Willingham v. State

457 S.E.2d 561, 265 Ga. 435
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedMay 30, 1995
DocketS95A0749
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 457 S.E.2d 561 (Willingham v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Willingham v. State, 457 S.E.2d 561, 265 Ga. 435 (Ga. 1995).

Opinion

Carley, Justice.

After a jury trial, appellant and his two co-defendants were found guilty of malice murder. He appeals from the judgment of conviction [436]*436and life sentence entered on the jury’s verdict finding him guilty.1

Decided May 30, 1995. Janise L. Miller, for appellant. Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Leonora Grant, Henry M. Newkirk, Assistant District Attorneys, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Richard J. Warren, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

[436]*4361. Appellant enumerates the general grounds.

The homicide resulted from a dispute over drugs and, as noted in the prior appeal of one of appellant’s co-defendants, there was a conflict in the evidence as to who was the actual triggerman. Chapman v. State, 263 Ga. 393 (435 SE2d 202) (1993). Insofar as appellant’s role in the homicide is concerned, the co-defendants both testified that it was he who fired the fatal shot and their testimony was corroborated in other material respects. The co-defendants were available for cross-examination and the credibility of their testimony was for the jury. When construed most strongly against appellant and in support of the guilty verdict, the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find proof beyond a reasonable doubt of appellant’s guilt of malice murder. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. Appellant enumerates as error the denial of his motion to sever his trial from that of the two co-defendants. Appellant urges that severance was necessary to prevent the return of a guilty verdict based upon his mere association with the two co-defendants. However, appellant was being tried under the theory that he was a party to the homicide and “there was ample evidence to show that [he] was a party to the crime.” Harrell v. State, 253 Ga. 474, 475 (2) (321 SE2d 739) (1984). Where, as here, there is sufficient evidence of a “common scheme or plan” to commit a criminal offense, joinder is authorized and severance is not mandatory. Padgett v. State, 239 Ga. 556 (238 SE2d 92) (1977). The testimony of the co-defendants implicating appellant as the actual triggerman would be no less admissible and probative in a separate trial. As was the case in the prior appeal of appellant’s co-defendant, no harm has been shown to result from the joint trial and, therefore, appellant has not demonstrated any reversible abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of his motion to sever. Chapman v. State, supra at 394 (2).

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

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Bluebook (online)
457 S.E.2d 561, 265 Ga. 435, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/willingham-v-state-ga-1995.