Willie Jackson v. State of Nevada, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: October 6, 2025
• Docket: 3:24-cv-00536
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

5 * * *

6 WILLIE JACKSON, Case No. 3:24-cv-00536-MMD-CLB

7 Plaintiff, SCREENING ORDER v. 8 STATE OF NEVADA, et al., 9 Defendants. 10

11 Pro se Plaintiff Willie Jackson filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 12 while incarcerated at Ely State Prison. (ECF No. 5.) On August 21, 2025, the Court 13 ordered Plaintiff to update his address by September 22, 2025. (ECF No. 18.) That 14 deadline expired without Plaintiff updating his address, and his mail from the Court is 15 being returned as undeliverable. (ECF No. 19.) 16 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the 17 exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . 18 dismissal” of a case. Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of L.A., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 19 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or 20 comply with local rules. See Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) 21 (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep 22 court apprised of address); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) 23 (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with court order). In determining whether to 24 dismiss an action on one of these grounds, the Court must consider: (1) the public’s 25 interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; 26 (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of 27 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. See In re 28 2 Malone, 833 F.2d at 130). 3 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving this litigation 4 and the Court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of Plaintiff’s 5 claims. The third factor, risk of prejudice to Defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal 6 because a presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing 7 a pleading ordered by the court or prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 8 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of 9 cases on their merits—is greatly outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 10 The fifth factor requires the Court to consider whether less drastic alternatives can 11 be used to correct the party’s failure that brought about the Court’s need to consider 12 dismissal. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining 13 that considering less drastic alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order 14 does not satisfy this factor); accord Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th 15 Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the persuasive force of” earlier Ninth Circuit cases that 16 “implicitly accepted pursuit of less drastic alternatives prior to disobedience of the court’s 17 order as satisfying this element[,]” i.e., like the “initial granting of leave to amend coupled 18 with the warning of dismissal for failure to comply[,]” have been “eroded” by Yourish). 19 Courts “need not exhaust every sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a 20 case, but must explore possible and meaningful alternatives.” Henderson v. Duncan, 779 21 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986). Because this action cannot realistically proceed without 22 the ability for the Court and Defendants to send Plaintiff case-related documents, filings 23 and orders, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another deadline. But 24 without an updated address, the likelihood that the second order would even reach 25 Plaintiff is low, so issuing a second order will only delay the inevitable and further 26 squander the Court’s finite resources. Setting another deadline is not a meaningful 27 alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 28 1 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, the Court finds that they 2 || weigh in favor of dismissal. It is therefore ordered that this action is dismissed without 3 || prejudice based on Plaintiff's failure to file an updated address in compliance with this 4 || Court’s August 21, 2025 order. (ECF No. 18.) The Clerk of Court is kindly directed to enter 5 || judgment accordingly and close this case. No other documents may be filed in this now- 6 || closed case. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint in a new 7 || case and provide the Court with his current address. 8 It is further ordered that Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF 9 || Nos. 1, 12) is denied as moot. 10 DATED THIS 6" Day of October, 2025.

12 MIRANDA M. DU 13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28