1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 WILSON LEBRANDON WHITE, No. 2:24-cv-2273-TLN-CKD P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 MIKE GIBILISCO, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff Wilson LeBrandon White is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights 18 action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is before 19 the court. (ECF No. 37.) The motion should be granted because there is no genuine dispute of 20 material fact for trial. 22 Plaintiff initiated this case on August 21, 2024, and filed the operative third amended 23 complaint on October 30, 2024, naming defendants Gibilisco, Rowe, and Larsen. (ECF Nos. 1, 24 16.) After the screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), pursuant to plaintiff’s notice of 25 election and voluntary dismissal, the case proceeded only on retaliation and failure to protect 26 claims against defendant Larsen and retaliation and excessive force claims against defendant 27 Gibilisco. (See ECF Nos. 18, 23, 24.) 28 //// 1 On September 9, 2025, defendants Larsen and Gibilisco filed the motion for summary 2 judgment presently before the court, arguing the undisputed facts establish plaintiff failed to 3 comply with required procedural aspects of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act under Section 4 1997e(a). (ECF No. 37 at 13-17.) Defendants also argue plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law 5 and that they are entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. at 17-20.) Plaintiff filed a one-page 6 opposition to the motion stating his rights were violated and not otherwise addressing the matters 7 raised in the motion or the merits of the claims. (ECF No. 47.) Defendants filed a reply. (ECF No. 8 48.) 10 Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party shows there is “no genuine 11 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 12 Civ. P. 56(a). In order to obtain summary judgment, “[t]he moving party initially bears the burden 13 of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 14 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The 15 moving party may accomplish this by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, 16 including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, 17 stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admission, interrogatory 18 answers, or other materials” or by showing that such materials “do not establish the absence or 19 presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to 20 support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). 21 “Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need 22 only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Oracle 23 Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). 24 Summary judgment should be entered “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, 25 against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 26 essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” 27 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the 28 nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323. 1 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing 2 party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. 3 Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence 4 of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its 5 pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or 6 admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7 56(c)(1); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in 8 contention is material, i.e., a fact “that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing 9 law,” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific 10 Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., 11 “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” 12 Anderson, 447 U.S. at 248. 13 In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not 14 establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “‘the claimed factual 15 dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at 16 trial.’” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630 (quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 17 253, 288-89 (1968)). Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to pierce the pleadings and to 18 assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 19 587 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 20 “In evaluating the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact, [the 21 court] draw[s] all inferences supported by the evidence in favor of the non-moving party.” Walls 22 v. Central Contra Costa Transit Auth., 653 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). It is 23 the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be 24 drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). The opposing party 25 “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” 26 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citations omitted). “Where the record taken as a whole could not 27 lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 28 Id. at 587 (quoting First Nat’l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289). 2 I. Plaintiff’s Verified Allegations1 3 Plaintiff alleges that on June 27, 2024, at the Shasta County Jail, Deputy Larsen failed to 4 protect him from another inmate. (ECF No. 16 at 1, 3.) When the other inmate attacked plaintiff, 5 Larsen laughed and said, “that’s what you get for telling everything[.]” which was referring to 6 “several grievance and lawsuits on deputies for improper behavior in the pass (sic).” (Id. at 3, 4.) 7 Deputy Gibilisco issued a verbal command to plaintiff and the other inmate to stop 8 fighting. (ECF No. 16 at 5.) Plaintiff tried to explain that he was the one being attacked but 9 Gibilisco did not listen and tased plaintiff.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 WILSON LEBRANDON WHITE, No. 2:24-cv-2273-TLN-CKD P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 MIKE GIBILISCO, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff Wilson LeBrandon White is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights 18 action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is before 19 the court. (ECF No. 37.) The motion should be granted because there is no genuine dispute of 20 material fact for trial. 22 Plaintiff initiated this case on August 21, 2024, and filed the operative third amended 23 complaint on October 30, 2024, naming defendants Gibilisco, Rowe, and Larsen. (ECF Nos. 1, 24 16.) After the screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), pursuant to plaintiff’s notice of 25 election and voluntary dismissal, the case proceeded only on retaliation and failure to protect 26 claims against defendant Larsen and retaliation and excessive force claims against defendant 27 Gibilisco. (See ECF Nos. 18, 23, 24.) 28 //// 1 On September 9, 2025, defendants Larsen and Gibilisco filed the motion for summary 2 judgment presently before the court, arguing the undisputed facts establish plaintiff failed to 3 comply with required procedural aspects of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act under Section 4 1997e(a). (ECF No. 37 at 13-17.) Defendants also argue plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law 5 and that they are entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. at 17-20.) Plaintiff filed a one-page 6 opposition to the motion stating his rights were violated and not otherwise addressing the matters 7 raised in the motion or the merits of the claims. (ECF No. 47.) Defendants filed a reply. (ECF No. 8 48.) 10 Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party shows there is “no genuine 11 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 12 Civ. P. 56(a). In order to obtain summary judgment, “[t]he moving party initially bears the burden 13 of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 14 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The 15 moving party may accomplish this by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, 16 including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, 17 stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admission, interrogatory 18 answers, or other materials” or by showing that such materials “do not establish the absence or 19 presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to 20 support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). 21 “Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need 22 only prove that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Oracle 23 Corp., 627 F.3d at 387 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). 24 Summary judgment should be entered “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, 25 against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 26 essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” 27 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the 28 nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323. 1 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing 2 party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. 3 Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence 4 of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its 5 pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or 6 admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7 56(c)(1); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in 8 contention is material, i.e., a fact “that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing 9 law,” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific 10 Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., 11 “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” 12 Anderson, 447 U.S. at 248. 13 In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not 14 establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “‘the claimed factual 15 dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at 16 trial.’” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630 (quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 17 253, 288-89 (1968)). Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to pierce the pleadings and to 18 assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 19 587 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 20 “In evaluating the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact, [the 21 court] draw[s] all inferences supported by the evidence in favor of the non-moving party.” Walls 22 v. Central Contra Costa Transit Auth., 653 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). It is 23 the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be 24 drawn. Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). The opposing party 25 “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” 26 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citations omitted). “Where the record taken as a whole could not 27 lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 28 Id. at 587 (quoting First Nat’l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289). 2 I. Plaintiff’s Verified Allegations1 3 Plaintiff alleges that on June 27, 2024, at the Shasta County Jail, Deputy Larsen failed to 4 protect him from another inmate. (ECF No. 16 at 1, 3.) When the other inmate attacked plaintiff, 5 Larsen laughed and said, “that’s what you get for telling everything[.]” which was referring to 6 “several grievance and lawsuits on deputies for improper behavior in the pass (sic).” (Id. at 3, 4.) 7 Deputy Gibilisco issued a verbal command to plaintiff and the other inmate to stop 8 fighting. (ECF No. 16 at 5.) Plaintiff tried to explain that he was the one being attacked but 9 Gibilisco did not listen and tased plaintiff. (Id.) After plaintiff was down on the ground, Gibilisco 10 continued to tase plaintiff repeatedly, said “I’ll fry your ass,” called plaintiff a rat for filing 11 grievances and lawsuits against deputies at the jail, and said “now go tell them that.” (Id. at 5, 6.) 12 Larsen agreed plaintiff was a rat. (Id. at 5.) 13 II. Undisputed Facts from Defendants’ Evidence 14 The Shasta County Inmate Jail Handbook includes Section VII, on the jail’s Custody 15 Grievances Procedure, which has three levels of review. (ECF No. 37-3, ¶¶ 5, 6.) Plaintiff 16 received the Shasta County Jail Inmate Handbook on a jail-issued tablet and could use the jail- 17 issued tablets to file grievances. (Id., ¶¶ 6, 7.) As of December 24, 2025, plaintiff had submitted 18 74 grievances at the Shasta County Jail and utilized the jail’s procedures to escalate 23 of those 19 74 grievance submissions to level three of the grievance process. (Id., ¶¶ 4, 13.) 20 During that time period, plaintiff did not file any grievances against Deputy Larsen. (ECF 21 No. 37-3, ¶¶ 5, 7.) 22 Plaintiff filed a grievance about the tasing incident at issue in this case, #462975871, and 23 wrote “I’m having major head aches from the ring when I was attached in my cell and tased 2x I 24 1 In resolving this motion, the court credits plaintiff’s verified allegations in the first amended 25 complaint and the statements in his declaration signed under penalty of perjury (see ECF No. 60 at 7-13) to the extent they are based on plaintiff’s personal knowledge of specific, admissible 26 facts. See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2004); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 27 1132 n. 14 (9th Cir. 2000). Statements that are legal conclusions and statements that are speculative assertions do not raise a genuine dispute of fact. Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 28 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). 1 need medical attention ASAP this is urgent.” (ECF No. 37-3 at 344.) The grievance did not name 2 any deputies. (Id.) The grievance response indicates plaintiff was taken to be evaluated and was 3 medically cleared to return to housing. (Id. at 345.) The grievance was closed at level one of the 4 process. (Id.) 5 Plaintiff submitted a grievance, #462559881, against Deputy Gibilisco, which focuses on 6 plaintiff’s issues with being served his meals on a soft tray and also mentions Gibilisco “yelling” 7 at plaintiff and having “negative emotions” and stating “he knows he lied on his report[.]” (ECF 8 No. 37-3 at 339.) This grievance was denied at level three of the process. (Id.) 10 I. Exhaustion Requirement 11 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions 12 under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, 13 prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are 14 exhausted.” An inmate seeking money damages must complete the prison administrative process. 15 Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 734 (2001) 16 If undisputed evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff shows a failure 17 to exhaust, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of 18 Civil Procedure. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014). If there is at least a 19 genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was exhaustion, the motion for summary 20 judgment must be denied. See Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a). 21 II. Analysis 22 Plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he exhausted 23 administrative remedies on his retaliation, excessive force, and failure to protect claims arising 24 out of or related to the June 27, 2024, tasing incident at issue in this action. Defendants submit 25 evidence that plaintiff did not file any grievances against Deputy Larsen and did not file any 26 grievance against Deputy Gibilisco alleging any conduct at issue in this case. (ECF No. 37-3, ¶¶ 27 5, 7.) In addition, the only grievance plaintiff filed in connection with the tasing incident stated 28 plaintiff was “tased 2x” and neither named deputies nor described or complained of the alleged 1 | conduct or statements of any deputies in connection with the incident or surrounding events. (See 2 || id. at 344.) 3 This case should be dismissed without prejudice because there is no genuine issue of 4 || material fact as to whether plaintiff exhausted available administrative remedies with respect to 5 || his remaining claims against defendants Larsen and Gibilisco prior to filing this action. See Wyatt 6 || v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003) (the proper remedy for failure to exhaust 7 || nonjudicial remedies is dismissal of the claim without prejudice) (overruled on other grounds). In 8 | light of this determination, and in the interests of judicial economy, the court does not analyze 9 || defendants’ alternate arguments that these claims also fail as a matter of law and that they are 10 || entitled to qualified immunity. 12 For the reasons set forth above, IT IS RECOMMENDED as follows: 13 1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 37) be granted. 14 2. Plaintiff's remaining claims in the third amended complaint against defendants Larsen 15 and Gibilisco be dismissed for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies 16 prior to filing suit. 17 3. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case. 18 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 19 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days after 20 | being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with 21 || the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to 22 || Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be 23 || filed and served within 7 days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure 24 || to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s 25 || order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 26 | Dated: June 15, 2026 □□ I / dle ae
28 Wg wnit2273:ms UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE