Wilson v. Unknown Oceanside Police Officers

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 TEDDY LEROY WILSON, Case No.: 23-cv-270-TWR-DDL

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 15 OFFICERS, et al., Defendants. [Dkt. No. 25] 16

17 18 Plaintiff Teddy Leroy Wilson (“Plaintiff”) is proceeding pro se in this action 19 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the Court is a document titled “Protective Order for 20 Teddy LeRoy Wilson Jr. Plaintiff and Restraining Order Against Defendants,” by which 21 Plaintiff seeks a “protective order, restraining order and or stay away order” “so that 22 [Defendants] will not harass, harm, discriminate, stalk, [or] mob [him] or be privy to [his] 23 personal information” (the “Motion”). Dkt. No. 25. The Court construes Plaintiff’s filing 24 as a motion for a preliminary and permanent injunction. The Motion has been referred to 25 the undersigned for decision. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 I. 3 Plaintiff has sued various law enforcement personnel employed by the City of 4 Oceanside (among others), alleging they used “overexcessive force” against him during his 5 arrest at the Oceanside Transit Center on January 4, 2023. See generally Dkt. No. 1. 6 Plaintiff now moves for a “protection order” against Sgt. Jeffrey Brandt, Michelle 7 Alaracon, and Officers Daniel Post, Aaron Weirich, Billy Walker, Natalie Laser and Dustin 8 Lundy of the City of Oceanside (collectively herein, “Defendants”) and T. Nelson of 9 “County Probation.”1 Dkt. No. 25 at 1. Plaintiff states such an order is necessary so that 10 the named officers “will not retaliate against [him] for filing this civil case. . . or approch 11 [sic] [him] to provoke an incedent [sic] and make it look like a normal routine stop.” Id. 12 Plaintiff states he fears the officers will “recognize [him] on the street . . . [and] provoke 13 an incedent [sic] with no probable cause.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff requests the Court enter a “life 14 time protective order,” prohibiting the named officers and their colleagues, friends or 15 family from “committing or allowing harmful acts to happen again.” Id. 16 II. 18 Notwithstanding Defendants’ assertion that “[c]ivil restraining orders as Plaintiff 19 requests here come under the jurisdiction of the state court and are governed under Code 20 of Civil Procedure [section] 527.6” (Dkt. No. 31 at 3), the Court finds federal law governs 21 this federal civil rights action. Because “courts have an independent obligation to police 22 their own subject matter jurisdiction, including the parties’ standing,” Animal Legal Def. 23 Fund v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 935 F.3d 858, 866 (9th Cir. 2019), the Court further 24 finds Plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive relief under well-established Supreme 25 Court authority. 26

27 28 1 T. Nelson has not yet appeared in the action. 1 In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (hereinafter “Lyons”), plaintiff 2 Lyons was allegedly injured when police officers applied a “chokehold” during a routine 3 traffic stop. Id. at 97. He sought a preliminary and permanent injunction against the use 4 of such chokeholds, asserting he “justifiably fear[ed] that any contact he ha[d] with Los 5 Angeles police officers may result in his being choked … without provocation.” Id. at 97- 6 98. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s entry of the injunction, finding Lyons’s 7 “abstract injury” did not create an “actual case or controversy” and thus, the trial court 8 lacked jurisdiction to grant the requested relief. Id. at 101-02; see also id. at 107 (finding 9 Lyons’s allegations “an insufficient basis to provide a federal court with jurisdiction to 10 entertain” the request for injunctive relief).2 The Lyons court explained: 11 That Lyons may have been illegally choked by the police on [the date of his 12 stop], while presumably affording Lyons standing to claim damages against 13 the individual officers . . . does nothing to establish a real and immediate threat that he would again be stopped . . . by an officer or officers who would 14 illegally choke him into unconsciousness without any provocation or 15 resistance on his part. 16 Id. at 106. In other words, even assuming the truth of Lyons’s allegations of 17 unconstitutional conduct during his traffic stop, it was “surely no more than speculation to 18 assert” those circumstances would be repeated. Id. at 108. The Supreme Court has clarified 19 that “[a]lthough imminence is a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond 20 its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III 21 purposes,” and reiterated that “allegations of possible future injury” are insufficient to 22 confer standing. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (emphasis in 23 original). 24 The Lyons court alternatively held that even if Lyons’s standing were assumed, he 25 would not be entitled to seek injunctive relief, because “th[at] equitable remedy is 26 27 28 1 unavailable absent a showing of irreparable injury, a requirement that cannot be met where 2 there is no showing of any real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will be wronged again 3 . . ..” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111. The Supreme Court concluded “[t]he speculative nature of 4 Lyons’[s] claim of future injury requires a finding that this prerequisite of equitable relief 5 has not been fulfilled.” Id. The Supreme Court declined to relax the prerequisites for 6 equitable relief in Lyons’s case, “recogniz[ing] the need for . . . restraint in the issuance of 7 injunctions against state officers engaged in the administration of the states’ criminal laws 8 in the absence of irreparable injury which is both great and immediate.” Id. at 112; see 9 also Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The Supreme 10 Court has repeatedly cautioned that, absent a threat of immediate and irreparable harm, the 11 federal courts should not enjoin a state to conduct its business in a particular way.”). 12 The Court finds the reasoning in Lyons fatal to Plaintiff’s Motion. As in Lyons, 13 Plaintiff’s single encounter with Defendants does not establish that further such encounters 14 are imminent or likely. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105; see also McDonald v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 15 506 F. Supp. 3d 969, 988 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (dismissing claim for injunctive relief where 16 plaintiff “ha[d] not shown a sufficient likelihood that police officers will further violate his 17 rights”). And, as in Lyons, Plaintiff’s fear that Defendants or their unnamed “co-workers,” 18 “friends” and “family” will “recognize [Plaintiff] on the street” and “provoke” an incident 19 with him or read his “confidential documents,” including his diary (see Dkt. No. 25 at 2), 20 “is no more than conjecture.” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 108; accord Wolfe v. City of Portland, 21 566 F. Supp. 3d 1069, 1079 (D. Or. 2021) (to establish standing to seek injunctive relief, 22 “[t]he threat of repeated future injury . . . may not be conjectural or hypothetical”). 23 Accordingly, the Court concludes it lacks jurisdiction to grant Plaintiff a “life time 24 protective order” (Dkt. No. 23 at 2) or, alternatively, that Plaintiff has not established the 25 necessary “real and immediate threat” to entitle him to injunctive relief. See Lyons, 461 26 U.S. at 107, 111. 27 / / / 28 / / / I Il. 3 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for a Protective Order [Dkt. No. 25] is 4 || DENIED. 5 |} IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 || Dated: October 4, 2023 _—_— 7 Tb hohe A 8 “Hon. DavidD.Leshner SCS 9 United States Magistrate Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28