Willis v. United States

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 22, 2025
• Docket: 24-2548
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 22 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KENTRELL WILLIS, No. 24-2548 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 1:19-cv-00761-BAM v. MEMORANDUM* UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Barbara McAuliffe, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**

Submitted December 17, 2025***

Before: PAEZ, CHRISTEN, and KOH, Circuit Judges.

Federal prisoner Kentrell Willis appeals pro se from the district court’s

summary judgment in Willis’s action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”)

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). *** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). alleging sexual assault and negligence. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We review de novo the district court’s summary judgment, and for an

abuse of discretion its application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Ah Quin v.

County of Kauai Dep’t of Transp., 733 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 2013). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Willis’s

action was untimely and Willis failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as

to whether he was entitled to equitable tolling. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (FTCA

claims must be filed in the district court within six months after notice of

administrative denial); Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997–98 (9th Cir. 2009)

(setting forth requirements for equitable tolling to apply, and concluding that

prisoner was not entitled to equitable tolling where the record showed that he

prepared “other substantial legal filings” before the limitations period expired).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in applying judicial estoppel to

bar Willis’s new argument that his claims were timely. See Baughman v. Walt

Disney World Co., 685 F.3d 1131, 1133 (9th Cir. 2012) (setting forth discretionary

factors for judicial estoppel to apply, including that a party would gain an unfair

advantage from arguing a position inconsistent with one that this court previously

accepted in granting relief); Willis v. United States, 847 Fed Appx. 485 (9th Cir.

2021) (unpublished) (vacating the district court’s screening dismissal of Willis’s

action and remanding for the district court to consider Willis’s argument that

2 24-2548 although the claims were untimely, equitable tolling applies).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

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