Winchell v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Winchell v. State

740 So. 2d 572, 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 9052, 1999 WL 453840

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedJuly 7, 1999

DocketNo. 97-01679

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 740 So. 2d 572 (Winchell v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Winchell v. State, 740 So. 2d 572, 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 9052, 1999 WL 453840 (Fla. Ct. App. 1999).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

John Winchell appeals his judgment and sentence for aggravated assault. We affirm the judgment without discussion. However, we remand for resentencing because the trial court failed to orally pronounce its intent to impose a minimum mandatory term for Winchell’s habitual offender sentence. See State v. Hudson, 698 So.2d 831 (Fla.1997). Because enhancement under the habitual offender statute is permissive, rather than mandatory, the trial court was required to orally pronounce the minimum mandatory term. See Moody v. State, 699 So.2d 1009 (Fla.1997); Hudson, 698 So.2d at 833. We, therefore, reverse the sentence. On remand, the trial court should enter a written sentence which conforms with the court’s original oral pronouncement.

Affirmed in part, and remanded for re-sentencing.

PARKER, C.J., THREADGILL and STRINGER, JJ., Concur.

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PER CURIAM.

John Winchell appeals his judgment and sentence for aggravated assault. We affirm the judgment without discussion. However, we remand for resentencing because the trial court failed to orally pronounce its intent to impose a minimum mandatory term for Winchell’s habitual offender sentence. See State v. Hudson, 698 So.2d 831 (Fla.1997). Because enhancement under the habitual offender statute is permissive, rather than mandatory, the trial court was required to orally pronounce the minimum mandatory term. See Moody v. State, 699 So.2d 1009 (Fla.1997); Hudson, 698 So.2d at 833. We, therefore, reverse the sentence. On remand, the trial court should enter a written sentence which conforms with the court’s original oral pronouncement.

Affirmed in part, and remanded for re-sentencing.

PARKER, C.J., THREADGILL and STRINGER, JJ., Concur.

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740 So. 2d 572, 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 9052, 1999 WL 453840, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/winchell-v-state-fladistctapp-1999.

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