Wilson v. IDOC

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Illinois
DecidedMay 25, 2022
Docket3:20-cv-00141
StatusUnknown

This text of Wilson v. IDOC (Wilson v. IDOC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wilson v. IDOC, (S.D. Ill. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DARREN WILSON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) Case No. 3:20-cv-00141-GCS ) PERCY MYERS, ) CHRISTINE BROWN, ) and ) ROB JEFFREYS, )

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER SISON, Magistrate Judge: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND Pending before the Court are Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. (Doc. 65, 66, 68, 69, 78).1 Plaintiff opposes the motions. (Doc. 74, 75). Based on the following, the Court GRANTS the motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff Darren Wilson, an inmate currently incarcerated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center (“Pinckneyville”), alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in treating injuries to both of his knees and refusing to provide him with a knee brace. He seeks declaratory judgment, monetary damages, and injunctive relief. Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his complaint:

1 Along with the motions for summary judgment, Defendants filed the required Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 notice informing Plaintiff of the consequences of failing to respond to the motions for summary judgment and what is required in responding to a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 67, 70). On September 5, 2018, Plaintiff injured his left knee. He saw Dr. Myers for the injury, and an x-ray was ordered. The x-ray confirmed a broken knee. Despite being diagnosed with

a broken knee, Dr. Myers refused to follow-up on the injury and denied Plaintiff medical treatment for the injury. (Doc. 1, p. 5). A nurse practitioner later ordered an MRI for Plaintiff’s knee, which Dr. Myers canceled. Plaintiff also alleges that Christine Brown was deliberately indifferent in treating his left knee by lying and telling Plaintiff that he would be seen by a specialist. She also told Plaintiff that he was approved for surgery and would receive physical therapy, but those procedures had been approved for his right knee, not

his left. Id. Plaintiff also alleges that he received improper treatment for injuries to his right knee. He alleges that Dr. Garcia initially refused to send him to a specialist. (Doc. 1, p. 8). In June 2018, he received physical therapy, but he could not bend his knee due to it being displaced. The physical therapist also informed Dr. Myers that he should consider

sending Plaintiff to a surgeon. Id. at p. 9. The surgeon found that Plaintiff had complications with his right knee since 2009. Plaintiff was unable to bend his knee or leg, and as a result, surgical options were limited. He was referred to a knee reconstruction specialist, but the specialist found that surgery would not be helpful at because the knee went untreated for ten years. Id. The surgeon later wrote back indicating that she would

provide Plaintiff with another medical opinion, but he has been refused a referral back to the surgeon. Id. at p. 10. On March 30, 2019, Plaintiff fell, but Dr. Myers refused to provide him any treatment for the knee. Id. at p. 9. Plaintiff also alleges that he is a qualified individual with a disability and was previously prescribed an immobilizer knee brace for his right knee. That brace was taken

away from him in 2009, and he has tried to obtain another one from 2009 to 2019 to no avail. Because Plaintiff does not have access to a knee brace, he has fallen and injured himself on numerous occasions. Plaintiff notes that he has now received the knee brace, but he went without such a brace for several years because the Defendants improperly denied his request for one. (Doc. 1, p. 13). On April 6, 2020, the Court conducted a threshold review of Plaintiff’s complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff was allowed to proceed with two counts of deliberate indifference in violation of the Eight Amendment: Count 1 against Brown and Dr. Myers regarding the treatment Plaintiff received for the injury to his left knee; and Count 2 against Dr. Myers and Dr. Garcia regarding the treatment Plaintiff received for the injury to his right knee. Plaintiff was also allowed to proceed in Count 3 against Rob

Jeffreys, in his official capacity only, on a claim pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and/or Rehabilitation Act (“RA”) due to the fact that the facility took away and refused to replace his immobilizer knee brace. (Doc. 9).2 Both Defendants Myers and Brown maintain that they are entitled to summary judgment as Plaintiff cannot set forth any evidence that they were deliberately indifferent

to his serious medical needs in treating his knees. Specifically, Defendant Myers contends that the records clearly show that the injury to Plaintiff’s left knee did not constitute a

2 On August 26, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss Defendant Dr. Hector Garcia from the lawsuit. (Doc. 49). serious medical need and that his treatment of the left knee was appropriate. As to the right knee, Defendant Myers contends that he ordered x-rays, prescribed pain

medications, and referred Plaintiff to orthopedic surgical evaluations. Once it was determined that Plaintiff was not a surgical candidate for his right knee, Defendant Myers continued to provide conservative treatment. Likewise, Defendant Brown argues that Plaintiff received continued medical treatment for his left knee. Additionally, Brown did not provide medical assistance as part of her job responsibilities, and she was not able to order a particular treatment for any inmate.

Defendant Jeffreys also maintains that he is entitled to summary judgment as Plaintiff cannot establish that he was denied reasonable accommodations related to his alleged disability. The evidence shows that his use of an immobilizer brace was discontinued by medical staff upon his transfer to Pinckneyville. Plaintiff counters that the evidence shows that Defendants Myers and Brown were

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Plaintiff further notes that his need for the immobilizer is based on a serious medical condition regarding his knee. FACTS The following facts are taken from the record and presented in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences are drawn in

his favor. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009). During the relevant times alleged in the complaint, Plaintiff was housed in Pinckneyville.3

Defendant Christine Brown, a registered nurse, was the Health Care Unit Administrator (“HCUA”) at Pinckneyville. Defendant Brown’s responsibilities as the HCUA are to direct, coordinate, and review the activities of the healthcare operations in conjunction with the Medical Director and the Nursing Director. Defendant Brown does not treat patients in her administrative role; nor does she make decisions regarding the medical care of prisoners. In reviewing medical and ADA related grievances, it was

customary for Defendant Brown to review an inmate’s medical chart and Medication Administration Record (“MAR”). Defendant Brown would also speak with the Director of Nursing and the Pharmacy Technician, or housing unit officer depending on the issue grieved. As to Plaintiff’s medical care grievances, Defendant Brown would have reviewed Plaintiff’s chart and the MAR. (Doc. 73). She also would have spoken with the

Director of Nursing and the Pharmacy Technician before providing a response to the grievance officer. Id. Since June 13, 2018, Defendant Dr. Percy Myers was employed as the Medical Director at Pinckneyville. From May 23, 2017 to June 12, 2018, Myers was an independent contractor working as a physician at Pinckneyville.

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Wilson v. IDOC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wilson-v-idoc-ilsd-2022.