Willie L. Lollis, Jr. v. Shaw Global Energy Services

CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedOctober 3, 2007
DocketWCA-0007-0395
StatusUnknown

This text of Willie L. Lollis, Jr. v. Shaw Global Energy Services (Willie L. Lollis, Jr. v. Shaw Global Energy Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Willie L. Lollis, Jr. v. Shaw Global Energy Services, (La. Ct. App. 2007).

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

07-395

WILLIE L. LOLLIS, JR.

VERSUS

SHAW GLOBAL ENERGY SERVICES

********** APPEAL FROM THE OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION - # 4 PARISH OF VERMILION, NO. 05-03229 SAM L. LOWERY, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION JUDGE **********

GLENN B. GREMILLION JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, Glenn B. Gremillion, and J. David Painter, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Louis M. Corne 1014 West University Ave. Lafayette, LA 70506 (337) 264-1160 Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee: Willie L. Lollis, Jr.

John J. Rabalais Rabalais, Unlan & Lorio 5100 Village Walk, Suite #300 Covington, LA 70433 (985) 893-9900 Counsel for Defendant/Appellant: Shaw Global Energy Services GREMILLION, Judge.

The defendant, Shaw Global Energy Services, appeals the decision of the

workers’ compensation judge finding the plaintiff, Willie Lee Lollis, Jr., disabled,

entitled to indemnity benefits, and entitled to any necessary medical treatment or

vocational rehabilitation services as a result of an occupational disease. We affirm.

FACTS

Lollis was employed as a paint mixer/sandblaster by Shaw at its

Delcambre, Louisiana location. On November 7, 2004, while mixing Tideguard

171A Gray Resin, a spray-on epoxy cladding from Ameron Coatings, Lollis noticed

a bitter taste in his mouth and then saw that he had Tideguard on his arms. He

reported the incident to his supervisors after his arms became irritated. As a result of

this contact, Lollis suffered headaches and developed rashes over his body. On

January 14, 2005, he was diagnosed as suffering from an irritant dermatitis by Dr.

Jennifer-Waguespack LaBiche, a dermatologist. Although Shaw restricted him from

working in contact with Tideguard, Lollis quit work on February 13, 2005, because

he claimed that the rash had spread to his eyes and affected his vision. A patch test

performed by Dr. Waguespack-LaBiche revealed that Lollis was allergic to epoxy

resin. Dr. William Nassetta, a specialist in occupational and environmental

medicine, diagnosed him as suffering from an allergic contact dermatitis.

Lollis filed the instant disputed claim for compensation against Shaw

seeking weekly indemnity benefits, medical treatment, and penalties and attorney’s

fees. Shaw denied all of Lollis’ claims and further alleged that he forfeited his right

to receive any benefits due to his fraudulent statements. Following a trial on the

1 merits, the workers’ compensation judge denied Shaw’s fraud claim and held that

Lollis was disabled and entitled to weekly indemnity benefits retroactive to February

13, 2005, medical expenses and treatment, vocational rehabilitation services, and

future supplemental earnings benefits if appropriate. The workers’ compensation

judge further awarded Lollis $2000 in penalties and $7500 in attorney’s fees as a

result of Shaw’s failure to accommodate his work restrictions and its failure to

provide him with vocational rehabilitation services. This appeal was perfected by

Shaw.

ISSUES

Shaw raises six assignments of error on appeal.

1. That the workers’ compensation judge erred in finding that Lollis suffered a compensable accident or occupational injury.

2. That the workers’ compensation judge erred in finding a causal connection between Lollis’ alleged exposure to Tideguard and his alleged disability.

3. That the workers’ compensation judge erred in finding that Lollis proved his disability.

4. That the workers’ compensation judge erred in finding that Lollis was entitled to indemnity benefits and additional medical benefits.

5. That the workers’ compensation judge erred in finding that it failed to reasonably controvert Lollis’ entitlement to benefits.

6. That the workers’ compensation judge erred in finding that Lollis did not forfeit his entitlement to indemnity benefits by making false statements for the purpose of receiving workers’ compensation benefits.

2 STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review applied to factual findings in workers'

compensation matters is the manifest error standard. This standard, which is based

upon the reasonableness of the factual findings in light of the record reviewed in its

entirety, is well established in our jurisprudence following the seminal cases of Rosell

v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989), and Stobart v. State, through Department of

Transportation and Development, 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993).

As stated in Bruno v. Harbert International Inc., 593 So.2d 357, 361

(La.1992):

A worker’s testimony alone may be sufficient to discharge this burden of proof, provided two elements are satisfied: (1) no other evidence discredits or casts serious doubt upon the worker’s version of the incident; and (2) the worker’s testimony is corroborated by the circumstances following the alleged incident. West v. Bayou Vista Manor, Inc., 371 So.2d 1146 (La.1979); Malone and Johnson, 13 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, Workers’ Compensation, § 253 (2d Ed.1980). Corroboration of the worker’s testimony may be provided by the testimony of fellow workers, spouses, or friends. Malone & Johnson, supra; Nelson [v. Roadway Express, Inc., 588 So.2d 350 (La.1991)]. Corroboration may also be provided by medical evidence. West, supra.

OCCUPATIONAL INJURY

In its first three assignments of error, Shaw argues that the workers’

compensation judge erred in finding that Lollis suffered an occupational injury as a

result of his exposure to Tideguard and that he satisfied his burden of proof with

regard to disability.

An employee suffering from an occupational disease receives the same

workers’ compensation benefits as an employee who has suffered an injury by

accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. La.R.S. 23:1031.1(A).

3 An occupational disease is defined as “that disease or illness which is due to causes

and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to the particular trade, occupation,

process, or employment in which the employee is exposed to such disease.” La.R.S.

23:1031.1(B). However, it does not include carpal tunnel syndrome, degenerative

disc disease, spinal stenosis, arthritis, mental illness, or heart-related or perivascular

disease. Id.

In order to recover medical and compensation benefits as the result of

an occupational disease, Lollis must prove that he became allergic to epoxy resins as

a result of the nature of his duties as a sandblaster/painter. Dunaway v. Lakeview

Reg’l Med. Ctr., 02-2313 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/6/03), 859 So.2d 131. Lollis’ burden is

to prove a connection between his condition and his work-related duties by a

reasonable probability. Id. Proof of only a possible relationship between the two

does not satisfy this burden. Id.

In order to receive temporary total disability benefits, an employee must

prove that he is unable to physically engage in any employment or self-employment

as a result of his work-related injury. La.R.S. 23:1221(1)(c). The employee’s burden

of proof is by clear and convincing evidence; thus, Lollis must prove that his

disability is highly probable or much more probable than not. Carrier v. Debarge’s

Coll. Junction, 95-18 (La.App. 3 Cir. 9/27/95), 673 So.2d 1043, writ denied, 96-0472

(La. 4/8/96), 671 So.2d 337.

Lollis testified that Shaw began using Tideguard in October 2004, at the

request of a customer. He stated that he mixed this coating for approximately three

weeks without any problems.

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Related

Bruno v. Harbert Intern. Inc.
593 So. 2d 357 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1992)
Stobart v. State Through DOTD
617 So. 2d 880 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1993)
Carrier v. Debarge's College Junction
673 So. 2d 1043 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1996)
Dunaway v. Lakeview Regional Medical Center
859 So. 2d 131 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2003)
Nelson v. Roadway Exp., Inc.
588 So. 2d 350 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1991)
Rosell v. Esco
549 So. 2d 840 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1989)
Odom v. Kinder Nursing Home
956 So. 2d 128 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2007)
West v. Bayou Vista Manor, Inc.
371 So. 2d 1146 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1979)

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