Wilson v. Georgia Power and Light Company

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Wilson v. Georgia Power and Light Company

36 S.E.2d 847, 73 Ga. App. 436, 1946 Ga. App. LEXIS 325

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedFebruary 7, 1946

Docket31038.

StatusPublished

This text of 36 S.E.2d 847 (Wilson v. Georgia Power and Light Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Wilson v. Georgia Power and Light Company, 36 S.E.2d 847, 73 Ga. App. 436, 1946 Ga. App. LEXIS 325 (Ga. Ct. App. 1946).

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Opinion

Broyles, C. J.

(After stating the foregoing facts.) The general rule is that a resident of a city can not recover damages, in an action ex contractu or in an action ex delicto, from a waterworks company, for a loss by fire caused by a failure of the company to furnish, in accordance with its contract with the city, a sufficient supply of water to extinguish the fire. Fowler v. Athens City Waterworks Co., 83 Ga. 219 (9 S. E. 673, 20 Am. St. R. 313); Holloway v. Macon &c. Co., 132 Ga. 387 (64 S. E. 330); Gnann v. Coastal Co., 44 Ga. App. 217 (160 S. E. 807); Martha Mills v. Moseley, 50 Ga. App. 536 (179 S. E. 159); Washington Water Co. *438 v. Pope Mfg. Co., 176 Ga. 155, 161 (167 S. E. 286). However, counsel for the plaintiff in error earnestly contends that the instant case is an exception to the above-stated general rule, because the heretofore-quoted provision of the city ordinance granting the franchise to the defendant imposed upon it a legal duty, owed to any resident .of the city whose house was on fire, to furnish a sufficient supply of water to extinguish the fire. In order to have that question finally determined, this court certified the question to the Supreme Court; and that court in its answer to the question held that the provision in question of the city ordinance did not constitute this case an exception to the general rule, since the ordinance “makes no effort to prescribe the specific acts of diligence, but simply provides that the waterworks company shall be liable for and save the city harmless from any claim for damages on account of negligence. This could have no meaning other than such damages as are recoverable under the law.”

Under that ruling of the Supreme Court and the facts set forth in the petition, the trial court did not err in dismissing the petition on general demurrer.

Judgment affirmed.

MacIntyre and Gardner, JJ., concur.

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Broyles, C. J.

(After stating the foregoing facts.) The general rule is that a resident of a city can not recover damages, in an action ex contractu or in an action ex delicto, from a waterworks company, for a loss by fire caused by a failure of the company to furnish, in accordance with its contract with the city, a sufficient supply of water to extinguish the fire. Fowler v. Athens City Waterworks Co., 83 Ga. 219 (9 S. E. 673, 20 Am. St. R. 313); Holloway v. Macon &c. Co., 132 Ga. 387 (64 S. E. 330); Gnann v. Coastal Co., 44 Ga. App. 217 (160 S. E. 807); Martha Mills v. Moseley, 50 Ga. App. 536 (179 S. E. 159); Washington Water Co. *438 v. Pope Mfg. Co., 176 Ga. 155, 161 (167 S. E. 286). However, counsel for the plaintiff in error earnestly contends that the instant case is an exception to the above-stated general rule, because the heretofore-quoted provision of the city ordinance granting the franchise to the defendant imposed upon it a legal duty, owed to any resident .of the city whose house was on fire, to furnish a sufficient supply of water to extinguish the fire. In order to have that question finally determined, this court certified the question to the Supreme Court; and that court in its answer to the question held that the provision in question of the city ordinance did not constitute this case an exception to the general rule, since the ordinance “makes no effort to prescribe the specific acts of diligence, but simply provides that the waterworks company shall be liable for and save the city harmless from any claim for damages on account of negligence. This could have no meaning other than such damages as are recoverable under the law.”

Under that ruling of the Supreme Court and the facts set forth in the petition, the trial court did not err in dismissing the petition on general demurrer.

Judgment affirmed.

MacIntyre and Gardner, JJ., concur.

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36 S.E.2d 847, 73 Ga. App. 436, 1946 Ga. App. LEXIS 325, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wilson-v-georgia-power-and-light-company-gactapp-1946.

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