308 Ga. 306 FINAL COPY
S20A0027. WILSON v. THE STATE.
ELLINGTON, Justice.
Following a jury trial, Robert Wilson was convicted of the
murder of his infant son, Trey.1 He appeals, challenging only the
sufficiency of the evidence. Specifically, Wilson contends that the
evidence that he is the person who caused Trey’s fatal injuries was
entirely circumstantial and that the evidence presented at trial did
not exclude his reasonable hypothesis that Lashawn Dugger, the
victim’s mother, fatally injured the victim. For the reasons set forth
below, we disagree and affirm Wilson’s conviction.
1 The crimes occurred on February 23, 2007. A Telfair County grand jury
returned an indictment on March 19, 2007, charging Wilson with felony murder (Count 1) and cruelty to children in the first degree (Count 2). Following a jury trial ending on March 26, 2008, Wilson was found guilty on both counts, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment for murder. Count 2 merged with Count 1. Wilson filed a motion for a new trial on April 10, 2008. After a December 4, 2018 hearing, more than ten years later, the court denied the motion for a new trial on March 15, 2019. Wilson filed a timely notice of appeal, and his appeal was docketed in this Court for the term beginning in December 2019 and submitted for decision on the briefs. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict,2 the evidence
showed the following. On February 23, 2007, between 11:00 and
11:30 a.m., Dugger and Wilson took their six-month-old son, Trey,
to visit Dugger’s sister, Sacha Bennett, while she was on a break at
her job. On the way home, Dugger and Wilson picked up lunch and
returned home. Dugger testified that, after they ate lunch, Trey
vomited, and she changed Trey’s clothes in the living room, cleaned
him up with a wet wipe, gave him a bottle of Pedialyte, and laid him
on the couch. Dugger was due at her job at the Telfair State Prison
at 1:45 p.m. that day for a briefing before the 2:00 to 10:00 p.m. shift
that she worked. She called a restaurant and placed an order for a
meal to take to work, put on her uniform, and left at approximately
1:00 p.m. so she would have time to pick up her food order, drive to
the prison, and process through the security gates to reach the
briefing room. Dugger’s supervisor testified that Dugger was at the
1:45 p.m. briefing that day.
2 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560)
(1979). After Dugger left for work, Vincent Clark, a friend of Wilson’s,
stopped by to visit Wilson. Clark testified that it was “probably
about” or “close to” 2:00 p.m. when he arrived and that Trey was
lying asleep on the sofa and slept the whole time he was there. Clark
testified that he stayed for “30 minutes to an hour or something like
that,” watching television and talking with Wilson, and left “about
2:45 [p.m.] or something like that,” after his mother telephoned him,
although he could not remember the exact time. On cross-
examination, Clark testified that he was “sure” that he did not leave
at 2:00 p.m. that day. As Clark was leaving, Trey spit up a little bit.
Shortly before 3:00 p.m., Wilson went across the street to ask
a neighbor for a ride to the hospital, stating that his son was sick.
The first neighbor he asked was not available, but another neighbor,
Shawn Brown, who was already in his car getting ready to run an
errand, agreed to take Wilson and Trey to the hospital. Wilson went
back to his home to get Trey, and they set out for the hospital. Wilson
testified at trial that Trey had a heartbeat and was breathing when
they got into Brown’s car. During the drive, which took about five to six minutes, Wilson told Brown to hurry because he feared that Trey
had stopped breathing. Wilson called Bennett on the way to the
hospital, said he was not sure whether Trey was breathing, and
asked her to meet him at the hospital. He testified that he would
have been unable to reach Dugger, because she was not allowed to
carry her cell phone while she was on duty at the prison.
Brown, Wilson, and Trey arrived at the hospital between 3:00
and 3:10 p.m., and Bennett arrived a few minutes later. According
to the hospital’s records, Trey was assessed at 3:10 p.m., and at that
time he was not breathing, his heart was not beating, and he was
cool to the touch, with a temperature of 94 degrees. With
medications and continued CPR, the medical team was able to revive
Trey briefly around 4:25 p.m., with a very low heartbeat that was
sustained with artificial respiration for a short period. After further
unsuccessful efforts to revive the child, he was pronounced dead at
5:10 p.m.
The medical examiner, a forensic pathologist, performed an
autopsy. He found extensive internal bleeding from very severe lacerations to Trey’s liver as a result of an extreme degree of blunt
force trauma to the abdomen. The medical examiner testified that
the liver injury was of the severity one might see in a motor vehicle
accident or a fall from a four-story building. He testified that the
severity of the liver injury was not consistent with an accidental
cause, such as falling off a bed or being dropped into a bathtub. In
the medical examiner’s professional opinion, the survival time from
infliction of such a liver injury to death would range from several
minutes to 30 minutes, with 45 minutes being “a best case scenario”
but “very unlikely.”
The medical examiner found a large bruise on the victim’s
abdomen, which overlay the internal injuries, and opined that the
same blunt force likely caused both the abdominal bruising and the
liver injury. He testified that, because CPR is performed when the
patient’s heart is not beating, and because bruises typically do not
form when the heart is not circulating blood effectively, CPR
typically does not cause any bruising. In addition, the medical
examiner testified that the abdominal bruise was not in the area where the medical staff would have done chest compressions for
CPR. A nurse who assisted in the resuscitation efforts also testified
that the marks on the child’s abdomen were not in a location
consistent with the location of the chest compressions the medical
team performed, stating that the marks were much lower and to the
left.
During the autopsy, the medical examiner also found some
recent head injuries, specifically, a quarter-sized bruise on Trey’s
forehead and a mild to moderate amount of subarachnoid
hemorrhage, which indicated recent head trauma. In addition, he
found eight non-recent rib fractures in various stages of healing. The
medical examiner determined that the cause of death was traumatic
injuries of the head and abdomen. In his opinion, the liver injury
alone was enough to cause Trey’s death, and the head injuries
possibly shortened the time from the liver injury to death.
OCGA § 24-14-6 provides: “To warrant a conviction on
circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent
with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.”
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
308 Ga. 306 FINAL COPY
S20A0027. WILSON v. THE STATE.
ELLINGTON, Justice.
Following a jury trial, Robert Wilson was convicted of the
murder of his infant son, Trey.1 He appeals, challenging only the
sufficiency of the evidence. Specifically, Wilson contends that the
evidence that he is the person who caused Trey’s fatal injuries was
entirely circumstantial and that the evidence presented at trial did
not exclude his reasonable hypothesis that Lashawn Dugger, the
victim’s mother, fatally injured the victim. For the reasons set forth
below, we disagree and affirm Wilson’s conviction.
1 The crimes occurred on February 23, 2007. A Telfair County grand jury
returned an indictment on March 19, 2007, charging Wilson with felony murder (Count 1) and cruelty to children in the first degree (Count 2). Following a jury trial ending on March 26, 2008, Wilson was found guilty on both counts, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment for murder. Count 2 merged with Count 1. Wilson filed a motion for a new trial on April 10, 2008. After a December 4, 2018 hearing, more than ten years later, the court denied the motion for a new trial on March 15, 2019. Wilson filed a timely notice of appeal, and his appeal was docketed in this Court for the term beginning in December 2019 and submitted for decision on the briefs. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict,2 the evidence
showed the following. On February 23, 2007, between 11:00 and
11:30 a.m., Dugger and Wilson took their six-month-old son, Trey,
to visit Dugger’s sister, Sacha Bennett, while she was on a break at
her job. On the way home, Dugger and Wilson picked up lunch and
returned home. Dugger testified that, after they ate lunch, Trey
vomited, and she changed Trey’s clothes in the living room, cleaned
him up with a wet wipe, gave him a bottle of Pedialyte, and laid him
on the couch. Dugger was due at her job at the Telfair State Prison
at 1:45 p.m. that day for a briefing before the 2:00 to 10:00 p.m. shift
that she worked. She called a restaurant and placed an order for a
meal to take to work, put on her uniform, and left at approximately
1:00 p.m. so she would have time to pick up her food order, drive to
the prison, and process through the security gates to reach the
briefing room. Dugger’s supervisor testified that Dugger was at the
1:45 p.m. briefing that day.
2 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560)
(1979). After Dugger left for work, Vincent Clark, a friend of Wilson’s,
stopped by to visit Wilson. Clark testified that it was “probably
about” or “close to” 2:00 p.m. when he arrived and that Trey was
lying asleep on the sofa and slept the whole time he was there. Clark
testified that he stayed for “30 minutes to an hour or something like
that,” watching television and talking with Wilson, and left “about
2:45 [p.m.] or something like that,” after his mother telephoned him,
although he could not remember the exact time. On cross-
examination, Clark testified that he was “sure” that he did not leave
at 2:00 p.m. that day. As Clark was leaving, Trey spit up a little bit.
Shortly before 3:00 p.m., Wilson went across the street to ask
a neighbor for a ride to the hospital, stating that his son was sick.
The first neighbor he asked was not available, but another neighbor,
Shawn Brown, who was already in his car getting ready to run an
errand, agreed to take Wilson and Trey to the hospital. Wilson went
back to his home to get Trey, and they set out for the hospital. Wilson
testified at trial that Trey had a heartbeat and was breathing when
they got into Brown’s car. During the drive, which took about five to six minutes, Wilson told Brown to hurry because he feared that Trey
had stopped breathing. Wilson called Bennett on the way to the
hospital, said he was not sure whether Trey was breathing, and
asked her to meet him at the hospital. He testified that he would
have been unable to reach Dugger, because she was not allowed to
carry her cell phone while she was on duty at the prison.
Brown, Wilson, and Trey arrived at the hospital between 3:00
and 3:10 p.m., and Bennett arrived a few minutes later. According
to the hospital’s records, Trey was assessed at 3:10 p.m., and at that
time he was not breathing, his heart was not beating, and he was
cool to the touch, with a temperature of 94 degrees. With
medications and continued CPR, the medical team was able to revive
Trey briefly around 4:25 p.m., with a very low heartbeat that was
sustained with artificial respiration for a short period. After further
unsuccessful efforts to revive the child, he was pronounced dead at
5:10 p.m.
The medical examiner, a forensic pathologist, performed an
autopsy. He found extensive internal bleeding from very severe lacerations to Trey’s liver as a result of an extreme degree of blunt
force trauma to the abdomen. The medical examiner testified that
the liver injury was of the severity one might see in a motor vehicle
accident or a fall from a four-story building. He testified that the
severity of the liver injury was not consistent with an accidental
cause, such as falling off a bed or being dropped into a bathtub. In
the medical examiner’s professional opinion, the survival time from
infliction of such a liver injury to death would range from several
minutes to 30 minutes, with 45 minutes being “a best case scenario”
but “very unlikely.”
The medical examiner found a large bruise on the victim’s
abdomen, which overlay the internal injuries, and opined that the
same blunt force likely caused both the abdominal bruising and the
liver injury. He testified that, because CPR is performed when the
patient’s heart is not beating, and because bruises typically do not
form when the heart is not circulating blood effectively, CPR
typically does not cause any bruising. In addition, the medical
examiner testified that the abdominal bruise was not in the area where the medical staff would have done chest compressions for
CPR. A nurse who assisted in the resuscitation efforts also testified
that the marks on the child’s abdomen were not in a location
consistent with the location of the chest compressions the medical
team performed, stating that the marks were much lower and to the
left.
During the autopsy, the medical examiner also found some
recent head injuries, specifically, a quarter-sized bruise on Trey’s
forehead and a mild to moderate amount of subarachnoid
hemorrhage, which indicated recent head trauma. In addition, he
found eight non-recent rib fractures in various stages of healing. The
medical examiner determined that the cause of death was traumatic
injuries of the head and abdomen. In his opinion, the liver injury
alone was enough to cause Trey’s death, and the head injuries
possibly shortened the time from the liver injury to death.
OCGA § 24-14-6 provides: “To warrant a conviction on
circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent
with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.”
The reasonableness of an alternative hypothesis raised by a defendant is a question principally for the jury, and when the jury is authorized to find that the evidence, though circumstantial, is sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of the accused’s guilt, this Court will not disturb that finding unless it is insupportable as a matter of law.
Cochran v. State, 305 Ga. 827, 829 (1) (828 SE2d 338) (2019)
(citation and punctuation omitted). Wilson contends that the
evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to exclude the
hypothesis that Dugger injured Trey, either intentionally or
accidentally, before she left for work. Wilson testified in his own
defense, and his version of events differed from Dugger’s in certain
respects. While Dugger testified that she did not take Trey out of the
living room to clean him and that she left for work at about 1:00
p.m., Wilson testified that Dugger took Trey to the bathroom to clean
him and that she left for work “a little bit after 1:30 [p.m.].” He notes
that the medical examiner could not say “with certainty” that Trey
would have expired by bleeding to death within 45 minutes after
receiving the injury but could only say that it was “very unlikely” that Trey would have lived as long as 45 minutes. In addition,
Wilson points to Dugger’s testimony that Trey was sickly from birth
and that she was overwhelmed in the early months when she was
his primary caregiver. Wilson also posits that the rib fractures that
were in various stages of healing when Trey died would have been
sustained during the period when Dugger was the primary
caregiver, suggesting that she had previously abused him.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, however, we
conclude that the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational jury
to reject Wilson’s hypothetical version of events and to find him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder predicated on
cruelty to children in the first degree. See OCGA § 16-5-70 (b) (“Any
person commits the offense of cruelty to children in the first degree
when such person maliciously causes a child under the age of 18
cruel or excessive physical or mental pain.”). The evidence
established that the only possible perpetrators of the fatal
abdominal trauma were Wilson or Dugger. Contrary to Wilson’s
argument, the evidence was not consistent with the victim being injured by being handled roughly or being dropped into the bathtub.
The expert opinion evidence established that death would have
occurred within 45 minutes after the abdominal trauma and likely
sooner than that. Dugger’s last opportunity to injure the victim was
before 1:30 p.m., even according to Wilson’s timeline, which would
have resulted in death by 2:15 p.m. at the very latest. According to
Clark’s testimony, he saw the victim alive at about 2:45 p.m. And
according to Wilson, the victim was alive at the beginning of the
short drive to the hospital, close to 3:00 p.m. The evidence
authorized the jury to reject as unreasonable Wilson’s hypothesis
that Dugger injured the victim before she left for work. See Nixon v.
State, 284 Ga. 800, 802-803 (671 SE2d 503) (2009); Lindo v. State,
278 Ga. App. 228, 234-235 (3) (628 SE2d 665) (2006). The evidence
was sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process. See Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
Accordingly, we affirm Wilson’s felony murder conviction.
Judgment affirmed. Melton, C. J., Nahmias, P. J., and Blackwell, Boggs, Peterson, Warren, and Bethel, JJ., concur. DECIDED MARCH 13, 2020. Murder. Telfair Superior Court. Before Judge Johnson. Steven M. Harrison, for appellant. Timothy G. Vaughn, District Attorney, Keely K. Pitts, Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Michael A. Oldham, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.