Wilson v. Wakeman

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: December 16, 2024
• Docket: 3:23-cv-05931
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 MARIO WILSON, CASE NO. 3:23-cv-05931-JHC-GJL 11 Plaintiff, v. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 12 GARY WAKEMAN, Noting Date: December 30, 2024 13 Defendant. 14

15 The District Court has referred this action, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to United 16 States Magistrate Judge Grady J. Leupold. Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiff Mario 17 Wilson’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (“Motion”). Dkt. 23. 18 In the Motion, Plaintiff asks the Court to order the removal of his post-release 19 supervising Community Corrections Officer (“CCO”) from his case because the Officer’s actions 20 may be hindering Plaintiff’s ability to litigate this action. Id. The Court concludes Plaintiff is 21 seeking injunctive relief on matters outside the claims raised in the underlying action. Further, 22 even if the request were proper, Plaintiff has not demonstrated the required extraordinary 23 24 1 circumstances for a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s 2 Motion be DENIED. 3 I. BACKGROUND 4 On November 3, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging that Defendant Gary

5 Wakeman’s actions while Plaintiff was incarcerated at Stafford Creek Corrections Center 6 (“SCCC”) in 2021 amounted to unconstitutional conduct. Dkt. 8. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges 7 that Defendant, SCCC’s Chaplain, violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to practice his 8 religion when he confiscated Plaintiff’s religious headwear (a “kufi”) upon Plaintiff’s arrival at 9 SCCC in 2021 and refused to return it. Id. at 2–4. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant 10 Wakeman retaliated against Plaintiff for his repeated requests for the kufi by “threatening to 11 make me send out my religious headwear.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief as well as 12 compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 7. 13 On December 11, 2023, Plaintiff was released from incarceration. See Dkt. 24 at 1; see 14 also Dkt. 15. After Defendant answered the Complaint on December 29, 2023, see Dkt. 14, the

15 Court issued a Pretrial Scheduling Order, setting forth various pretrial deadlines, Dkt. 16. On 16 June 3, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion for extension of time, requesting additional time to seek 17 leave to amend the Complaint. Dkt. 19. Without opposition from Defendant, the Court granted 18 Plaintiff’s Motion and set a deadline for him to file a motion for leave to file an amended 19 complaint along with a complete proposed amended complaint on or before August 26, 2024. 20 Dkt. 21. Plaintiff failed to file such a motion within that time period. See Dkt. Thus, on 21 September 30, 2024, the Court issued a new Pretrial Scheduling Order. Dkt. 22. 22 Plaintiff has now filed this Motion for a preliminary injunction. Dkt. 23. Defendant has 23 responded to the Motion. Dkt. 24.

24 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 The Court applies substantially identical standards when determining whether to issue a 3 temporary restraining order (“TRO”) or a preliminary injunction. See Lockheed Missile & Space 4 Co. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 887 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (N.D. Cal. 1995). This relief is “an

5 extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled 6 to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008); see also Rizzo v. 7 Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378 (1976) (stating injunctions are to be used sparingly, and only in a clear 8 and plain case). 9 The purpose of preliminary injunctive relief is to preserve the status quo or prevent 10 irreparable injury pending the resolution of the underlying claim. Sierra On-line, Inc. v. Phoenix 11 Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984). The party seeking such relief must show that 12 (1) “he is likely to succeed on the merits,” (2) “he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence 13 of preliminary relief,” (3) “the balance of equities tips in his favor,” and (4) “an injunction is in the 14 public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.

15 Alternatively, a TRO or preliminary injunction is appropriate if “‘serious questions going 16 to the merits were raised and the balance of the hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor,’” 17 which allows the status quo to be preserved when complex legal questions require further 18 inspection or deliberation. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 19 2011) (quoting The Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008)). Nonetheless, the 20 plaintiff must still show that irreparable injury is likely and that the injunction is in the public 21 interest. Id. 22 Finally, in a preliminary injunction, it is appropriate to grant “intermediate relief of the 23 same character as that which may be granted finally.” De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States,

24 1 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945); Kaimowitz v. Orlando, 122 F.3d 41, 43 (11th Cir. 1997). However, a 2 court should not issue an injunction when the relief sought is not of the same character and the 3 injunction deals with a matter lying wholly outside the issues in the underlying action. De Beers 4 Consol. Mines, 325 U.S. at 220.

5 The two claims pending in the Complaint filed in this case are: (1) Plaintiff’s First 6 Amendment rights were violated when Defendant confiscated Plaintiff’s religious headwear and 7 refused to return it; and (2) Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff in violation of his First 8 Amendment rights. See Dkt. 8. Plaintiff alleges his rights were violated by Defendant in 2021 9 while Plaintiff was incarcerated at SCCC. See id. 10 In the instant Motion, Plaintiff requests that the Court order Amin D. Kermani, Plaintiff’s 11 current CCO overseeing his post-release supervision, be removed as his case Officer. Dkt. 23. He 12 claims that in October 2024, an “altercation” occurred between himself and CCO Kermani, who at 13 that time was not assigned to Plaintiff’s supervision. Id. at 1. Following this altercation, CCO 14 Kermani assigned himself to Plaintiff’s case and allegedly began making “unnecessary requests

15 and threats regarding compliance.” Id. at 2. Examples of such “unnecessary requests,” according to 16 Plaintiff, include a request for information regarding Plaintiff’s job schedule and a requirement that 17 Plaintiff undergo an anger management assessment, despite Plaintiff having completed such 18 programs in 2013 and 2021. Id. 19 Plaintiff requests the Court order CCO Kermani be removed as his case Officer because 20 these requests and actions by CCO Kermani “may impede [Plaintiff’s] ability to litigate 21 effectively,” “may lead to unnecessary legal action against Plaintiff,” and “could jeopardize the 22 integrity of the ongoing lawsuit.” Id. Plaintiff also requests that the Court enjoin the Washington 23 Department of Corrections (“DOC”) from imposing unnecessary conditions on Plaintiff’s post-

24 1 release supervision “that impede his ability to litigate his ongoing lawsuit.” Id. at 3. The DOC is 2 not a defendant in this action. 3 The claims for injunctive relief raised in the instant Motion arise out of a completely 4 different set of facts than those alleged in the Complaint. In the Complaint, Plaintiff contends his

5 First Amendment rights were violated in 2021 when Defendant, SCCC’s Chaplain, confiscated his 6 religious headwear and retaliated against him. See Dkt. 8. In the instant Motion, Plaintiff contends 7 CCO Kermani, who is not a party to this case, made “unnecessary requests” of him once he 8 became Plaintiff’s supervising CCO in October 2024. Dkt. 23 at 1–2. Plaintiff has not alleged any 9 connection between Defendant Wakeman and the conduct alleged in this Motion. Without any 10 such connection, the injunctive relief sought here—the removal of CCO Kermani as Plaintiff’s 11 case Officer and a requirement that the DOC not impose unnecessary conditions on Plaintiff’s 12 post-release supervision—will not remedy the constitutional violations alleged in the Complaint. 13 See Dulaney v. Dyer, No. 1:14-cv-1051-LJO-BAM, 2015 WL 269244, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 14 2008) (“Since the relief sought would not remedy the violation of the Federal right at issue here,

15 the Court cannot grant the requested relief[.]”). Because his request is unrelated to his underlying 16 requested relief, Plaintiff’s request is improper here. 17 Further, even if the request were proper, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate the required 18 extraordinary circumstances for a preliminary injunction. Initially, Plaintiff has failed to show that 19 he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim. In the Motion, Plaintiff makes general allegations 20 that CCO Kermani may be infringing upon Plaintiff’s ability to litigate the underlying case. Dkt. 21 23 at 2. He claims CCO Kermani’s actions, which he terms as “harassment,” “may impede 22 [Plaintiff’s] ability to litigate effectively,” “may lead to unnecessary action against Plaintiff,” and 23 “could jeopardize the integrity of the ongoing lawsuit.” Id. (emphasis added). However, these

24 1 allegations are speculative and not supported by any actual harmful actions on the part of CCO 2 Kermani. While Plaintiff indicates that CCO Kermani requested Plaintiff’s job schedule and 3 required Plaintiff to undergo an anger management assessment, the Court will not make the 4 inferential leap that such requests have necessarily infringed upon Plaintiff’s ability to litigate his

5 underlying claims in this case. Without more specific evidence, Plaintiff cannot show he is entitled 6 to injunctive relief. 7 Additionally, Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of irreparable injury, because he has not 8 pleaded any actual harm beyond mere speculation that CCO Kermani has created a “climate of fear 9 that may lead to unnecessary legal action against Plaintiff.” Dkt. 23 at 2. Plaintiff has not detailed 10 what actions CCO Kermani has taken or could take to create a “climate of fear,” or even why this 11 hypothetical “climate of fear” would lead to legal action against Plaintiff. Rather, as Defendant 12 suggests, Plaintiff’s Motion amounts to a disagreement on how Plaintiff’s post-release supervision 13 should be conducted. See Dkt. 24 at 4. In essence, Plaintiff cannot show an irreparable injury that 14 an injunction would remedy because the “climate of fear” he describes only amounts to

15 speculative, rather than actual, injuries.1 16 In sum, the Court finds the allegations and preliminary injunctive relief raised in the instant 17 Motion are wholly unrelated to the claims alleged in the Complaint. Therefore, the Court lacks the 18 authority to issue the injunctive relief requested. See Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s 19 Med. Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 2015) (“When a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief based on 20 claims not pled in the complaint, the court does not have the authority to issue an injunction.”). 21 // 22

23 1 Because Plaintiff has not shown he is “‘likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,’ Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 274, we need not address the . . . remaining elements of the preliminary injunction standard.” 24 Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166, 1174 (9th Cir. 2011). 1 III. CONCLUSION 2 Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes Plaintiff is not entitled to a preliminary 3 injunction. Accordingly, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction 4 (Dkt. 23) be DENIED without prejudice.

5 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), the parties 6 shall have fourteen (14) days from service of this report to file written objections. See also Fed. 7 R. Civ. P. 6. Failure to file objections will result in a waiver of those objections for purposes of 8 de novo review by the district judge, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), and can result in a waiver of 9 those objections for purposes of appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 142 (1985); Miranda 10 v. Anchondo, 684 F.3d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Accommodating the time 11 limit imposed by Rule 72(b), the Clerk is directed to set the matter for consideration on 12 December 30, 2024, as noted in the caption. 13 Dated this 16th day of December, 2024. 14 A 15 16 Grady J. Leupold United States Magistrate Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24