Wilson v. City of Pontiac

292 N.W. 565, 294 Mich. 79
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedMay 22, 1940
DocketCalendar 41,203
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 292 N.W. 565 (Wilson v. City of Pontiac) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wilson v. City of Pontiac, 292 N.W. 565, 294 Mich. 79 (Mich. 1940).

Opinion

Butzel, J.

This is an original petition for mandamus by a taxpayer of the city of Pontiac to direct the .city of Pontiac to place on its tax rolls immediately all parcels of land sold under the “scavenger” act (Act No. 155, Pub. Acts 1937, as amended by Act No. 244, Pub. Acts 1939 [Comp. Laws Supp. 1940, § 3723-1 et seq., Stat. Ann. § 7.951 et seq.]), irrespective of whether the State land office board has executed deeds or contracts. The attorney general has intervened to oppose the petition.

According to the allegations of the petition, a “scavenger” sale was started in Oakland county on February 13, 1940, and certain lands were bid in in accordance with section 7 of the act (set forth in the margin). Some of the lands were bid in-by strangers *81 to the title who deposited cash, but no deeds have yet been issued by the State land office board; other lands were bid in by “owners” as defined in section 5 (set forth in the margin), and arrangements were made to purchase on contract as permitted by section 7, but no contracts have yet been issued. In obedience to *82 tbe duty imposed by section 7, repeated in section 9, tbe State land office board notified tbe treasurer of Oakland county, wbo in turn notified defendants of tbe sales of tbe properties offered at tbe scavenger sale. Plaintiff claims that tbe properties thus sold became taxable “from tbe moment tbe gavel fell elos *83 rng the sale, ’ ’ and that it was the duty of the assessing officer of the city of Pontiac or the hoard of review immediately to place these properties on the assessment rolls, even if the owner not be known at the time (1 Comp. Laws 1929, §3412 [Stat. Ann. §7.24]). Plaintiff claims that the refusal of defendants to *84 place these properties on the assessment rolls creates an inequality in the distribution of the tax burden and increases the amount of taxes plaintiff will be obliged to pay for the year 1940. In defendants ’ return to the order to show cause, the sale of the properties and notification thereof are admitted, but it is claimed *85 that the properties should not he placed on the tax roll because no deeds or contracts have been issued, and that until such issuance the properties still belong to the State of Michigan and are exempt from the general tax laws as State lands (general property-tax law, 1 Comp. Laws 1929, § 3395 [Stat. Ann. § 7.7]), *86 and that if these properties are illegally placed on the tax rolls and later ordered removed, the city of Pontiac will be charged back with the county and school taxes uncollected because of the unauthorized assessment.

The sole question before us in the instant case is whether the lands are subject to taxation when a bid is accepted, or whether the power to tax is deferred until a deed or contract is executed to the successful purchaser. Section 7 provides:

“No bid shall be accepted.unless payment in cash is made within 24 hours of the bid, and such bid shall remain open, for 24 hours. ’ ’

The second paragraph of section 7 declares:

“All such lands disposed of under contract or deed, except lands purchased and held by taxing units for public purposes, shall be immediately subject to taxation by the several taxing units having jurisdiction.”

The question is, when are the lands ‘ ‘ disposed of Í ” In interpreting the act our duty is to ascertain the meaning of the statute, to give it full force and effect, coloring our construction by the purpose of its enactment. The statute is remedial and is entitled to a liberal construction. Oakland County Treasurer v. Auditor General, 292 Mich. 58. It is said to be the duty of the court to draw inferences from the evident intent of the legislature, as gathered from a view of the law in its entirety; we must render effectual the specific things which are included in the broad and comprehensive terms and purposes of the law. At *87 torney General v. Railway Co., 210 Mich. 227; Oakland County Treasurer v. Auditor General, supra. The part of section 7 quoted above states that the lands sold shall be “immediately” subject to taxation. Section 8 referring to other lands subject to the jurisdiction and control of the board states that they shall be classified “with the end in view of rehabilitating such lands as rapidly and speedily as possible and returning said lands to the tax rolls.” The general tenor of the act is to rehabilitate for tax purposes, with certain exceptions, lands acquired by the State “by virtue of any tax sale.” In keeping with the policy of the act, we think the word “immediately” in section 7 refers to the time when a bid may be accepted as provided in the first paragraph of section 7, and not the time when the transaction may be culminated by the execution of a deed or land contract. The rights of one who ultimately acquires the land spring from the acceptance of a bid though defeasible, for that is the occasion which determines the purchase price and starts running the time limitations for the favored purchasers. The expression “disposed of under contract or deed” following the phrase “all such lands” in the second paragraph of section 7 is only descriptive of the lands for which bids have been accepted in accordance with the preceding paragraph of this section.

The charge is made by plaintiff and admitted by the defendants that, within the time prescribed, the State land office board by its agent in charge of its sale, in pursuance of section 7 of said act, as amended, reported to the county treasurer who, in turn, notified the defendants of the sales of the properties sold at the scavenger sale. Upon such notice, it became the duty of the defendants to place such properties on the assessment roll of the city of Pontiac for 1940 and subject them to taxation.

*88 A writ of mandamus shall issue in accordance with this opinion. No costs.

Bushnell, C. J., and Sharpe, Potter, Chandler, North, McAllister, and Wiest, JJ., concurred.

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118 N.W.2d 296 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1962)
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Bluebook (online)
292 N.W. 565, 294 Mich. 79, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wilson-v-city-of-pontiac-mich-1940.