Williamsport Bank v. Knapp

Supreme Court

Williamsport Bank v. Knapp

119 U.S. 357, 7 S. Ct. 274, 30 L. Ed. 446, 1886 U.S. LEXIS 1999

CourtSupreme Court of the United States

DecidedDecember 13, 1886

StatusPublished

Cited by8 cases

This text of 119 U.S. 357 (Williamsport Bank v. Knapp) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Williamsport Bank v. Knapp, 119 U.S. 357, 7 S. Ct. 274, 30 L. Ed. 446, 1886 U.S. LEXIS 1999 (1886).

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Opinion

*360 Me. Justiob Geay,

after stating the case as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.

• Assuming, what does not appear in the record, that the evidence stated in the bills of exceptions was all the evidence introduced at the trial and referred to in the certificate of division, that certificate is clearly insufficient to support the jurisdiction of this court.

Under the acts of Congress, authorizing questions arising on a trial or hearing before two judges in the Circuit Court, and upon which they are divided in opinion, to be certified to this court for decision, it has always been held that each question certified must be one of law, .and not of fact, nor of mixed law and fact, and that it must be a distinct point or proposition, clearly stated, and not the whole case, nor the question whether upon the evidence the judgment should be ■ for one party or for the other. Saunders v. Gould, 4 Pet. 392; United States v. Bailey, 9 Pet. 267; Weeth v. New England Mortgage Co., 106 U. S. 605; California Paving Co. v. Molitor, 113 U. S. 609, 615-617; Waterville v. Van Slyke, 116 U.S. 699-704.

■ Tested by these'rules, the first and second questions certified, each being whether “ under the evidence ” the defendant was authorized to receive interest at a certain rate, as well as the fourth question, “whether upon the whole evidence the plaintiff was entitled to recover,” are not questions which this ' court is required or authorized to answer.

'■The third question is equally irregular and insufficient. Instead of being clearly and distinctly stated, it is quite obscure and ambiguous, for it does not show whether the supposéd decision of the Supremo Court of Pennsylvania, “that there are no banks, nor have there been any such banks in Pennsylvania, authorized to take and receive interest at a greater rate than six per cent.,” was based upon matter of law, or matter of fact, or both. The latest reported decision of that court, to which the learned counsel for the plaintiff in error referred to explain this question, affirmed a ruling of a lower court that, “ in-fact and in law, there is ho bank of issue in Penn *361 sylvania, authorized to charge a rate of interest in excéss of the legal rate; ” and said nothing upon the question whether there ever had been any such banks. Lebanon National Bank v. Karmany, 98 Penn. St. 65, 73.

. Neither the ampunt of the judgment below, nor the certificate of division, being sufficient to give this court-jurisdiction, it necessarily follows, as was held in Weeth v. New England Mortgage Co. and Waterville v. Van Slyke, above cited, that the

Writ of error must be dismissed:

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*360 Me. Justiob Geay,

after stating the case as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.

• Assuming, what does not appear in the record, that the evidence stated in the bills of exceptions was all the evidence introduced at the trial and referred to in the certificate of division, that certificate is clearly insufficient to support the jurisdiction of this court.

Under the acts of Congress, authorizing questions arising on a trial or hearing before two judges in the Circuit Court, and upon which they are divided in opinion, to be certified to this court for decision, it has always been held that each question certified must be one of law, .and not of fact, nor of mixed law and fact, and that it must be a distinct point or proposition, clearly stated, and not the whole case, nor the question whether upon the evidence the judgment should be ■ for one party or for the other. Saunders v. Gould, 4 Pet. 392; United States v. Bailey, 9 Pet. 267; Weeth v. New England Mortgage Co., 106 U. S. 605; California Paving Co. v. Molitor, 113 U. S. 609, 615-617; Waterville v. Van Slyke, 116 U.S. 699-704.

■ Tested by these'rules, the first and second questions certified, each being whether “ under the evidence ” the defendant was authorized to receive interest at a certain rate, as well as the fourth question, “whether upon the whole evidence the plaintiff was entitled to recover,” are not questions which this ' court is required or authorized to answer.

'■The third question is equally irregular and insufficient. Instead of being clearly and distinctly stated, it is quite obscure and ambiguous, for it does not show whether the supposéd decision of the Supremo Court of Pennsylvania, “that there are no banks, nor have there been any such banks in Pennsylvania, authorized to take and receive interest at a greater rate than six per cent.,” was based upon matter of law, or matter of fact, or both. The latest reported decision of that court, to which the learned counsel for the plaintiff in error referred to explain this question, affirmed a ruling of a lower court that, “ in-fact and in law, there is ho bank of issue in Penn *361 sylvania, authorized to charge a rate of interest in excéss of the legal rate; ” and said nothing upon the question whether there ever had been any such banks. Lebanon National Bank v. Karmany, 98 Penn. St. 65, 73.

. Neither the ampunt of the judgment below, nor the certificate of division, being sufficient to give this court-jurisdiction, it necessarily follows, as was held in Weeth v. New England Mortgage Co. and Waterville v. Van Slyke, above cited, that the

Writ of error must be dismissed:

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Bluebook (online)

119 U.S. 357, 7 S. Ct. 274, 30 L. Ed. 446, 1886 U.S. LEXIS 1999, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williamsport-bank-v-knapp-scotus-1886.

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