Willie L. Lollis, Jr. v. Shaw Global Energy Services

Louisiana Court of Appeal·Decided October 3, 2007·No. WCA-0007-0395·Unknown

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT 07-395

WILLIE L. LOLLIS, JR. VERSUS SHAW GLOBAL ENERGY SERVICES

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APPEAL FROM THE

OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION - # 4 PARISH OF VERMILION, NO. 05-03229 SAM L. LOWERY, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION JUDGE **********

GLENN B. GREMILLION

JUDGE

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Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, Glenn B. Gremillion, and J. David Painter, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Louis M. Corne 1014 West University Ave. Lafayette, LA 70506 (337) 264-1160 Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee:

Willie L. Lollis, Jr.

John J. Rabalais Rabalais, Unlan & Lorio 5100 Village Walk, Suite #300 Covington, LA 70433 (985) 893-9900 Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:

Shaw Global Energy Services

GREMILLION, Judge.

The defendant, Shaw Global Energy Services, appeals the decision of the workers’ compensation judge finding the plaintiff, Willie Lee Lollis, Jr., disabled, entitled to indemnity benefits, and entitled to any necessary medical treatment or vocational rehabilitation services as a result of an occupational disease. We affirm.

FACTS

Lollis was employed as a paint mixer/sandblaster by Shaw at its Delcambre, Louisiana location. On November 7, 2004, while mixing Tideguard 171A Gray Resin, a spray-on epoxy cladding from Ameron Coatings, Lollis noticed a bitter taste in his mouth and then saw that he had Tideguard on his arms. He reported the incident to his supervisors after his arms became irritated. As a result of this contact, Lollis suffered headaches and developed rashes over his body. On January 14, 2005, he was diagnosed as suffering from an irritant dermatitis by Dr. Jennifer-Waguespack LaBiche, a dermatologist. Although Shaw restricted him from working in contact with Tideguard, Lollis quit work on February 13, 2005, because he claimed that the rash had spread to his eyes and affected his vision. A patch test performed by Dr. Waguespack-LaBiche revealed that Lollis was allergic to epoxy resin. Dr. William Nassetta, a specialist in occupational and environmental medicine, diagnosed him as suffering from an allergic contact dermatitis.

Lollis filed the instant disputed claim for compensation against Shaw seeking weekly indemnity benefits, medical treatment, and penalties and attorney’s fees. Shaw denied all of Lollis’ claims and further alleged that he forfeited his right to receive any benefits due to his fraudulent statements. Following a trial on the

merits, the workers’ compensation judge denied Shaw’s fraud claim and held that Lollis was disabled and entitled to weekly indemnity benefits retroactive to February 13, 2005, medical expenses and treatment, vocational rehabilitation services, and future supplemental earnings benefits if appropriate. The workers’ compensation judge further awarded Lollis $2000 in penalties and $7500 in attorney’s fees as a result of Shaw’s failure to accommodate his work restrictions and its failure to provide him with vocational rehabilitation services. This appeal was perfected by Shaw.

ISSUES

Shaw raises six assignments of error on appeal.

1. That the workers’ compensation judge erred in finding that Lollis suffered a compensable accident or occupational injury.

2. That the workers’ compensation judge erred in finding a causal connection between Lollis’ alleged exposure to Tideguard and his alleged disability.

3. That the workers’ compensation judge erred in finding that Lollis proved his disability.

4. That the workers’ compensation judge erred in finding that Lollis was entitled to indemnity benefits and additional medical benefits.

5. That the workers’ compensation judge erred in finding that it failed to reasonably controvert Lollis’ entitlement to benefits.

6. That the workers’ compensation judge erred in finding that Lollis did not forfeit his entitlement to indemnity benefits by making false statements for the purpose of receiving workers’ compensation benefits.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review applied to factual findings in workers'

compensation matters is the manifest error standard. This standard, which is based upon the reasonableness of the factual findings in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, is well established in our jurisprudence following the seminal cases of Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989), and Stobart v. State, through Department of Transportation and Development, 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993).

As stated in Bruno v. Harbert International Inc., 593 So.2d 357, 361 (La.1992):

A worker’s testimony alone may be sufficient to discharge this burden of proof, provided two elements are satisfied: (1) no other evidence discredits or casts serious doubt upon the worker’s version of the incident; and (2) the worker’s testimony is corroborated by the circumstances following the alleged incident. West v. Bayou Vista Manor, Inc., 371 So.2d 1146 (La.1979); Malone and Johnson, 13 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, Workers’ Compensation, § 253 (2d Ed.1980). Corroboration of the worker’s testimony may be provided by the testimony of fellow workers, spouses, or friends. Malone & Johnson, supra; Nelson [v. Roadway Express, Inc., 588 So.2d 350 (La.1991)]. Corroboration may also be provided by medical evidence.

West, supra.

OCCUPATIONAL INJURY

In its first three assignments of error, Shaw argues that the workers’

compensation judge erred in finding that Lollis suffered an occupational injury as a result of his exposure to Tideguard and that he satisfied his burden of proof with regard to disability.

An employee suffering from an occupational disease receives the same workers’ compensation benefits as an employee who has suffered an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. La.R.S. 23:1031.1(A).

An occupational disease is defined as “that disease or illness which is due to causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to the particular trade, occupation, process, or employment in which the employee is exposed to such disease.” La.R.S. 23:1031.1(B). However, it does not include carpal tunnel syndrome, degenerative disc disease, spinal stenosis, arthritis, mental illness, or heart-related or perivascular disease. Id.

In order to recover medical and compensation benefits as the result of an occupational disease, Lollis must prove that he became allergic to epoxy resins as a result of the nature of his duties as a sandblaster/painter. Dunaway v. Lakeview Reg’l Med. Ctr., 02-2313 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/6/03), 859 So.2d 131. Lollis’ burden is to prove a connection between his condition and his work-related duties by a reasonable probability. Id. Proof of only a possible relationship between the two does not satisfy this burden. Id.

In order to receive temporary total disability benefits, an employee must prove that he is unable to physically engage in any employment or self-employment as a result of his work-related injury. La.R.S. 23:1221(1)(c). The employee’s burden of proof is by clear and convincing evidence; thus, Lollis must prove that his disability is highly probable or much more probable than not. Carrier v. Debarge’s Coll. Junction, 95-18 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/27/95), 673 So.2d 1043, writ denied, 96-0472 (La. 4/8/96), 671 So.2d 337.

Lollis testified that Shaw began using Tideguard in October 2004, at the request of a customer. He stated that he mixed this coating for approximately three weeks without any problems. However, on November 7, 2004, he stated that he

noticed a strong bitter taste in his mouth and that the skin on his arms was irritated. When he removed his rubber gloves, he said that he noticed Tideguard on his arms and that his gloves were imprinted on his arms. He said that he washed his arms and then reported the incident to David Smith, his supervisor.

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Related

Bruno v. Harbert Intern. Inc.
593 So. 2d 357 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1992)
Stobart v. State Through DOTD
617 So. 2d 880 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1993)
Carrier v. Debarge's College Junction
673 So. 2d 1043 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1996)
Dunaway v. Lakeview Regional Medical Center
859 So. 2d 131 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2003)
Nelson v. Roadway Exp., Inc.
588 So. 2d 350 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1991)
Rosell v. Esco
549 So. 2d 840 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1989)
Odom v. Kinder Nursing Home
956 So. 2d 128 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2007)
West v. Bayou Vista Manor, Inc.
371 So. 2d 1146 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1979)