Schneider, J.
Taxpayer, an Ohio resident during the tax years in question, was the depositor of funds in the Pasadena Federal Savings and Loan Association, located in California and incorporated under and operated pursuant to Chapter 12, Title 12, U. S. Code (12 U. S. Code, Section 1461 et seq.). Whether his deposits were evidenced by certificates, passbooks or otherwise is not clear from the record or the arguments. It is agreed, however, that they yielded interest of over four per cent of the principal thereof in each year in question.
The Tax Commissioner assessed the intangible tax against him in an amount equal to five per cent of the interest paid in each year from the deposit upon the basis that that interest was income yield from an “investment.”
Upon appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals, the tax[123]*123payer claimed that the deposits were issued by an instrumentality of the federal government and thus excepted from Ohio taxation as an investment (under the Ohio statutory tax scheme, these deposits would thus escape state taxation entirely); and that taxation of his deposits discriminates against out-of-state deposits by an Ohio domiciliary in federal savings and loan associations.
The Board of Tax Appeals agreed with the taxpayer’s first contention, but by clear implication rejected the second. Although taxpayer has not cross-appealed and has virtually abandoned the latter contention, we are constrained to observe that Ohio seeks to tax out-of-state deposits of its domiciliarys yielding “annual income by way of interest or dividends in excess of four per cent” without regard to the source of the income. Therefore, a charge of discrimination against federally chartered institutions is unfounded.
In support of his appeal, the Tax Commissioner first insists that if R. C. 5709.021, 5701.052 and [124]*1245701.063 are construed in para materia, as they should be, it may be seen that the subject of the tax is the deposit in the out-of-state institution; and that a deposit, as distinguished from an issue of an evidence of indebtedness, in [125]*125a federally chartered or regulated -financial institution is not excepted from the tax. He refers to Section 5323, General Code*4 (114 Ohio Laws 714), as enacted in 1931, which is the antecedent of R. C. 5701.06 before the recodifi-[126]*126cation of 1953 (H. B. 1, 101st General Assembly), as authoritative of the legislative intent, in that the language employed in the General Code, “excepting such as have been issued,” is apposite to the recodification language, “excepting those issued. ...”
This argument is insubstantial. It gainsays the commonly known fact that for every deposit in a financial in[127]*127stitution some evidence thereof is “issued.” Moreover, the result of such construction would be to tax deposits in, but to exempt notes of, a federal instrumentality.
We will not impute to the legislative branch an intention to discriminate generally or to discriminate so narrowly.
Appellant’s principal alternate contention is that a federal savings and loan association is not an instrumentality of the federal government within the meaning of R. C. 5701.06. We agree, and hold that the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals was unreasonable and unlawful.
First, we dispel any implication that this appeal involves a question of the constitutional immunity of the federal government or any of its agencies from state taxation. Appellee does not claim it. Nor does any brief or argument of appellant suggest it. Indeed, absent the language of subparagraph (B)(2) of R. 0. 5701.06, there would be no question of Ohio’s constitutional power to tax the subject of this appeal. See Section 1464(h), Title 12, U. S. Code,5 which prohibits any state tax which discriminates against a federal association, thus impliedly granting the state power to tax upon the basis of similar treatment to similar local or state institutions.
Second, we dispel any notion that this appeal involves the question of discrimination in Ohio’s scheme of taxation whereby an Ohio resident is taxed at a higher rate on a foreign deposit yielding over four per cent (five per cent on the annual yield) than on a domestic deposit yielding the same income (two mills on the principal deposited). The appellee does not raise the question.
The only authority cited by the board in support of its decision on the question of a federal instrumentality is People v. Coast Federal Savings and Loan Assn. (1951), 98 [128]*128F. Supp. 311. Iii that case, the court did hold, inter alia, that the subject institution was an instrumentality and agency of the United States. But the case is not relevant to the present inquiry. It decided the inapplicability to a federal savings and loan association chartered pursuant to Section 1464 et seq., Title 12, U. S. Code (Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933), of California statutes regulating banks and prohibiting certain advertising practices by banking institutions.
Similar inapplicable holdings with reference to state regulatory powers are to be found in Ochs v. Washington Heights Federal Sav. and Loan Assn. (1966), 17 N. Y. 2d 82; Durnin v. Allentown Federal Savings and Loan Assn. (1963), D. C. Pa. 218 F. Supp. 716; and Springfield Institution for Savings v. Worcester Federal Sav. and Loan Assn. (1952), 329 Mass. 184, 107 N. E. 2d 315.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut in Waterbury Sav. Bank v. Danaher (1941), 128 Conn. 78, 97, 20 A. 2d 455, is strongly relied upon by ap-pellee and is highly persuasive of its conclusion that the term, “instrumentality of the United States,” is used to describe a government agency which is immune from state control and therefore is not answerable to the “tax” imposed by the Connecticut Unemployment Compensation Act which excepts such an instrumentality from its provisions.
That court leans heavily on the premise that the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933 (Section 1464 et seq., Title 12, U. S. Code), under which federal savings and loan associations are chartered and exclusively regulated by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, was adopted by Congress “to assist the government in providing for the general welfare by providing local thrift institutions in which people might invest and for financing homes.” (128 Conn. 78, at 97.)
No doubt that was the purpose of the Act. It is so stated in paragraph (a) of Section 1464, Title 12, U. S. Code. The digressive flaw in the reasoning of the Connecticut court is, it seems to us, in its conclusion that federal savings and loan associations are created by that Act. Although the record is of little assistance to us, we are con[129]*129vinced of the propriety of observing that wbieb ought to be of the most common knowledge, namely, that federally chartered federal savings and loan associations are, in fact, created by private persons, capitalized in large part by private funds, and operated for the private profit of their shareholders, managers and depositors. Their exclusive regulation by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board does not distract from their private character.
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Schneider, J.
Taxpayer, an Ohio resident during the tax years in question, was the depositor of funds in the Pasadena Federal Savings and Loan Association, located in California and incorporated under and operated pursuant to Chapter 12, Title 12, U. S. Code (12 U. S. Code, Section 1461 et seq.). Whether his deposits were evidenced by certificates, passbooks or otherwise is not clear from the record or the arguments. It is agreed, however, that they yielded interest of over four per cent of the principal thereof in each year in question.
The Tax Commissioner assessed the intangible tax against him in an amount equal to five per cent of the interest paid in each year from the deposit upon the basis that that interest was income yield from an “investment.”
Upon appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals, the tax[123]*123payer claimed that the deposits were issued by an instrumentality of the federal government and thus excepted from Ohio taxation as an investment (under the Ohio statutory tax scheme, these deposits would thus escape state taxation entirely); and that taxation of his deposits discriminates against out-of-state deposits by an Ohio domiciliary in federal savings and loan associations.
The Board of Tax Appeals agreed with the taxpayer’s first contention, but by clear implication rejected the second. Although taxpayer has not cross-appealed and has virtually abandoned the latter contention, we are constrained to observe that Ohio seeks to tax out-of-state deposits of its domiciliarys yielding “annual income by way of interest or dividends in excess of four per cent” without regard to the source of the income. Therefore, a charge of discrimination against federally chartered institutions is unfounded.
In support of his appeal, the Tax Commissioner first insists that if R. C. 5709.021, 5701.052 and [124]*1245701.063 are construed in para materia, as they should be, it may be seen that the subject of the tax is the deposit in the out-of-state institution; and that a deposit, as distinguished from an issue of an evidence of indebtedness, in [125]*125a federally chartered or regulated -financial institution is not excepted from the tax. He refers to Section 5323, General Code*4 (114 Ohio Laws 714), as enacted in 1931, which is the antecedent of R. C. 5701.06 before the recodifi-[126]*126cation of 1953 (H. B. 1, 101st General Assembly), as authoritative of the legislative intent, in that the language employed in the General Code, “excepting such as have been issued,” is apposite to the recodification language, “excepting those issued. ...”
This argument is insubstantial. It gainsays the commonly known fact that for every deposit in a financial in[127]*127stitution some evidence thereof is “issued.” Moreover, the result of such construction would be to tax deposits in, but to exempt notes of, a federal instrumentality.
We will not impute to the legislative branch an intention to discriminate generally or to discriminate so narrowly.
Appellant’s principal alternate contention is that a federal savings and loan association is not an instrumentality of the federal government within the meaning of R. C. 5701.06. We agree, and hold that the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals was unreasonable and unlawful.
First, we dispel any implication that this appeal involves a question of the constitutional immunity of the federal government or any of its agencies from state taxation. Appellee does not claim it. Nor does any brief or argument of appellant suggest it. Indeed, absent the language of subparagraph (B)(2) of R. 0. 5701.06, there would be no question of Ohio’s constitutional power to tax the subject of this appeal. See Section 1464(h), Title 12, U. S. Code,5 which prohibits any state tax which discriminates against a federal association, thus impliedly granting the state power to tax upon the basis of similar treatment to similar local or state institutions.
Second, we dispel any notion that this appeal involves the question of discrimination in Ohio’s scheme of taxation whereby an Ohio resident is taxed at a higher rate on a foreign deposit yielding over four per cent (five per cent on the annual yield) than on a domestic deposit yielding the same income (two mills on the principal deposited). The appellee does not raise the question.
The only authority cited by the board in support of its decision on the question of a federal instrumentality is People v. Coast Federal Savings and Loan Assn. (1951), 98 [128]*128F. Supp. 311. Iii that case, the court did hold, inter alia, that the subject institution was an instrumentality and agency of the United States. But the case is not relevant to the present inquiry. It decided the inapplicability to a federal savings and loan association chartered pursuant to Section 1464 et seq., Title 12, U. S. Code (Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933), of California statutes regulating banks and prohibiting certain advertising practices by banking institutions.
Similar inapplicable holdings with reference to state regulatory powers are to be found in Ochs v. Washington Heights Federal Sav. and Loan Assn. (1966), 17 N. Y. 2d 82; Durnin v. Allentown Federal Savings and Loan Assn. (1963), D. C. Pa. 218 F. Supp. 716; and Springfield Institution for Savings v. Worcester Federal Sav. and Loan Assn. (1952), 329 Mass. 184, 107 N. E. 2d 315.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut in Waterbury Sav. Bank v. Danaher (1941), 128 Conn. 78, 97, 20 A. 2d 455, is strongly relied upon by ap-pellee and is highly persuasive of its conclusion that the term, “instrumentality of the United States,” is used to describe a government agency which is immune from state control and therefore is not answerable to the “tax” imposed by the Connecticut Unemployment Compensation Act which excepts such an instrumentality from its provisions.
That court leans heavily on the premise that the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933 (Section 1464 et seq., Title 12, U. S. Code), under which federal savings and loan associations are chartered and exclusively regulated by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, was adopted by Congress “to assist the government in providing for the general welfare by providing local thrift institutions in which people might invest and for financing homes.” (128 Conn. 78, at 97.)
No doubt that was the purpose of the Act. It is so stated in paragraph (a) of Section 1464, Title 12, U. S. Code. The digressive flaw in the reasoning of the Connecticut court is, it seems to us, in its conclusion that federal savings and loan associations are created by that Act. Although the record is of little assistance to us, we are con[129]*129vinced of the propriety of observing that wbieb ought to be of the most common knowledge, namely, that federally chartered federal savings and loan associations are, in fact, created by private persons, capitalized in large part by private funds, and operated for the private profit of their shareholders, managers and depositors. Their exclusive regulation by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board does not distract from their private character. Indeed, in return for exclusive federal regulation and for their voluntary amenability to that regulation and to federal law, they receive such benefits as capitalization from the Homeowners Loan Corporation and deposit insurance from the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. They are immune from the duplicating control of the states. It would appear to us, therefore, that a federal savings and loan association is “a beneficiary and not an instrumentality of the United States government,” as the court characterized the Waterbury Savings Bank, a Connecticut chartered financial institution. (128 Conn. 78, at 89.)
In its emphasis upon the role of the federal savings and loan association in furthering the purposes and concerns of the federal government, the Connecticut court seems to deny the role of state-chartered savings and loan associations in furthering the legitimate interest of the several states in the promotion of thrift and in the financing of housing and the role which both types of associations play in furthering the interest of both the states and federal government.
We are, therefore, persuaded to accept the rationale of the New York Court of Appeals as expressed in Liberty National Bank and Trust Co. v. Buscaglia (1967), 21 N. Y. 357, 235 N. E. 2d 101, in which it was held that the fact that a federally chartered national bank was the depository for federal funds and was subject to federal regulation through membership in the federal reserve system, did not render the bank an instrumentality of the federal government and did not entitle it to the same immunity to state taxation that the federal government itself enjoyed.
A comparison of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act [130]*130(Section 1421 et seq., Title 12, U. S. Code) with the Home Owners’ Loan Act convinces ns of the fallacy of imputing to the General Assembly an intention to discriminate in favor of federal savings and loan associations and against state savings and loan associations, which would be the result of the interpretation of the statute adopted by the Board of Tax Appeals. The former act was first adopted in 1932. It commanded the creation of the Federal Home Loan Board and of the several district home loan banks. It commanded control of the latter by the former. Without question, both agencies were created, funded, controlled and operated by the federal government in furtherance of its endeavors to promote housing and the general welfare. As such, they are, in the truest sense, instru-mentalities of the federal government.
To us, therefore, it seems clear that the object of the General Assembly in enacting the antecedent of E. C. 5701.06 was to except, from the definition of “investments” for the purpose of Ohio taxation, the issued paper of institutions having characteristics similar to a federal home loan bank and the Federal Home Loan Board, and not the issued paper or other evidences of indebtedness of institutions having essentially private characteristics like those of federal savings and loan associations.
Decision reversed.
0 ’Neill, C. J., Herbert, Duncan, Oobbigan, Stern and Leach, JJ., concur.