Wimberly v. Gulf Production Co.

274 S.W. 986, 1925 Tex. App. LEXIS 644
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJuly 2, 1925
DocketNo. 8703.
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 274 S.W. 986 (Wimberly v. Gulf Production Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wimberly v. Gulf Production Co., 274 S.W. 986, 1925 Tex. App. LEXIS 644 (Tex. Ct. App. 1925).

Opinion

LANE, J.

This suit was brought by W. O. Wimberly and wife, Martha A. Wimberly, to recover the sum of $35,000; it being alleged they suffered damages in such sum by reason of the death of their son, John Wim-berly, 18 years of age, who was fatally injured by an explosion of natural gas while in a bath room, owned by Gulf Production Company, on the 17th day of May, 1923. The plaintiffs alleged that defendant maintained a plant for drilling, storing, selling, and transporting oil and gas and oil and gas products, near Goose Creek, in Harris county, Texas; that in connection therewith it maintained a bath house equipped with shower bath apparatus and with fixtures for natural gas, which were used to heat the water used in said house; that the Production Company and its agents and servants in charge of its premises and bath house, had habitually permitted the public generally to use said bath house; that said house was especially fascinating and attractive to minors; that John Wimberly and other minors had frequently used the bath house with the knowledge and acquiescence of the Production Company, which amounted to an implied invitation for John Wimberly to use .said bath house; that their son and his companions were led to believe and did believe that they were rightfully upon said premises ; that the gas stove and pipes used for the purpose of heating the water used in the bath house were exclusively within the control of the defendant; that the gas was a dry natural gas, highly inflammable and explosive, and a highly dangerous agency; that defendant was aware of the danger of such gas and apparatus, bath house, and premises; that deceased was an immature youth, inexperienced in the control of gas, and in the operation of means and appliances for using same, and did not know the danger to which he was exposed; that defendant negligently and carelessly failed to warn deceased of the danger of using the gas, or to use any means to prevent the use of the bath house by children, but kept said house and premises open and easily accessible, and negligently failed to place about the premises and upon the bath house; or adjacent thereto, any signs warning persons thereon of the alleged dangers; that appellants’ son and his companions had exercised due care for their own safety on the occasion of said explosion, and that the said fire and explosion were the direct (result of the negligence of appellee in failing to maintain the gas pipes feeding the gas to the stove and other appliances in said bath house in a reasonably safe condition, and in permitting said gas stove, pipe, appliances, and apparatus to become old, worn, loose, weak, leaky, and defective, so that same were insufficient to contain, retain, and repress the amount of gas forced into said pipes and building by the natural pressure of said gas; that the explosion resulting from such negligence had severely injured and burned appellapt’s said son, *987 which injuries resulted in Ms death; that by reaso-n thereof appellants had been deprived of the society and companionship of their said son, of his earnings during his minority, and of the amounts that he would have contributed to appellants after he had attained legal age, in all to their damage in the sum of $35,000, for which amount they prayed judgment of the court.

Appellee answered by general demurrer and general denial, and by special answer especially denied that the deceased, .John Wimberly, was ever invited by appellee or any of its employes, who had authority so to do, either expressly or impliedly, to use the bathing facilities which appellee had provided for its employes; that said John Wim-berly had entered upon said premises without authority, and was á trespasser, and that as such trespasser appellee owed him no duty, and was not bound to exercise any care for his safety. Further answering, ap-pellee, while not admitting that John Wim-berly was other than a trespasser on said premises, averred that the explosion resulting in the injury and death of said John Wimberly was the result of the contributory negligence of said John Wimberly and his companions, in that they entered upon said premises without notifying appellee or its employes of their intention to use said bathing facilities, and at an hour when appellee’s employes in charge of said premises were absent or engaged in attending to duties in connection with the warehouse of appellee; that deceased, acting with his associates, were negligent, in that they failed to properly ignite the gas after turning same on, thereby permitting the gas to escape from the pipe in sufficient quantity to become dangerous, if a match was struck in said bath house; and that, after a dangerous amount of gas had been permitted to escape, the deceased, or one of his companions acting with him, had attempted to light said gas, ox-struck a match, which caused said gas to ignite, thereby causing the explosion and the resultant injuries.

After the plaintiffs had closed their evidence, the court instructed the jury selected to try the cause to return a verdict for defendant, which was accordingly done. Upon such vei-diet judgment was rendered for the defendant, from which the plaintiffs have appealed. On appeal, Wimberly and wife insist that • the court erred in instructing a verdict for defendant, in that:

(1) “Whether the death of the deceased was the natural and probable consequence of the maintenance by appellee of defective apparatus, carrying a concealed and deadly amount of highly explosive natural gas, and. whether in the light of the attending circumstances should have been foreseen by the appellee, was an issue of fact, which the trial court should have submitted to the jury for their determination.” (2) “It was the duty of appellee to foresee the clangers to and the probable presence of and consequent injury to any one who used the facilities of the bath house maintained by appellee on its premises; and the evidence was sufficient to warrant a "submission to the jury of the question of whether or not ap-pellee should reasonably have anticipated that some person might probably go upon the premises to take advantage of such facilities.” (3) “There was evidence that the failure of the ap-pellee to post notices or give warning of the danger attending the use of its appliances for heating the gas was negligence, and the trial court erred in refusing to submit the same to the jury.” And (4) “the issue as to whether plaintiff’s deceased was a trespasser, a licensee, or an invitee, was a question of fact for the jury.”

They also insist that the maintenance of the bath house, equipped as it was, was something unusually attractive to persons of immature judgment, and that such maintenance was an implied invitation for the deceased to go upon the premises and use bathing facilities in the bath house for the purpose of.taking a bath. We shall first dispose of the contention last mentioned. We think it -would, indeed, be the establishment of a dangerous precedent to hold, under the doctrine of “attractive nuisances,” that an ordinary bath house, equipped as the one in question is shown to have been, is an attractive nuisance, or that it is such a thing’ as would attract a yoxmg man of more than 18 yeai*s of age to enter it and use its appurtenances, so as to bring it within the doctrine of “attractive nuisances.”

Adopting substantially and almost liter-ally the language of the court in the case of Shaw v. Chicago & A. Ry. Co. (Mo. Sup.) 184 S. W.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
274 S.W. 986, 1925 Tex. App. LEXIS 644, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wimberly-v-gulf-production-co-texapp-1925.