Wilson v. Morton

1911 OK 453, 119 P. 213, 29 Okla. 745, 1911 Okla. LEXIS 380
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
DecidedNovember 14, 1911
Docket2388
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 1911 OK 453 (Wilson v. Morton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wilson v. Morton, 1911 OK 453, 119 P. 213, 29 Okla. 745, 1911 Okla. LEXIS 380 (Okla. 1911).

Opinion

*748 HAYES, J.

(After stating the facts as above). By agreement or concession of counsel there is but one proposition of law presented by this proceeding. That' question is: ■ Whether the proceedings: taken and had 'by Blanche Keeler, guardian, in making the sale of her wards’ interests in the lands, was in substantial compliance with the requirements of section 22 of an act of Congress, approved April 26, 1906 (34 U. S. Stat. at L. c. 1876, p. 145). dt is the contention of plaintiff in error that in making a-sale of a minor Indian’s lands under said statute the statute of probate procedure of the state regulating the sale,of real estate of minors shall be followed, and that, since it was not followed in this case, the sale is void. This contention necessarily presents as the first question for determination whether the state statute prescribing the procedure for sale of minors’ lands has any application to the sale made under section 22 of the federal statute. • Our decision upon this question renders it unnecessary to decide whether the departure in the procedure pursued in this case from the procedure .prescribed by the state statutes would render the sale void or only voidable.

What is required in order to make a valid sale under section 22 of..the federal statute is now presented to this court for the first time. There may have been other cases decided by the court heretofore, under the facts of which this question could have’been presented. If so, our attention was not challenged or directed thereto, and no decision thereon has ever been made-The trial court took the view that said section 22 fixes 'within its own terms the procedure to be followed in making a sale thereunder, and that no other statute has any application thereto. In that view we concur. Section 22 of the act of Congress of April 26, 1906, reads as follows: ■ ■

“That the adult heirs of any deceased Indian of either of the Five Civilized Tribes whose selection has been made, or to whom a deed or patent has been issued for his or her share of the land of the tribe to which'he or she belongs or belonged, may sell and convey the lands inherited from such decedent; and if there be both adult and minor heirs of sucli decedent, then such minors may join in a sale of such lands by a guardian duly appointed *749 by the- proper United States court for the Indian Territory. And in case of the organization of a state or territory, then by a proper court of the county in which said minor or minors may reside or in which said real estate is situated, upon an order of such court made upon petition filed by guardian. All conveyances made under this provision by heirs who are full-blood Indians are to be subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe.”

Congress by this statute intended to and did remove all restrictions upon the alienation of lands inherited from deceased Indians of the Five Civilized Tribes in the hands of adult heirs, which had been placed thereon by the various acts and treaties of Congress with the Indian tribes. It authorized all such adult heirs, except those of full blood, to sell their inherited lands without the approval of anyone; but full-blood adult heirs could convey only with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. The act does not undertake to remove generally the restrictions upon alienation by minor heirs. It does authorize under certain conditions certain minor heirs to convey. It is important in the construction of the statute and in arriving at the intent of the legislative will to notice the class of minor heirs whose inherited lands are authorized to be sold. The classification of those who may sell and those who may not sell is not made upon -the basis of the quantum of Indian blood of the heirs, as has been the case in all instances before and since this act, where Congress has attempted to remove restrictions upon the power of alienation of certain members of these tribes, but to retain them as to others. The power of the minor heir to sell is not made dependent upon whether he is a full-blood Indian or less than a full-blood, nor dependent upon his age, nor upon whether a sale of his land is necessary to his education' and support, or to be made for the purpose of investment. His authority to sell by his guardian is made dependent upon the existence of an adult heir, and, where there is an adult heir, authority is not given to the minor to sell alone and separately his-interest, but he may, acting through his guardian,- upon order-of court, join the adult heir in a sale. The act does not specifically prescribe that the sale may *750 be made for the purpose or under the procedure prescribed by thp statute then in force in the Indian Territory, authorizing and providing for the sales of real estate of other minors than Indians; and, if said statutes or the statutes in force at the time of this sale ever had any application to the sales of minors’ lands made under said section 22 of the federal act, they must be held to have done so by implication, and not by any express provision of the act. If Congress intended that the statutes in force in the Indian Territory at the time of the passage of this act should fix the'procedux-e to be followed in making such sales at the passage of the act, it may be assumed that Congress knew what such statutes were; and, if the procedure prescribed by the statutes would in a large measure defeat the legislative purpose in permitting minor heirs to join the adult 'heirs in the sale, the act ought not to be held by mere implication to provide that such sales should be governed by those statutes. In placing restrictions upon the alienation by Indian allottees of the Five Civilized Tribes of their allotted lands, the legislative purpose was to protect the Indian against his own improvidence, against the cunning of those who, through cupidity, might undertake to procure from them their lands at inadequate prices, and to protect them against the superior business ability of his more experienced white neighbors until such Indians might become familiar with their lands and their value, and sufficiently adapted to the new condition in which they were placed by a division of their tribal property that they could realize the full value of their lands when the same were placed upon the market by them. In authorizing the adult heirs to sell their inherited lands, Congress correctly anticipated that many cases would arise in which there would be 'both adult and minor heirs, each holding an undivided interest in the lands of a deceased allottee; and, unless some provision was made for the minor heirs to join with the adult heirs in the sale of the entire property, the very property which the act authorizes the adults to sell would be attended with conditions that would greatly tend to prevent those Indians whom the government had theretofore kept under its protecting care from securing the *751 market value of their interest in their inherited estates; and, if the adult heirs sold their lands, then the minor heirs, on becoming of age, or when the restriction should be removed from their power to sell, would find their opportunities to sell to any one except the purchaser from the adult heir greatly lessened and the value of their property greatly depreciated on that account before they had power or opportunity to convey.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1911 OK 453, 119 P. 213, 29 Okla. 745, 1911 Okla. LEXIS 380, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wilson-v-morton-okla-1911.