Wilson v. Department of Public Safety

66 F. App'x 791
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedMay 14, 2003
Docket02-6236
StatusUnpublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 66 F. App'x 791 (Wilson v. Department of Public Safety) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wilson v. Department of Public Safety, 66 F. App'x 791 (10th Cir. 2003).

Opinion

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

PER CURIAM.

Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (IFP), Anthony Wilson filed this civil action against the Oklahoma Department of Public Safety and Oklahoma Highway Patrol Trooper Derrick Ware, alleging that Trooper Ware stopped Mr. Wilson’s car because of Mr. Wilson’s race. Mr. Wilson asserted that Trooper Ware violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and that the Department of Public Safety violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Mr. Wilson also asserted tort claims under Oklahoma law.

The district court dismissed Mr. Wilson’s complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and also concluded that it was frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)®. Additionally, the court imposed conditions upon Mr. Wilson’s filing of future lawsuits in the Western District of Oklahoma. Upon review of the record, we conclude that the district court erred in dismissing Mr. Wilson’s complaint. Accordingly, we grant Mr. Wilson’s motion to proceed IFP in this appeal, vacate the district court’s order of dismissal (including the conditions for future filings), and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

Mr. Wilson’s complaint alleges that, late in the evening on October 10, 2001, Trooper Ware stopped his car without legal justification. Mr. Wilson states that he “obeyed all traffic laws, drove at the rate *793 of the posted speed limit, wore his seat-belt, and stayed within his respective lane.” Rec. doc. 1, at 2 (Complaint, filed Jan. 3, 2002). According to Mr. Wilson, Trooper Ware stated that he had stopped Mr. Wilson because Mr. Wilson was “laying down in his seat” and could not see the road. Id. However, Mr. Wilson alleges, the real reason for the stop was that Trooper Ware “targeted [Mr. Wilson] for stop and detention due to the fact [that] [Mr. Wilson] is a black male in a predominantly non-minority area during late night.” Id. Mr. Wilson adds that Trooper Ware threw Mr. Wilson’s insurance verification card at him, striking him in the arm. He asserted claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Oklahoma law.

The district court dismissed Mr. Wilson’s claims on alternative grounds. The court first concluded that Mr. Wilson’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In the alternative, the court held that Mr. Wilson’s complaint was frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

As to the claim that Trooper Ware lacked a legitimate ground for the traffic stop, the court noted that the complaint acknowledged that Trooper Ware’s stated reason for making the stop was that Mr. Wilson’s seat was reclined. The district court then noted that Mr. Wilson had failed to allege that his seat was not reclined. See Rec. doc. 30, at 6 (Dist. Ct. Order, filed June 20, 2002) (stating that “[o]ther than plaintiffs own opinions, there are no facts alleged to support plaintiffs claim that the stop was not conducted for the reason given,” “[t]he obvious fact tending to support a claim that the Trooper’s reason was false would be that the plaintiffs seatback was not reclined,” and “[t]his fact is missing from the plaintiffs complaint”). As to Mr. Wilson’s allegations under Title VI, the court concluded that the failure to contest the legitimate basis for the traffic stop warranted dismissal of that claim as well. Id. at 9. Finally, the court held that the Oklahoma Department of Public Safety was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from Mr. Wilson’s state law claims. Id. at 11.

The district court then held that Mr. Wilson’s complaint “lacks well-pleaded factual allegations and relies entirely upon allegations of conclusions or opinions.” Id. at 14. It therefore concluded that the complaint was frivolous.

Finally, the court noted that since 1998, Mr. Wilson had filed eight other lawsuits in the Western District of Oklahoma. Although the court did not find that these other actions were frivolous, id., it did state that “the frivolous nature of this lawsuit, combined with plaintiffs previous litigation history, suggests that [Mr. Wilson] may be perilously close to abusing the privilege of bringing in forma pauperis actions in this court.” Id. at 15. Accordingly, the court imposed the following restrictions upon Mr. Wilson: (1) in any future complaints, Mr. Wilson must list all previous lawsuits he had filed in the Western District of Oklahoma, including the case number; and (2) in any future complaints, Mr. Wilson must also state that the court dismissed this case on the alternative ground of frivolousness. Id.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Mr. Wilson contends that the district court erred in dismissing his constitutional claims and his Title VI claims. He also challenges the imposition of conditions on future filings. He does not challenge the dismissal of his state law claims.

Additionally, Mr. Wilson moves to proceed IFP in this appeal. We may only *794 grant such a motion if Mr. Wilson “show[s] a financial inability to pay the required filing fees and the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal.” DeBardeleben v. Quinlan, 937 F.2d 502, 505 (10th Cir.1991). There is no dispute that Mr. Wilson meets the financial requirements of IFP. As we discuss below, he also meets the other requirements.

A. Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Claims

We begin our analysis with Mr. Wilson’s two constitutional claims—that the traffic stop conducted by Trooper Ware on the evening of October 11, 2001 violated Mr. Wilson’s rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. These two constitutional provisions support different causes of action.

As the district court observed, under the Fourth Amendment, a traffic stop must be reasonable, that is, the stop must be “based on an observed traffic violation” or “the police officer [must have a] reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring.” Rec. doc. 30, at 5 (citing United States v. Bustillos-Munoz, 235 F.3d 505, 512 (10th Cir.2000)); see also United States v. Ramstad, 308 F.3d 1139

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66 F. App'x 791, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wilson-v-department-of-public-safety-ca10-2003.