Wilmington Shipping Co. v. United States

27 Cust. Ct. 335, 1951 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 1117
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedOctober 30, 1951
DocketNo. 55946; protest 148378-K (Wilmington)
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 27 Cust. Ct. 335 (Wilmington Shipping Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wilmington Shipping Co. v. United States, 27 Cust. Ct. 335, 1951 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 1117 (cusc 1951).

Opinion

Lawrence, Judge:

The plaintiff herein imported from.Canada a spare propeller and a tailshaft for use as spare parts on the M. V. Maruba which was laid up for repairs at the port of Wilmington, N. C.

Upon arrival of the merchandise, the importation was classified by the collector of customs as articles or wares not specially provided for, composed wholly or in chief value of base metal, pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 397 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U. S. C. § 1001, par. 397), as modified by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (82 Treas. Dec. 305, T. D. 51802), and duty was assessed thereon at the rate of 22)4 per centum ad valorem.

It is asserted by plaintiff in its protest that—

* * * ' Since these items were manufactured specifically for this vessel and cannot be used on any other vessel, it is our view and the view of the owners of the vessel that these items should be exempt from import duties in exactly the same manner as if they had been aboard this vessel upon its arrival in the United States.

At the trial, it was agreed between the parties that if the importation was not entitled to free entry, the collector’s classification and assessment of duty were correct.

The facts of the case are not disputed; the question presented by this controversy being purely one of law.

From the record it appears that the Maruba, after the expiration of a charter which engaged her in South American trade, entered Wilmington, N. C., for lay up and repairs. Prior to arrival of the vessel at Wilmington, she had suffered an accident in Venezuela, in which her propeller was broken. This made it necessary to install the spare propeller and tailshaft which were being carried aboard the vessel as spare parts. During her subsequent lay up at Wilmington, it was decided to restock the vessel with a spare propeller and tailshaft. An order was placed with the manufacturer of the original parts to fabricate a new propeller and tailshaft from the original drawings and specifications for this vessel, for forwarding to Wilmington to be placed aboard the vessel as spare parts. It was not the intention of the owner to use these two items in the general repairs then [336]*336taking place, but rather to have them as replacement parts in the event of some future accident or if a need should arise due to the normal wear and tear of the propelling machinery of the vessel. The new parts were ordered from the original plans and specifications of the motor vessel Maruba and could not be used on any other vessel.

It is the contention of plaintiff that—

* * * It seems to be an accepted practice and view of the courts that if these items had been constructed at the time the vessel was constructed and had accompanied the vessel, they would have been free of duty. We contend that these items were constructed when they were needed to be constructed, not until the spares on the vessel had been placed in use and left no spares; that they were constructed according to the original plans and specifications of the vessel, and for this vessel only, and that as such they should be entitled to free entry.

In support of its contention, plaintiff relies on the cases of Canadian National Steamship Co., Ltd. v. United States, 29 C. C. P. A. (Customs) 123, C. A. D. 180, and Page & Jones v. United States, 26 C. C. P. A. (Customs) 124, C. A. D. 5.

The two cases above cited are likewise relied upon by counsel for the defendant but for the purpose of negating plaintiff’s contention, and in addition reference is made to the case of A. Johnson & Co., Inc. v. United States, 17 Cust. Ct. 140, C. D. 1034.

We shall review the aforesaid cases seriatim and consider them with relation to the facts at bar.

In the Canadian National Steamship Co., Lid., case, supra, the merchandise involved consisted of a propeller and shaft which had been made specially for the Canadian steamship T. S. S. North Star at the time said vessel was constructed in England, and the cost thereof had been included in the original price of said vessel. The articles were carried on board the vessel from England to Canada and were intended to be carried and used on that vessel alone. Special circumstances arose which necessitated the removal of the articles from the vessel at Halifax, Nova Scotia. Subsequently, the North Star was disabled off the southeastern coast of the United States and put into the Charleston Navy Yard for repairs. The spare propeller and shaft were then sent from Halifax to Charleston for installation in the North Star. The collector at the port of Charleston classified said articles as manufactures of metal, not specially provided for, and assessed duty thereon as provided in paragraph 397 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U. S. C. § 1001, par. 397). Plaintiff therein claimed the articles to be free of duty. The appellate court reversed the trial court, which had overruled the protest, stating—

It is our view that the propeller and shaft in controversy, which could only be used upon this particular vessel, which were made especially for the vessel when it was constructed, and which were carried thereupon until necessity required their removal, are parts of the vessel. Indubitably, no one would have questioned the status of the merchandise if it had accompanied the vessel into the port of Charleston, S. C., and we think the circumstances under which it was removed from the vessel and subsequently placed thereon is not sufficient reason for holding it to be merchandise such as was held to be dutiable in the cases relied upon by the Government, to wit, Moral & Co v. United States, T. D. 29260, 16 Treas. Dec. 167; United States v. Sickel, 6 Ct. Cust. Appls. 146, T. D. 35394; Texas Transport & Terminal Co. v. United States, T. D. 45897, 62 Treas. Dec. 223; and Page & Jones v. United States, supra. [26 C. C. P. A. (Customs) 124, C.A.D. 5.]

The Page & Jones case, supra, upon which the parties to the present controversy rely in part, dealt with a steam turbine and parts thereof. It appears that the steamship San Fernando, of British registry, was bound for Mexico when she became disabled on the high seas and was towed into the port of Mobile, Ala. Her turbine engine and parts were shipped to England for repairs. Upon their [337]*337return from England, duty was imposed not only on the value of the repairs, but also on the value of the repaired machinery. . The appellate court cited with approval the holding of the trial court to the effect that—

* * * It was unquestionably a nonimportation and was so treated by the collector upon its original arrival in the United States, as an integral part of the San Fernando. But when it was removed from that vessel it became an engine and nothing more, and, as such, an article which may be exported and reimported, which was done. Upon its return it was a separate dutiable entity and was correctly so classified by the collector.

The case of A. Johnson & Co., Inc. v. United States, supra,

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Bluebook (online)
27 Cust. Ct. 335, 1951 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 1117, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wilmington-shipping-co-v-united-states-cusc-1951.