MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2026 ME 49 Docket: And-25-270 Submitted On Briefs: January 21, 2026 Decided: May 28, 2026
Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, DOUGLAS, and LIPEZ, JJ, and HJELM, A.R.J. Concurrence: HJELM, A.R.J.
WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, FSB, AS TRUSTEE FOR BROUGHAM FUND I TRUST
v.
LEONARD M. CORTELLINO et al.
MEAD, J.
[¶1] Leonard M. Cortellino and Pauline A. Cortellino appeal from a
judgment of foreclosure and sale entered by the Superior Court (Androscoggin
County, Archer, J.), contending that the court erred in determining that, at the
time of the foreclosure action, the mortgage at issue was owned by Wilmington
Savings Fund Society, FSB, as Trustee for Brougham Fund I Trust and that the
court erred in concluding that the right-to-cure notice met the requirements of
14 M.R.S. § 6111 (2025).1 We conclude that the court did not err when it
determined that Wilmington Savings owned the mortgage, but we determine
1 Title 14 M.R.S. § 6111 has since been amended, though not in any way that affects this appeal. See P.L. 2025, ch. 275, §§ 1-3 (effective Jan. 1, 2026) (codified at 14 M.R.S. § 6111 (1-A)(G), (H), (I) (2026)). 2
that, as a matter of law, the notice of right to cure was fatally defective. On that
basis, we vacate the judgment and remand for entry of dismissal.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] “The trial court made the following factual findings, which are
supported by the record.” Wuestenberg v. Rancourt, 2020 ME 25, ¶ 2, 226 A.3d
227. On June 20, 2006, the Cortellinos executed a promissory note in the
principal amount of $293,250 in favor of Mortgage Lenders Network USA, Inc.
(MLN) for the purchase of property in Lewiston. That same day, the Cortellinos
executed a mortgage securing the note and encumbering the property. The
mortgage was granted to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS)
“solely as nominee for” MLN. In August 2012, MERS purportedly assigned the
mortgage to another entity, and it was later reassigned several more times, with
the final assignment to Wilmington Savings in 2016. The note was endorsed
several times; Wilmington Savings possessed the original note at the time of
trial, permitting Wilmington Savings to enforce it. See Bank of Am., N.A.
v. Greenleaf, 2014 ME 89, ¶¶ 9-10, 96 A.3d 700 (stating that a party that
possesses a promissory note has standing to enforce it).
[¶3] On February 5, 2007, before the first assignment of the Cortellino
mortgage, MLN filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The United States Bankruptcy 3
Court for the District of Delaware entered a final decree and order closing the
case on May 21, 2012. MLN ceased operating after the bankruptcy.
[¶4] In 2014, we issued our decision in Greenleaf, where we made clear
that in order to establish standing to foreclose on a mortgaged property, the
party seeking to foreclose must prove ownership of the mortgage. See id. ¶ 12.
We specifically held that the assignment of a mortgage by MERS in that case
was insufficient to transfer ownership of the mortgage. Id. ¶¶ 13-16. It
subsequently became clear to the assignees of the mortgage in this case that
assignment of the mortgage by MERS was similarly insufficient to transfer
ownership of the Cortellino mortgage. Several mortgage lenders involved in
the assignments, such as PHH Mortgage Corporation, were then faced with the
problem of curing the defective assignment because MLN, the original lender,
was no longer in business. On July 29, 2020, PHH petitioned the Chancery Court
of Delaware for an appointment of a receiver for MLN, specifically to address
the Greenleaf issues in Maine and to provide for the enforceability of mortgages
that had been held by MLN. On February 5, 2021, the Court of Chancery
appointed a receiver for MLN. The receiver then assigned the Cortellino
mortgage from MLN to Wilmington Savings; that assignment was recorded on
July 1, 2022. 4
[¶5] In 2014, the Cortellinos breached the terms of the note and
conditions of the mortgage by failing to make payments. On August 12, 2022,
BSI Financial Services, on behalf of Wilmington Savings, sent the Cortellinos a
notice of default and right to cure based on the Cortellinos’ default. On
October 28, 2022, Wilmington Savings filed a complaint against the Cortellinos
seeking a judgment of foreclosure and damages associated with breach of the
note. The court conducted a trial on October 28, 2024, and, after the parties
submitted written arguments and proposed findings, entered a judgment of
foreclosure and sale on April 22, 2025. The court also made written findings of
fact and conclusions of law in support of its judgment. The Cortellinos filed a
motion for findings of fact on April 25, 2025, which was denied on June 1, 2025,
in part because the Cortellinos failed to include proposed findings. See M.R.
Civ. P. 52(b). The Cortellinos timely appealed. See M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(2).
II. DISCUSSION
[¶6] When we review a judgment of foreclosure, we review the trial
court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Burek, 2013 ME 87, ¶ 17, 81 A.3d 330. “When a party’s
motion for further findings has been denied, we cannot infer findings from the
evidence in the record. Instead, the court’s judgment must be supported by 5
express factual findings that are based on record evidence, are sufficient to
support the result, and are sufficient to inform the parties and any reviewing
court of the basis for the decision.” Doe v. Lindahl, 2023 ME 28, ¶ 10, 293 A.3d
439 (citations and quotation marks omitted). However, where—as here—a
party has failed to submit proposed findings as required by M.R. Civ. P. 52(b),
“we will infer that the trial court made any factual inferences needed to support
its ultimate conclusion.” Sullivan v. Tardiff, 2015 ME 121, ¶ 15, 124 A.3d 652
(quotation marks omitted).
[¶7] The Cortellinos argue that the court erred in concluding that
Wilmington Savings owned the mortgage. Ownership of a mortgage is
necessary to establish standing to pursue a foreclosure claim. Greenleaf, 2014
ME 89, ¶ 12, 96 A.3d 700. The parties agree that the rights contained in the
mortgage were property of the MLN Chapter 11 bankruptcy estate. With
support in the record, the court found that the Delaware court’s
post-bankruptcy order appointing a receiver for MLN was valid, enforceable,
and entitled to full faith and credit. See V.L. v. E.L., 577 U.S. 404, 407 (2016).
Further, the court properly determined that the receiver’s assignment of the
mortgage to Wilmington Savings was within the scope of the receiver’s
authority, resulting in an enforceable transfer of the Cortellinos’ mortgage to 6
Wilmington Savings. No evidence was presented to suggest that the mortgage
was sold or otherwise transferred to a third party or that it reverted back to
MLN. As a result, the court committed no error in determining that Wilmington
Savings was the owner of the mortgage. See Bureau v. Gendron, 2001 ME 157,
¶ 11, 783 A.2d 643 (“If the trustee takes no action regarding the scheduled
property during the bankruptcy proceeding, then the asset reverts back to the
debtor by operation of law at the close of the bankruptcy proceeding.”).
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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2026 ME 49 Docket: And-25-270 Submitted On Briefs: January 21, 2026 Decided: May 28, 2026
Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, DOUGLAS, and LIPEZ, JJ, and HJELM, A.R.J. Concurrence: HJELM, A.R.J.
WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, FSB, AS TRUSTEE FOR BROUGHAM FUND I TRUST
v.
LEONARD M. CORTELLINO et al.
MEAD, J.
[¶1] Leonard M. Cortellino and Pauline A. Cortellino appeal from a
judgment of foreclosure and sale entered by the Superior Court (Androscoggin
County, Archer, J.), contending that the court erred in determining that, at the
time of the foreclosure action, the mortgage at issue was owned by Wilmington
Savings Fund Society, FSB, as Trustee for Brougham Fund I Trust and that the
court erred in concluding that the right-to-cure notice met the requirements of
14 M.R.S. § 6111 (2025).1 We conclude that the court did not err when it
determined that Wilmington Savings owned the mortgage, but we determine
1 Title 14 M.R.S. § 6111 has since been amended, though not in any way that affects this appeal. See P.L. 2025, ch. 275, §§ 1-3 (effective Jan. 1, 2026) (codified at 14 M.R.S. § 6111 (1-A)(G), (H), (I) (2026)). 2
that, as a matter of law, the notice of right to cure was fatally defective. On that
basis, we vacate the judgment and remand for entry of dismissal.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] “The trial court made the following factual findings, which are
supported by the record.” Wuestenberg v. Rancourt, 2020 ME 25, ¶ 2, 226 A.3d
227. On June 20, 2006, the Cortellinos executed a promissory note in the
principal amount of $293,250 in favor of Mortgage Lenders Network USA, Inc.
(MLN) for the purchase of property in Lewiston. That same day, the Cortellinos
executed a mortgage securing the note and encumbering the property. The
mortgage was granted to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS)
“solely as nominee for” MLN. In August 2012, MERS purportedly assigned the
mortgage to another entity, and it was later reassigned several more times, with
the final assignment to Wilmington Savings in 2016. The note was endorsed
several times; Wilmington Savings possessed the original note at the time of
trial, permitting Wilmington Savings to enforce it. See Bank of Am., N.A.
v. Greenleaf, 2014 ME 89, ¶¶ 9-10, 96 A.3d 700 (stating that a party that
possesses a promissory note has standing to enforce it).
[¶3] On February 5, 2007, before the first assignment of the Cortellino
mortgage, MLN filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The United States Bankruptcy 3
Court for the District of Delaware entered a final decree and order closing the
case on May 21, 2012. MLN ceased operating after the bankruptcy.
[¶4] In 2014, we issued our decision in Greenleaf, where we made clear
that in order to establish standing to foreclose on a mortgaged property, the
party seeking to foreclose must prove ownership of the mortgage. See id. ¶ 12.
We specifically held that the assignment of a mortgage by MERS in that case
was insufficient to transfer ownership of the mortgage. Id. ¶¶ 13-16. It
subsequently became clear to the assignees of the mortgage in this case that
assignment of the mortgage by MERS was similarly insufficient to transfer
ownership of the Cortellino mortgage. Several mortgage lenders involved in
the assignments, such as PHH Mortgage Corporation, were then faced with the
problem of curing the defective assignment because MLN, the original lender,
was no longer in business. On July 29, 2020, PHH petitioned the Chancery Court
of Delaware for an appointment of a receiver for MLN, specifically to address
the Greenleaf issues in Maine and to provide for the enforceability of mortgages
that had been held by MLN. On February 5, 2021, the Court of Chancery
appointed a receiver for MLN. The receiver then assigned the Cortellino
mortgage from MLN to Wilmington Savings; that assignment was recorded on
July 1, 2022. 4
[¶5] In 2014, the Cortellinos breached the terms of the note and
conditions of the mortgage by failing to make payments. On August 12, 2022,
BSI Financial Services, on behalf of Wilmington Savings, sent the Cortellinos a
notice of default and right to cure based on the Cortellinos’ default. On
October 28, 2022, Wilmington Savings filed a complaint against the Cortellinos
seeking a judgment of foreclosure and damages associated with breach of the
note. The court conducted a trial on October 28, 2024, and, after the parties
submitted written arguments and proposed findings, entered a judgment of
foreclosure and sale on April 22, 2025. The court also made written findings of
fact and conclusions of law in support of its judgment. The Cortellinos filed a
motion for findings of fact on April 25, 2025, which was denied on June 1, 2025,
in part because the Cortellinos failed to include proposed findings. See M.R.
Civ. P. 52(b). The Cortellinos timely appealed. See M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(2).
II. DISCUSSION
[¶6] When we review a judgment of foreclosure, we review the trial
court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Burek, 2013 ME 87, ¶ 17, 81 A.3d 330. “When a party’s
motion for further findings has been denied, we cannot infer findings from the
evidence in the record. Instead, the court’s judgment must be supported by 5
express factual findings that are based on record evidence, are sufficient to
support the result, and are sufficient to inform the parties and any reviewing
court of the basis for the decision.” Doe v. Lindahl, 2023 ME 28, ¶ 10, 293 A.3d
439 (citations and quotation marks omitted). However, where—as here—a
party has failed to submit proposed findings as required by M.R. Civ. P. 52(b),
“we will infer that the trial court made any factual inferences needed to support
its ultimate conclusion.” Sullivan v. Tardiff, 2015 ME 121, ¶ 15, 124 A.3d 652
(quotation marks omitted).
[¶7] The Cortellinos argue that the court erred in concluding that
Wilmington Savings owned the mortgage. Ownership of a mortgage is
necessary to establish standing to pursue a foreclosure claim. Greenleaf, 2014
ME 89, ¶ 12, 96 A.3d 700. The parties agree that the rights contained in the
mortgage were property of the MLN Chapter 11 bankruptcy estate. With
support in the record, the court found that the Delaware court’s
post-bankruptcy order appointing a receiver for MLN was valid, enforceable,
and entitled to full faith and credit. See V.L. v. E.L., 577 U.S. 404, 407 (2016).
Further, the court properly determined that the receiver’s assignment of the
mortgage to Wilmington Savings was within the scope of the receiver’s
authority, resulting in an enforceable transfer of the Cortellinos’ mortgage to 6
Wilmington Savings. No evidence was presented to suggest that the mortgage
was sold or otherwise transferred to a third party or that it reverted back to
MLN. As a result, the court committed no error in determining that Wilmington
Savings was the owner of the mortgage. See Bureau v. Gendron, 2001 ME 157,
¶ 11, 783 A.2d 643 (“If the trustee takes no action regarding the scheduled
property during the bankruptcy proceeding, then the asset reverts back to the
debtor by operation of law at the close of the bankruptcy proceeding.”).
[¶8] Next, the Cortellinos assert that the right-to-cure notice did not meet
the requirements of 14 M.R.S. § 6111 because the amounts stated as due in the
notice did not reflect the actual amounts that the Cortellinos were required to
pay to cure the default.2
[¶9] The notice states that, to cure the default, the Cortellinos must pay
a total of $412,774.69, and provides a list of itemized charges that are included
in this total amount. The Cortellinos are correct, however, that the itemized
amounts listed in the notice do not add up to the total amount. Furthermore,
one of the itemized charges is a total of the monthly mortgage payments owed
by the Cortellinos. That total is broken down according to the various monthly
2 The Cortellinos also assert that several of the charges listed in the notice cannot be the basis for
a default. Those charges include bankruptcy expenses, unpaid escrows, and property inspection fees. Because we conclude that the notice was defective for other reasons, we do not address these challenges. 7
payments owed. The sum of the various monthly payments owed listed in the
notice, however, is different from the total amount stated for overdue monthly
payments. 3
[¶10] A right-to-cure notice must include an “itemization of all past due
amounts causing the loan to be in default,” “the total amount due to cure the
default,” and “[a]n itemization of any other charges that must be paid in order
to cure the default.” 14 M.R.S. § 6111(1-A)(B)-(C). Here, the notice contains an
itemization of amounts, but the total of the itemized amounts does not equal
the total included on the notice. Further, the largest figure listed in the notice
—total unpaid monthly charges—is different from the sum of the itemized
3 The notice stated as follows: 8
unpaid monthly charges. As a result, the notice fails to comply with section
6111 and is deficient as a matter of law because it fails to put the mortgagor on
notice of what is required to cure the default. See JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v.
Lowell, 2017 ME 32, ¶¶ 13-21, 156 A.3d 727; J.P. Morgan Mortg. Acquisition
Corp. v. Moulton, 2024 ME 13, ¶ 11, 314 A.3d 134.
[¶11] When a right-to-cure notice overstates the amount required to
cure the default, the notice does not strictly comply with section 6111 and is
therefore deficient. See Moulton, 2024 ME 13, ¶ 11, 314 A.3d 134. Here, the
total of the itemized charges set out in the notice is lower than the total listed
on the notice as required to cure the default. Therefore, the total amount
required to cure the default is overstated. Because the notice is replete with
numerical inconsistences and internal mathematical errors, it was materially
insufficient to put the Cortellinos on notice of what was required to cure the
default. Consequently, the court erred in concluding that the notice met the
requirements of section 6111. See id.
[¶12] We therefore remand the case to the trial court for entry of an
order dismissing the complaint. 9
The entry is:
Judgment of foreclosure vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court for entry of dismissal. 4
HJELM, A.R.J., concurring.
[¶13] I join the Court’s opinion in full, including the remand for entry of
an order dismissing the foreclosure complaint rather than a judgment for the
Cortellinos.5 Court’s Opinion ¶ 12. This is the result required by our decision
in Finch v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 2024 ME 2, ¶¶ 49-51, 307 A.3d 1049, which prescribes
the law that now governs the effect of an adjudication that a notice of right to
cure issued by a mortgagee is defective. I write separately only to reiterate my
view that Finch was wrongly decided. See id. ¶¶ 53-91 (Hjelm, A.R.J.,
dissenting). Nonetheless, it is controlling law, and for that reason, I must
4 As we noted in Finch v. U.S. Bank, N.A., “A judgment that is based solely on a plaintiff’s failure to
meet a precondition to suit is not a judgment on the merits.” 2024 ME 2, ¶ 32 n.10, 307 A.3d 1049 (quotation marks omitted). We further stated that when a notice of right-to-cure fails to comply with section 6111, the court should “consider awarding attorney fees to the borrower pursuant to the applicable statute. In appropriate cases, the court should also consider imposing sanctions and other relief available under the foreclosure statutes or its inherent authority, including dismissal with prejudice if it is appropriate.” Id. ¶ 51 (citation omitted). On remand, the court may elect to allow the parties to be heard on any such issue.
5 The remand, however, also allows for the court to consider any request for sanctions to be
imposed against Wilmington Savings for pursuing a claim predicated on a clearly defective notice of right to cure. See Court’s Opinion n.4; see also U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Jewett, 2025 ME 94, ¶ 11, 347 A.3d 1011; Finch v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 2024 ME 2, ¶ 51, 307 A.3d 1049. 10
concur that here, on remand, a mere dismissal of the complaint—and not a full
judgment against Wilmington Savings—is the disposition compelled by that
case.
E. Chris L’Hommedieu, Esq., L’Hommedieu Law Office, PA, Lewiston, for appellants Leonard Cortellino and Pauline Corellino
Adam J. Shub, Esq., and Jonathan Mermin, Esq., Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau & Pachios, LLP, Portland, for appellee Wilmington Savings Fund Society
Androscoggin County Superior Court docket number RE-2022-31 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY