Wilmington Savings Fund Society v. Brick Simple

• Court: Superior Court of Delaware
• Decided: December 2, 2025
• Docket: N25C-03-051 FJJ
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND ) SOCIETY, FSB, ) ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) C.A. No.: N25C-03-051 FJJ ) BRICK SIMPLE, LLC and ) DETLEV D. ANSINN, JR., ) ) Defendants. ) ORDER

On Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Having considered Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants’

response and the arguments of the parties, it appears to the Court that:

1. On July 19, 2018, Brick Simple, LLC (“Brick Simple”) executed a

Promissory Note in favor of WSFS in the amount of $1,000,000. The note

was later amended to reduce the principal to $800,000. Detlev D. Ansinn,

Jr. (“Ansinn”) signed the note both as a member of Brick Simple and as

personal guarantor. 1

2. The Note provides: “Borrower will pay this loan in full immediately upon

Lender’s demand.”2

3. On or about January 3, 2025, despite no default on the part of the

1 Ansinn transcript 37; 24-38:4; 53:19-21. 2 Exhibit A to the complaint. Ansinn transcript 11:22-12:1.

1 Defendants, WSFS issued a demand letter requesting immediate payment.3

While Ansinn takes issue with whether he received the letter in his capacity

as the sole member of Brick Simple or in his capacity as guarantor of the

loan, there is no factual dispute that he received the demand letter. 4

4. The loan has not been paid. 5

5. The Note and Guaranty provide for recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs. 6

6. Superior Court Civil Rule 56(c) states a party seeking summary judgment

must show “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 7 “A genuine issue

of material fact is one that ‘may reasonably be resolved in favor of either

party.’”8 The court views the evidence provided “in a light most favorable

to the non-moving party.”9 The initial burden is on the moving party to show

there are no genuine issues of material fact. 10 The burden then shifts to the

non-moving party to show there is at least one material issue of fact in

dispute.11 The court must consider “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

3 See Exhibit B to the complaint. 4 Ansinn dep. transcript 20:1-20:3. 5 Cite 35-15. 6 Exhibit A and Exhibit B to the complaint. 7 Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c). 8 Saunders v. Lightwave Logic, Inc., 2024 WL 4512227, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 2024) (quoting Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680–81 (Del. 1979)). 9 Gibson v. Metro. Grp. Prop. And Cas. Ins. Co., 2017 WL 5606714, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 15, 2017) (citing Burkhart v. Davies, 602 A.2d 56, 59 (Del. 1991)). 10 Id. 11 Id.

2 interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any,” in

determining whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact,12 and

the court must “accept all undisputed factual assertions and accept the

nonmoving party’s version of any disputed facts.”13 However, any factual

inferences made in favor of the non-moving party must be reasonable.14

7. The Note is payable on demand; demand has been made by the Plaintiff on

the Defendants and the note remains unpaid. Despite this clear language,

Defendants contend that summary judgment is not appropriate. Defendants

claim that the loan documents are ambiguous and, as such, that allows the

Defendants to present evidence in support of their defense of waiver,

estoppel and/or acquiescence. The basis for these defenses is Defendants’

allegations that representatives of Plaintiff made statements that WSFS does

not call these loans (which is what happened in the instant case) and “we’re

not that kind of bank.” The sole ambiguity relied upon by the Defendants

is that the Loan Maturity Date is left blank in the Promissory Note dated

July 19, 2018. This absence of a maturity date does not render the loan

document ambiguous given that the note document clearly states the loan is

12 Coker v. Tenney-Andrews, 2016 WL 6659500, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 10, 2016) (quoting Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c)). 13 Id. (quoting Sztybel v. Walgreen Co., 2011 WL 2623930, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. June 29, 2011)). 14 Smith v. Haldeman, 2012 WL 3611895, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 2012) (citing Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corp. Of America, Inc., 1988 WL 16284, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. July 13, 1988).

3 a demand loan. Without an ambiguity in the loan documents, Defendants

may not rely upon parol evidence contradicting the clear terms of the loan

documents.15

8. Defendants maintain that there is a factual dispute over attorneys’ fees

because when the demand letter was sent on January 3, 2025, it said that

attorneys’ fees and costs were due as of January 2, 2025, and the loan was

not yet in default. I agree that attorneys’ fees would not have been due at

that point but that does not create a genuine issue of material fact. At oral

argument Plaintiff’s counsel agreed that no attorneys’ fees would be

requested for the 30-day period following January 3, 2025. I order that

attorneys’ fees are not permitted for work spend prior to February 3, 2025.

For the stated reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is

GRANTED with the provision that attorneys’ fees are not due prior to February

2, 2025. The parties shall meet and confer on a final form of order and submit

same within 10 days of the date of this order. If the parties cannot agree, Plaintiff

shall submit its form of order within 10 days of the date of this order and

Defendants shall file any objection with its own form of order within 5 days of

Plaintiff’s filing.

15 See Am. Healthcare Admin. Servs., Inc. v. Aizen, 285 A.3d 461, 475 (Del. Ch. 2022).

4 IT IS SO ORDERED this 2nd day of December, 2025.

/s/ Francis J. Jones, Jr. Francis J. Jones, Jr., Judge

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