Wingate v. Orchard

75 F. 241, 21 C.C.A. 315, 1896 U.S. App. LEXIS 2028
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJune 1, 1896
DocketNo. 266
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 75 F. 241 (Wingate v. Orchard) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wingate v. Orchard, 75 F. 241, 21 C.C.A. 315, 1896 U.S. App. LEXIS 2028 (9th Cir. 1896).

Opinion

ROSS, Circuit Judge.

The sole question presented and argued by counsel in this case is whether or not a holder of stock of an insolvent national hank is entitled to offset against an assessment upon his stock, ordered by the comptroller of the currency, the amount of his deposits in the hank at the time it became insolvent. The court below held that the stockholder is entitled to offset against such assessment the amount of such individual claim against the hank, and to review that ruling the present writ of error wras brought. We are of opinion that the ruling was erroneous. The statute of the United States providing for the asso[242]*242ciation of persons for carrying on the business of banking provides, among other things, that:

“At least fifty per centum of tlie capital stock of every association shall be paid in before it shall be authorized to commence business; and the remainder of the capital stock of such association shall be paid in installments of at least ten per centum each on the whole amount* of the capital, as frequently as one installment at the end of each succeeding month from the time it shall be authorized by the comptroller of the currency to commence business; and the payment of each installment shall be certified to the comptroller, under oath, by the president or cashier of the association.” Rev. St. § 5140.

When the last of such installments is paid, the stock is fully paid for, and the capital of the bank equals at least the face value of its stock. But the statute providing for such banldng institutions proceeds to impose upon those who shall subscribe for their stock an additional liability. It does so in these words:

“The shareholders of every national banking association shall be held in-, dividually responsible, equally and ratably, and not one for another, for all contracts, debts, and engagements of such association, to the extent of the amount of their stock therein, at the par value thereof, in addition to the amount invested in such shares” (with certain exceptions not applicable to the present case). Rev. St. § 5151.

It was to enforce this additional liability that the comptroller of the currency directed the assessment, to enforce which the present suit was brought in the court below. The evident object of the statute is to provide a fund equaling in amount, but in addition to, the face value of the stock, to make good all contracts, debts, and engagements into which such association may enter, and, to that extent, it makes every shareholder individually responsible, equally and ratably, and not one for another. The fund thus provided for is not intended for any particular creditor, but to make good all contracts, debts, and engagements of such association, equally and without any preference. But unlike the voluntary obligation of the shareholder to pay for the stock for which he subscribes, and with which funds the business of the bank is to be conducted, the additional or double liability imposed by section 5151 of the Revised Statutes is to be called for only for the purpose of maldng good the contracts, debts, and engagements of the bank. If necessary for that purpose, that liability is to be enforced pursuant to the provisions of section 5234 of the Revised Statutes; that is to say, through a receiver acting under the direction of the comptroller of the currency, — such receiver having been appointed by the comptroller pursuant to the provisions of that section, and of sections 5226 and 5227 of the Revised Statutes. The fund thus provided for, in the event of the liquidation and winding up of the affairs of the bank, equal in amount to the face value of the stock, and imposed ' for the express purpose of making good the contracts, debts, and engagements of the association, is manifestly a trust fund, to a pro rata share of which all creditors are equally and equitably entitled. Obviously, to permit a holder of stock in such a bank to offset against an assessment for the additional liability thus imposed upon him as such holder the amount of his deposits in the bank, in respect to which he is no more entitled than any other creditor, [243]*243would be, in effect, to make him a preferred creditor. If the amount of his deposits should equal The par value of his stock, the allowance of such an offset would be, in effect, to pay him in full the amount of his deposits; and, if his deposits are less than the par value of his stock, the effect would be to pay him in full, lo that extent, whereas the other depositors may receive little or nothing. Buch was not the intention of congress in imposing, as it did, by section 5151 of the Revised Statutes, upon the shareholders of every national banking association, in addition to the amount invested in such shares, a liability for all contracts, debts, and engagements of such association, to the extent of the amount of their stock therein, at the par value thereof. On the contrary, the purpose was, as has been said, to provide a fund to which all creditors should be entitled to look upon equal terms, and in which, in the event of disaster, all creditors, without preference to any, should he entitled to share pro rata. There is nothing in the case of Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499, 13 Sup. Ct. 148, relied upon by counsel for the defendant in error, and which they say was the basis of the ruling of the court below, opposed io the views here expressed. In that case no question arose in respect to any holder of stock in a national bank. There the Fidelity National Bank of Cincinnati had loaned the Farmers’ & Merchants’ Bank §10,000, at a discount at tbe rate of 7 per cent, per annum for 90 days, under an agreement that the money so borrowed, less the discount, should be placed'to the credit of the Farmers’ Bank on the books of the Fidelity Bank. The promissory nob1 there in suit was executed accordingly. dated and discounted on June 6, 1887, and the proceeds, §9,-819.17, were placed to the credit of the Farmers’ Bank, upon the books of the Fidelity Bank, to meet any checks or drafts of the Farmers’ Bank, and to pay the note when it became due. After-wards, and before June 20th, the Farmers’ Bank drew against the deposit the sum of §1,009.23; and the balance, §8,809.94, remained to the credit of the defendant io meet the note, and was so to its credit at the time the receivin' was appointed. Upon the maturity of the note, and before suit was brought, defendant tendered the receiver the sum of $1,190.06, the balance due on the note, and kept the tender good. The court held that the credits between the banks were reciprocal, and parts of (lie same transaction, in which each gave credit to the other on the faith of the simultaneous credit, and that the principle applicable to mutual credits applied.

“It was, Therefore,” said the court, “the hala nee upon an adjustment of the accounts, which was the debt, and the Fanners’ ISanfc had the right, as against the receiver of the Fidelity ISanfc, although the note matured after the suspension of that hank, to set oif the balance due upon its deposit account, unless the provisions of the national hanking law were to the contrary.”

And the court proceeded to show that the provisions of sections 5234, 5236, and 5242 of the Revised Statutes, which were relied upon by counsel as forbidding the set-off, did not do so.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
75 F. 241, 21 C.C.A. 315, 1896 U.S. App. LEXIS 2028, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wingate-v-orchard-ca9-1896.