Wilson v. Otto (In re Wilson)

31 B.R. 392, 9 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 307, 1983 Bankr. LEXIS 5872
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. California
DecidedJune 30, 1983
DocketBankruptcy No. 82-00208-P7; Adv. No. C82-0650-P7
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 31 B.R. 392 (Wilson v. Otto (In re Wilson)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wilson v. Otto (In re Wilson), 31 B.R. 392, 9 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 307, 1983 Bankr. LEXIS 5872 (Cal. 1983).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION

ROSS M. PYLE, Bankruptcy Judge.

Donald and Barbara Wilson the plaintiff-debtors, filed a joint petition under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., hereinafter, “Code”) on January 20, 1982. An order discharging the debtors from their obligations was entered on June 7, 1982. Prior to discharge, the Wilsons brought this action pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) to avoid the defendant, John Otto’s, judicial lien, alleging that Otto’s lien impairs the Wilsons’ scheduled homestead exemptions.

Schedule B^4 of their Petition reflects that the Wilsons chose to take advantage of [393]*393both the federal and state homestead exemptions on their residence. Barbara Wilson claimed a $7,500 exemption under § 522(d)(1) of the Code, and Donald Wilson claimed a state exemption of $45,000 under California Civil Code Section 1237.

The parties stipulated to the following pertinent facts: (a) that a judgment was entered in the Municipal Court of California in favor of Otto against Donald Wilson, in the sum of $597.51 on August 7, 1979, and that an abstract of judgment was duly recorded on September 27, 1979; (b) that the recorded abstract of judgment constituted a lien on all the real property of the judgment debtor; and (c) that the market value of the Wilsons’ home is $140,000 subject to encumbrances in the following priorities:

First Trust Deed Coastal Savings $87,000
Judgment John Otto $ 7501
Judgment Joseph Vanni, Sr. $20,5002
Judgment Bank of America $40,0002

The question presented to the Court concerns Donald Wilson’s state homestead exemption. The Wilsons claim that the correct amount of the California exemption is $45,000; Otto argues that it is $40,000. The determination of this issue will ultimately be dispositive of the case. The stipulated facts show that, excluding judicial liens, there is $53,000 of equity in the residential property. Subtracting the two uncontested federal exemptions leaves us with $45,200.3 Since Otto’s lien is for $750, if the correct amount of the California exemption is $45,-000, the exemption is impaired and § 522(f)(1) would operate to nullify the lien; if the proper amount is $40,000, Otto’s lien does not impair the Wilsons’ homestead exemptions and would remain valid.

Otto argues that the allowed state exemption should be $40,000, the amount that was provided in California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1237 at the time his judicial lien arose in 1979.4 The Wilsons claim entitlement to the larger current exemption amount, as scheduled, because no objection was filed within the 15 day limitation period set forth in this District’s Local Bankruptcy Rule 32. They assert that Otto is barred from now raising any objection to the claimed amount as a defense to the complaint to avoid lien, citing as authority Judge Meyers’ decision in In re Skipwith, 9 B.R. 730 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Cal.1981).

DISCUSSION

Amount of Cal. Civil Code Section 1237 Homestead Exemption

The Wilsons argue that under Skipwith, supra, “it is clear that the debtors can take advantage of the increase in homestead exemption unless challenged by a creditor” (Plaintiff’s Trial Brief, p. 3, 11.2-4), and that in this case there was no challenge since Otto did not comply with Local Bankruptcy Rule 32. Judge Meyers in Skipwith, supra, determined that a trustee has no powers under § 544(a) which support a challenge to an increase in an exemption occurring prior to the filing of a petition. Skipwith, supra at 737. However, as alluded to by the Wilsons, Judge Meyers specifically refrained from “foreclosing the possibility that individual pre-existing creditors might maintain their own cause of action based on retained rights they may have to attack the increase.” Skipwith, supra at 738.

[394]*394Otto is the pre-existing creditor anticipated by Judge Meyers. Therefore, the only real issue is: Does Otto’s failure to comply with this Court’s Local Bankruptcy Rule 32 preclude him from asserting his rights as a pre-existing creditor by affirmative defense in a lien avoidance adversary proceeding brought by the Debtor.

Section 522(7) of the Code provides as follows:

“The debtor shall file a list of property that the debtor claims as exempt under subsection (b) of this section. If the debtor does not file such a list, a dependent of the debtor may file such a list, or may claim property as exempt from property of the estate on behalf of the debtor. Unless a party in interest objects, the property claimed as exempt on such list is exempt.”

No time period for objection is specified in this section. However Local Bankruptcy Rule 32 sets a limitation period of 15 days from the conclusion of the § 341(a) meeting within which a party in interest can object to a Debtor’s claim of exemptions. It is conceded that no objection was filed within this 15 day period. Local Bankruptcy Rule 32 was adopted to establish necessary procedures for the efficient administration of cases under the Code, and more particularly, to effectuate the intent of § 522(7).

While recognizing the important function of its Local Rules, this Court holds that the existence of Rule 32 does not preclude Otto’s challenge to the Wilsons’ California homestead exemption in the procedural context of this case.

The Bankruptcy Court in Martine v. Cipa, 11 B.R. 968 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Penn.1981) was faced with a similar situation. There a Debtor attempted to avoid a creditor’s lien under § 522(f), asserting that the creditor was barred from objecting to the amount of the Debtor’s exemption because she had failed to file her objection to the claimed amount of exemption within the time period specified in the Court’s previous order.5 Judge Gibson excused the creditor’s delay, basing his decision on the equities in the case, stating that the delay did not prejudice the Debtor in any way, and that a refusal to consider the merits would be extremely unfair to the creditors of the Debtor’s estate. Cipa, supra at 970. Although in Cipa there was no local rule analogous to this Court’s Rule 32, the equities dictate a similar result in this case.

Local Rules are promulgated primarily to promote the efficiency of the enacting court, and that court has a large measure of discretion in applying those rules. United States v. Simmons, 476 F.2d 33, 35 (9th Cir.1973); Telemart Enterprises Inc., 524 F.2d 761, 766 (9th Cir.1975); Lance, Inc. v. Dewco Services, Inc., 422 F.2d 778, 783-784 (9th Cir.1970). In this case, Local Rule 32 was intended to promote the speedy definition of the amount of property in the Debt- or’s estate. This decision does not hinder that policy.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
31 B.R. 392, 9 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 307, 1983 Bankr. LEXIS 5872, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wilson-v-otto-in-re-wilson-casb-1983.