Wine v. Brunty

38 Va. Cir. 349, 1996 Va. Cir. LEXIS 76
CourtWarren County Circuit Court
DecidedFebruary 6, 1996
DocketCase No. (Chancery) 95-128
StatusPublished

This text of 38 Va. Cir. 349 (Wine v. Brunty) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Warren County Circuit Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wine v. Brunty, 38 Va. Cir. 349, 1996 Va. Cir. LEXIS 76 (Va. Super. Ct. 1996).

Opinion

By Judge John E. Wetsel, Jr.

This case came before the Court on the Father’s Petition to enjoin the enforcement of a Washington State support order for his stepchildren by a former marriage under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. Upon consideration of the arguments of counsel, the Court has made the following decision to deny the petition for an injunction.

I. Statement of Material Facts

The following facts are not in dispute.

The Plaintiff (“Step-father”) was an enlisted serviceman in the U.S. Army, stationed in Washington State. While in Washington, the step-father married Patricia Howard Kemp (“Mother”) on February 12, 1993. At the time of the marriage, Patricia Kemp was the custodial parent of four children by previous relationships, none of whom were adopted by the Plaintiff during the marriage.

The Plaintiff and Patricia Kemp Wine separated several times during the marriage. The last separation occurred in the Spring of 1994, and on June [350]*35015, 1994, the Plaintiff left Washington State and reestablished his residence in the Commonwealth of Virginia.

On January 25,1995, pursuant to Washington law, the Washington child support agency, the Department of Social and Health Services Support Enforcement Division, entered a Notice and Finding of Financial Responsibility which obligated the step-father to pay support for his four stepchildren. The Washington Department of Social, and Health Services, Support Enforcement Division is Washington’s equivalent of the Division of Child Support Enforcement (“DCSE”) and is vested with administrative authority to issue legally binding administrative orders of support.

Washington’s administrative support order obligated the step-father to pay $362.00 per month current support ($133.00 per child per month) and obligated the step-father to pay a debt to the State of Washington for past-due child support. The step-father received a copy of the Washington administrative support order by certified mail, return receipt delivered, on January 31, 1995, and the notice stated that he was financially responsible for the support his Wife’s children and that his “past due” obligation totaled $2,837.66. The step-father did not appeal the administrative order in Washington.

On May 3, 1995, the Virginia Division of Child Support Enforcement received a petition from Washington pursuant to UIFSA requesting that Virginia initiate a wage withholding for the purposes of enforcing the Washington Administrative Support Order. This interstate petition requested that DCSE initiate income withholding and collection of arrearage pursuant to UIFSA. Washington attached a copy of their Notice and Finding of Financial Responsibility which is the equivalent of an administrative support order. Washington asserted a current support obligation of $362.00 per month existed. In addition, Washington claimed an arrearage due for public assistance paid in the amount of $3552.78 for the period from January 25, 1995, through April 20, 1995.

Pursuant to the request from Washington, and under the administrative authority granted by the Virginia legislature, DCSE implemented a wage withholding to the step-father’s employer, requiring that the father’s employer forward $268.50 semi-monthly, or 50% of the step-father’s disposable earnings, whichever is less. On June 20, 1995, the Plaintiff’s employer received a payroll deduction order from the Department of Social Services Division of Child Support Enforcement for the Commonwealth of Virginia directing a deduction of $268.50 payable to the Division of Support Enforcement for the support of Plaintiffs Wife’s chil[351]*351dren. No notice or opportunity for a hearing regarding this action was provided to the Plaintiff by the Department of Social Services of the Commonwealth of Virginia on the grounds that the Plaintiff had been given notice and an opportunity for Hearing by the State of Washington, pursuant to Virginia Code § 20-88.69.

The Plaintiff obtained a Final Decree of Divorce from Patricia A. Wine on August 31, 1995, which terminated his liability for the support of his stepchildren under Washington State law. The Department of Social Services for the Commonwealth of Virginia continues to collect the accumulated “arrearage” under the Washington order from Plaintiffs payroll by Administrative Order.

As a result of the administrative action of wage withholding by the Division of Child Support Enforcement, the step-father filed a petition for an injunction against the DCSE wage deduction order, which is the suit now before the Court, by which the step-father seeks to have the Court enjoin DCSE from “demanding or accepting further deductions” from the step-father’s wages and directing the Commissioner of Social Services to “refund all sums previously deducted” from the step-father’s wages by DCSE’s administrative wage withholding order.

H. Conclusions of Law

The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution requires that the courts of one state must give the judgment of another state the same effect as it has in the state where it was rendered. Therefore, if the judgment was conclusive in the state where it was pronounced, it is equally conclusive on the courts of other states in the United States. See Kelly v. Kelly, 118 Va. 376, 87 S.E. 567 (1916).

Congress has recently enacted the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act (“FFCCSOA”), to enable and compel states to enforce Orders from states whose law differs from its own. In FFCCSOA, Congress acknowledged that laws governing states in child support matters are not uniform. 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(2)(a)(2). However, it clearly intends for each state to honor the terms of another state’s lawful decree and instructs tribunals of all states that they “shall enforce according to its terms a child support order made consistently with this section by a court of another state.” 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(3)(a)(l) (emphasis supplied.) FFCCSOA broadly defines a “child” as follows:

[352]*352(A) a person under 18 years of age; and (B) a person 18 or more years of age with respect to whom a child support order has been issued pursuant to the laws of a State.

28 U.S.C. § 1738B(3)(b).

Step-child support obligations are established by statute in the State of Washington. RCW 26.16.205. The legality of step-parent liability for stepchildren has been affirmed by the Washington courts. See Washington State Organization of Step-parents v. Smith, 85 Wash. 2d 564, 526 P.2d 1202 (1975).

Washington State has adopted UIFSA and essentially has the same law as Virginia has regarding interstate child support proceedings. RCW 26.18 et seq.

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Related

Washington Statewide Organization of Stepparents v. Smith
536 P.2d 1202 (Washington Supreme Court, 1975)
State v. Kamae
526 P.2d 1200 (Hawaii Supreme Court, 1974)
Kelly v. Kelly
87 S.E. 567 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1916)

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Bluebook (online)
38 Va. Cir. 349, 1996 Va. Cir. LEXIS 76, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wine-v-brunty-vaccwarren-1996.