Wilson v. Ridgeway

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: January 25, 2021
• Docket: 4:20-cv-00381
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

7 MICHAEL GEARY WILSON, Case No. 20-cv-00381-PJH 8 Plaintiff,

9 v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 10 KARL CURTIS ROGER RIDGEWAY, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 23 11 Defendants. 12

13 14 Before the court is defendants Karl Ridgeway, Jack Benthall, Austin Cole, and 15 Olivia Ridgeway’s (“defendants”) motion to dismiss. The matter is fully briefed and 16 suitable for decision without oral argument. Having read the parties’ papers and carefully 17 considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, 18 the court rules as follows. 19 BACKGROUND 20 On January 17, 2020, pro se plaintiff Michael Wilson (“plaintiff”) filed a complaint 21 against defendants, Dkt. 1, and an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), Dkt. 22 2. Because plaintiff had not paid the filing fee, the court reviewed his complaint as 23 required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and dismissed it, with leave to amend, for failing to state a 24 claim. Dkt. 5. On April 13, 2020, plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC,” Dkt. 7) 25 and a renewed IFP application, Dkt. 8. The court reviewed plaintiff’s amended complaint 26 and dismissed all but one of plaintiff’s claims, finding the remaining third claim for 27 intentional interference with contractual relations was not clearly frivolous. Dkt. 13 at 13. 1 jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction over the case, id. at 13 n.2; however, out of an 2 abundance of caution, the court permitted plaintiff’s third claim to proceed. For a broader 3 recitation of the factual allegations in this case, the court refers to its March 19, 2020 4 order. Dkt. 5 at 1–3. 5 On December 11, 2020, defendants filed a document styled as an answer to the 6 complaint, Dkt. 23, which the court construed as a motion to dismiss for lack of personal 7 jurisdiction on December 22, 2020, Dkt. 26. Between December 19, 2020 and January 5, 8 2021, plaintiff filed a declaration in response to defendants’ filing, Dkt. 24, an opposition 9 to that filing, Dkt. 25, a declaration in response to the court’s order, Dkt. 27, a document 10 styled as a report of felonies, Dkt. 28, and a purported second amended complaint, Dkt. 11 29. Defendants have filed a reply. Dkt. 33. Plaintiff has filed an additional notice. Dkt. 12 35. 13 DISCUSSION 14 A. Legal Standard 15 “Courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter 16 jurisdiction exists, even when no party challenges it.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 17 94 (2010). Federal courts are presumed to lack subject matter jurisdiction, and the 18 plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that subject matter jurisdiction is proper. See 19 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). If the court determines 20 that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, then the action must be dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 12(h)(3). 22 Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over cases where the amount in 23 controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and where the matter in 24 controversy is between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). “Where the 25 plaintiff originally files in federal court, ‘the amount in controversy is determined from the 26 face of the pleadings.’” Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka, 27 599 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “The amount in controversy 1 dispute—controls so long as the claim is made in good faith.” Id. “To justify dismissal, it 2 must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional 3 amount.” Id. 4 B. Analysis 5 As an initial matter, the court addresses plaintiff’s purported second amended 6 complaint, (“SAC,” Dkt. 29), which, if valid, would moot defendants’ motion to dismiss. 7 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1) permits a party to amend its pleading once as a 8 matter of course within 21 days after serving it or 21 days after service of a motion under 9 Rule 12(b), whichever is earlier. Defendants’ responsive pleading was filed on the docket 10 on December 11, 2020. Dkt. 23. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, filed January 5, 11 2021, is more than 21 days after defendants’ pleading. While the court did not construe 12 defendants’ filing as a Rule 12(b)(2) motion until December 22, 2020, defendants’ filing 13 put plaintiff on notice that they moved for relief. See Dkt. 23, ¶ 12 (“[W]e motion [sic] that 14 the third and only claim be dismissed with prejudice.”). 15 As a general rule, courts have a liberal policy favoring amendments to pleadings, 16 which is “applied even more liberally to pro se litigants.” Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 17 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1987). Nonetheless, permitting amendment is not warranted in this 18 situation for four reasons. First, as mentioned, plaintiff’s amended complaint is untimely, 19 and plaintiff failed to secure leave of court to file an amended complaint. Second, he has 20 already been permitted a previous opportunity to amend his complaint in response to this 21 court’s March 19, 2020 order. Dkt. 5 at 10–11. Third, his second amended complaint 22 attempts to plead dozens of new claims in direct contravention of this court’s August 7, 23 2020 order that “[n]o new parties or causes of action may be pleaded without leave of 24 court or the agreement of defendants, once served.” Dkt. 13 at 13. Plaintiff has not 25 secured leave of court or the agreement of all defendants. Fourth, the court does not 26 have subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s remaining claim, for the reasons discussed 27 below. 1 amount-in-controversy exceeded $75,000 despite the conclusory allegation that it did. 2 Dkt. 26 at 2. The court directed plaintiff to demonstrate that the amount-in-controversy 3 exceeds the $75,000 threshold as required by title 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Id. at 3. 4 Plaintiff’s third claim for intentional interference with contractual relations alleges 5 that defendants knew about his power of attorney contract with his sister and disrupted 6 performance of the contract. See FAC ¶¶ 88–100. The question here is whether plaintiff 7 has made a good faith allegation regarding his damages for the purported interference 8 with the contract. Plaintiff has attached a copy of the power of attorney to one of his 9 recent filings, Dkt. 28 at 16, and also quotes portions of the agreement in his second 10 amended complaint. It provides for “reasonable compensation for services provided on 11 my behalf pursuant to this power of attorney. My agent will be reimbursed for all 12 reasonable expenses incurred relating to his or her responsibilities under this power of 13 attorney.” SAC ¶ 13.15; Dkt. 28 at 16. Plaintiff’s stepmother resigned as agent on 14 October 26, 2019 thereby designating plaintiff as successor, SAC ¶ 38, until he resigned 15 on December 17, 2019, id. ¶ 52. Plaintiff alleges that, during that period as his sister’s 16 agent, he performed over 400 hours of services. Id. ¶ 13.22. 17 In his amended complaint,1 plaintiff alleges that his sister has not paid him 18 reasonable compensation for his more than 400 hours of service under the power of 19 attorney and, because he alleges his billing rate is $150 per hour, he calculates that he 20 earned at least $60,000 in compensation. SAC ¶ 72. He also states that if defendants 21 had not interfered with the power of attorney then he would have continued to perform 22 such services indefinitely. Id. ¶ 73. In this scenario, plaintiff estimates he would have 23 worked 200 hours in 2020, multiplied by his rate of $150 per hour, which yields at least 24 $30,000 in compensation. Id. He also alleges that he incurred $10,376.82 in expenses. 25 Id. ¶ 63. Based on plaintiff’s other filings, that amount is money that plaintiff’s stepmother 26

27 1 While the second amended complaint did not supersede the operative first amended 1 paid on behalf of plaintiff’s sister and plaintiff states that he committed to reimburse his 2 stepmother on his sister’s behalf. Dkt. 28, ¶¶ 14–15. In his January 20, 2021 filing, 3 plaintiff claims that his sister owes him waiting time penalties under the California Labor 4 Code. Dkt. 35 at 4. 5 Generally, a plaintiff’s amount-in-controversy allegations control as long as they 6 are made in good faith. There are several reasons why plaintiff’s claims are not made in 7 good faith. Significantly, in a different civil action in this district, Judge Chesney has 8 compiled a summary of plaintiff Wilson’s civil filings in this district and determined him to 9 be a vexatious litigant. See Wilson v. Leigh Law Group, P.C., et al., No. 20-cv-3045- 10 MMC, Dkt. 51 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2020). While Judge Chesney’s vexatious litigant order 11 is limited to the parties in her cases, the order determined plaintiff’s repeat filings to be 12 both frivolous and constituting a pattern of harassment. See id. at 11–12. Those findings 13 echo similar patterns in plaintiff’s cases before this court in which he has abused the in 14 forma pauperis process and failed to follow court orders. See Wilson v. City of Walnut 15 Creek, et al., No. 20-cv-2721-PJH; Wilson v. Judicial Council of Cal., Superior Court of 16 Cal. for the Cnty. of Marin, et al., No. 20-cv-6764-PJH. The same is true in this case. 17 See, e.g., Dkt. 12; Dkt. 27 at 1–2. 18 Given that history and the prior complaints in this case, it is clear that plaintiff’s 19 allegations are solely intended to allege an amount over $75,000 so that his claims 20 remain in federal court.2 It is notable that plaintiff’s own sister filed a statement in which 21 she avers that plaintiff’s 400 hours “is an exaggeration.” Dkt. 23 at 4. In the reply filed by 22 defendants, she also stated that “[t]he first I heard about [plaintiff’s] demand for 23 compensation was when the defendants received his federal lawsuit.” Dkt. 33 at 15. 24 Plaintiff has not provided any accounting for his purported 400 hours of work other than 25 his self-serving claims that he performed that work. The fact that plaintiff now alleges he 26

27 2 Even if the court were to determine it had subject matter jurisdiction, it is clear that this 1 is his sister’s employee under the California Labor Code such that she owed him waiting 2 time penalties, Dkt. 35 at 4, only reinforces the conclusion that plaintiff is not alleging his 3 damages in good faith. 4 In sum, plaintiff’s amount-in-controversy allegations are not in good faith and do 5 not meet the requirements for subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 6 Additionally, because all defendants are residents of the state of South Carolina 7 and have not consented to jurisdiction in California, the court does not have personal 8 jurisdiction over them. “Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining the 9 bounds of their jurisdiction over persons.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283 (2014) 10 (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014)). California’s long-arm statute 11 permits jurisdiction “to the full extent permissible under the U.S. Constitution.” Daimler, 12 571 U.S. at 125 (citing Cal. Civ. Prov. Code § 410.10). 13 General jurisdiction over individuals is permitted where they are domiciled. 14 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011). In this 15 case, defendants are residents of South Carolina and general jurisdiction is not 16 applicable. Alternatively, there is no specific jurisdiction, which “looks to the defendant’s 17 contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside 18 there.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 284 (citation omitted). Applying here, defendants have no 19 contacts with California; rather, they are alleged to have directed some conduct towards 20 plaintiff and it is plaintiff who resides in California. Courts “have consistently rejected 21 attempts to satisfy the defendant-focused ‘minimum contacts’ inquiry by demonstrating 22 contacts between the plaintiff . . . and the forum State,” id., and that is exactly what 23 plaintiff attempts to do here—use his California residency to establish contacts with the 24 state. 25 Accordingly, the court finds it does not have either general or specific jurisdiction 26 and plaintiff’s claim must be dismissed. 27 CONCLUSION 1 over plaintiff’s claim or personal jurisdiction over defendants. The court DISMISSES 2 plaintiff’s remaining claim without prejudice so that he may pursue it in state court and 3 DENIES leave to amend. See Kelly v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 377 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th 4 Cir. 2004) (directing district court that lacked subject matter jurisdiction to dismiss claims 5 without prejudice). 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 Dated: January 25, 2021 8 /s/ Phyllis J. Hamilton PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON 9 United States District Judge

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