Willie Erving Taylor, Jr. v. City of Hammond, Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 30, 2018
• Docket: 18A-CB-1367
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any Nov 30 2018, 9:47 am

court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE Willie Erving Taylor, Jr. Michigan City, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Willie Erving Taylor, Jr., November 30, 2018 Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CB-1367 v. Appeal from the Lake Superior Court City of Hammond, Indiana; The Honorable John R. Pera, Mayor Thomas McDermott, Jr.; Judge City of Hammond Law Trial Court Cause No. Department Corporation 45D10-1803-CB-000004 Counsel, William J. O’Connor; Kristina C. Kantar, City Attorney; Detective Mark Detterline; Detective Wendy Jo Gardner; Reporting Officer Paul Lynn; Detective Dancer; Officer M. Schmidt; Officer Dulmovich; Detective Suarez; and Former Chief of Police, Brian Miller, Appellees-Defendants

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CB-1367 | November 30, 2018 Page 1 of 3 Vaidik, Chief Judge.

[1] In March 2018, Willie E. Taylor Jr., an inmate in the Indiana Department of

Correction, filed a pro se complaint for damages against the City of Hammond

and numerous individuals. Although it is difficult to decipher his allegations,

Taylor appears to allege that he was “wrongful[ly] convict[ed]” of Class C

felony auto theft in Cause No. 45G02-0609-FD-114. Appellant’s App. Vol. II

p. 13; see also Appellant’s Br. pp. 7 (alleging that he was “framed” by police) & 8

(alleging that he is innocent of the crime). Taylor seeks $3.2 million in

damages.

[2] Pursuant to the Frivolous Prisoner Claim Statute, Indiana Code chapter 34-58-

1, the trial court reviewed Taylor’s complaint and determined that his claim

could not proceed because it was not a claim upon which relief may be granted.

The court reasoned that Taylor’s complaint, which “essentially claims that the

Defendants are responsible for his false arrest and wrongful conviction for a

crime that occurred on September 23, 2006,” was filed “well after the expiration

of the [two-year] Statute of Limitations.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 26.

[3] Taylor now appeals. We agree that Taylor’s claim is not a claim upon which

relief may be granted, but for a different reason than the trial court found. That

is, a person cannot seek civil damages on the basis that they were wrongfully

convicted unless and until the conviction has been reversed, vacated, or

otherwise set aside. See generally Waldrip v. Waldrip, 976 N.E.2d 102, 111 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2012); Butt v. McEvoy, 669 N.E.2d 1015, 1017 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); see

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CB-1367 | November 30, 2018 Page 2 of 3 also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489 (1994) (holding that there is “no cause

of action under § 1983 unless and until the conviction or sentence is reversed,

expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus”).

Taylor acknowledges that his conviction in Cause No. 45G02-0609-FD-114 still

stands. See Appellant’s Br. p. 19. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

[4] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CB-1367 | November 30, 2018 Page 3 of 3