the policy of the country, and I am disposed to think it correct. It is at least one, on which it would be dangerous to be trying, experiments. The interest of the master affords a higher security against misconduct or negligence of his servants than any liability which the law could impose. >
Jlscson & Grimke', for appellants.
Eckhard & Toomer, contra.
I am of opinion, therefore, that a; new. trial ought to be granted.