Wilson v. Winstead

84 F.R.D. 218, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12815
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Tennessee
DecidedApril 25, 1979
DocketNo. CIV-2-79-43
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 84 F.R.D. 218 (Wilson v. Winstead) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wilson v. Winstead, 84 F.R.D. 218, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12815 (E.D. Tenn. 1979).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

NEESE, District Judge.

The default of the defendant herein was entered on April 6,1979. Rule 55(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On the same day, the plaintiff moved for a default judgment. Rule 55(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On April 9, 1979 the defendant made a motion that such default be set aside and vacated and submitted a proposed answer. Rule 55(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The purport of the defendant’s motion under Rule 55(c), supra, is that it is contrary to the “ * * * local custom and practice * * * ” for an attorney to move for the entry of a default without prior notice to adversary counsel. Whatever may be the localized custom and practice in that regard, such is not sanctioned by the rationale of Rule 55(a), supra.

The possibility of being held in default acts as a deterrent to those parties resorting to delay as an element of their litigation strategy. H. F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder L., C.A.D.C. (1970), 139 U.S.App.D.C. 256, 258, 432 F.2d 689, 691. Indeed, the plaintiff who fails to move seasonably for entry of a default is in peril of being confronted with a dismissal of his complaint for his failure to prosecute, see Rule 41(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If it is the practice to give more personalized notice of an intention to seek entry of a default, then counsel should adhere to the local custom and practice.

It is only for good cause that the entry of a default may be set aside. Rule 55(c), supra. Defaults are looked upon by this Court with disfavor. Carol B. Sorrell, plaintiff, v. United Inter-Mountain Telephone Company, defendant, no. CIV—2-74—3, memorandum opinion and order therein of July 18, 1974. Defaults are disfavored especially in certain types of actions, such as, for example, those implicating a public issue. 10 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 251: Civil, § 2681. In the matter sub judice, public employment by an elected public official is involved.

Although counsel who practice in this Court are cautioned against deeming any localized custom or practice to constitute “good cause” for the setting-aside of an entry of default in this Court, paramount is the consideration that this Court exists to do justice and is reluctant to proceed toward any judgment without a trial of the disputed issues. Possessing discretion to that end, Federated Mut. Implement & Hardware Ins. Co. v. Prather, D.C.Tenn. (1971), 343 F.Supp. 819, 822[2], affirmed C.A. 6th (1972) (no. 72-1040), the Court exercises that discretion so as to SET [220]*220ASIDE and VACATE the entry of default of April 6, 1979 herein. Rule 55(c), supra. The clerk will file the defendant’s answer; the plaintiff’s motion for a judgment by default is thus rendered MOOT.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

U.S. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Payne
387 F. Supp. 3d 853 (E.D. Tennessee, 2017)
Alli v. United States
93 Fed. Cl. 172 (Federal Claims, 2010)
McDaniel v. Nationwide
85 B.R. 69 (N.D. Illinois, 1988)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
84 F.R.D. 218, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12815, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wilson-v-winstead-tned-1979.