ERVIN, Judge.
Appellant, Irene Williamson, challenges a final administrative order entered by appel-lee, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), denying her request to restore lost food stamp benefits. Appellant contends that HRS erroneously disqualified her from receiving food stamps for six months based upon her nolo conten-dere plea to a charge of welfare fraud. Because the procedures employed in this case are contrary to the federal regulations governing food stamp disqualifications, we reverse and remand with instructions to restore the lost benefits to appellant.
Appellant, a recipient of food stamp benefits, was charged with welfare fraud. She pleaded nolo contendere and was sentenced to three years of probation. Adjudication of guilt was withheld, however, and the court did not order any food stamp disqualification penalty. Approximately two and one-half months later, appellant received a notice of disqualification, informing her that she was disqualified from receiving food stamps for a six-month period. The following reason was given for the disqualification: “A court ordered your disqualification from food stamp program, even through [sic] the court withheld adjudication of guilt, on 5/4/90.”
Appellant’s lawyer subsequently requested restoration of the lost benefits. When HRS denied the request, appellant requested an appeal hearing pursuant to Section 409.285, Florida Statutes (1989).1 At the hearing appellant argued that the federal food stamp regulations only allow for disqualification in very limited circumstances. The circumstance relevant to this case occurs if there has been a determination of guilt in criminal court on welfare fraud charges. Appellant argued that her nolo plea was not a guilty finding, thus, she should not have been disqualified from receiving food stamps. The appeals referee found that appellant’s nolo plea was the equivalent of a guilt determination, denied the appeal, and affirmed the disqualification. Hence, this appeal.
The food stamp program2 is a federal enactment that the Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture is authorized to administer, but responsibility for administering the local aspects of the program has been delegated to the applicable state agency in each participating state. 7 U.S.C.A. § 2020(a) (West 1988); 7 C.F.R. [594]*594§ 271.4(a) (1992). In Florida, HRS has been designated as the applicable state agency. Fla.Admin.Code Rule 10C-3.013. HRS must administer the food stamp program in a manner which conforms to the federal standards; it has no authority to amend unilaterally or invalidate federal instructions or regulations regarding the issuance of food stamps. Cf. Wilson v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 561 So.2d 660, 661 (Fla. 1st DCA1990); Fla.Admin.Code Rule 10C-3.011.
Section 273.16 of Title 7 of the Code of Federal Regulations (1992) provides that the state agency shall be responsible for investigating any case of alleged intentional violation of the food stamp program3 and ensuring that appropriate cases are acted upon either through an administrative disqualification hearing or referral to a court of appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution. 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(a)(1) (1992). The state agency shall base disqualifications on the determinations of the hearing authorities arrived at through administrative disqualification hearings or determinations reached by the appropriate courts. 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(a)(3). However, the state agency also has the options of allowing accused persons to waive their right to an administrative disqualification hearing or sign a disqualification consent agreement in cases of deferred adjudication. Id. If the state agency exercises the above options, it may base disqualifications on, in addition to administrative or court determinations, the signed waiver or consent agreement. Id.
In the instant case, HRS elected to refer appellant’s case to the Polk County Circuit Court for prosecution.4 The federal regulations instruct the agency in court-referred cases to encourage prosecutors to recommend to the courts that a disqualification penalty be imposed in addition to any other civil or criminal penalty for the violation. 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(g)(1)(h). As for imposition of disqualification penalties in court-referred cases, section 273.16(g)(2) provides that “[sjtate agencies shall disqualify an individual found guilty of intentional Program violation for the length of time specified by the court.” (Emphasis added.)
It is undisputed in the instant case that the court did not find appellant guilty— adjudication of guilt was specifically withheld. In a case of deferred adjudication of guilt, the pertinent federal regulation provides:
Deferred adjudication. Each State agency shall have the option of establishing procedures to allow accused individuals to sign disqualification consent agreements for cases of deferred adjudication. State agencies are encouraged to use this option for those cases in which a determination of guilt is not obtained from a court due to the accused individual having met the terms of a court order or which are not prosecuted due to the accused individual having met the terms of an agreement with the prosecutor. For State agencies which choose the option of allowing individuals to sign disqualification consent agreements in cases re[595]*595ferred for prosecution, the procedures shall conform with the requirements outlined in this section.
7 C.F.R. § 273.16(h) (emphasis added.)
Thus, the federal government has established the procedures to be followed in cases of deferred adjudication. By applying the statutory maxim of construction “expressio unius est exclusio alteráis,” that is, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of the other, we conclude that the federal government has excluded all other recognized procedures for disqualification in deferred adjudication cases. Cf. J.V. v. State, 516 So.2d 1133 (Fla. 1st DCA1987) (in holding that parents of child could not be deemed to have abused their child, court noted, by applying expressio unius maxim, that because statutory subsection pertaining to neglect explicitly excluded conduct based on legitimate religious belief, and because statute defining abuse did not include such conduct, parents’ conduct based on legitimate religious belief did not constitute abuse). Compliance therefore with the procedures set out in the federal regulations is necessary to ensure the accused person is properly notified of the consequences of his or her plea in regard to his or her continued eligibility for food stamps. See 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(h)(1).
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ERVIN, Judge.
Appellant, Irene Williamson, challenges a final administrative order entered by appel-lee, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), denying her request to restore lost food stamp benefits. Appellant contends that HRS erroneously disqualified her from receiving food stamps for six months based upon her nolo conten-dere plea to a charge of welfare fraud. Because the procedures employed in this case are contrary to the federal regulations governing food stamp disqualifications, we reverse and remand with instructions to restore the lost benefits to appellant.
Appellant, a recipient of food stamp benefits, was charged with welfare fraud. She pleaded nolo contendere and was sentenced to three years of probation. Adjudication of guilt was withheld, however, and the court did not order any food stamp disqualification penalty. Approximately two and one-half months later, appellant received a notice of disqualification, informing her that she was disqualified from receiving food stamps for a six-month period. The following reason was given for the disqualification: “A court ordered your disqualification from food stamp program, even through [sic] the court withheld adjudication of guilt, on 5/4/90.”
Appellant’s lawyer subsequently requested restoration of the lost benefits. When HRS denied the request, appellant requested an appeal hearing pursuant to Section 409.285, Florida Statutes (1989).1 At the hearing appellant argued that the federal food stamp regulations only allow for disqualification in very limited circumstances. The circumstance relevant to this case occurs if there has been a determination of guilt in criminal court on welfare fraud charges. Appellant argued that her nolo plea was not a guilty finding, thus, she should not have been disqualified from receiving food stamps. The appeals referee found that appellant’s nolo plea was the equivalent of a guilt determination, denied the appeal, and affirmed the disqualification. Hence, this appeal.
The food stamp program2 is a federal enactment that the Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture is authorized to administer, but responsibility for administering the local aspects of the program has been delegated to the applicable state agency in each participating state. 7 U.S.C.A. § 2020(a) (West 1988); 7 C.F.R. [594]*594§ 271.4(a) (1992). In Florida, HRS has been designated as the applicable state agency. Fla.Admin.Code Rule 10C-3.013. HRS must administer the food stamp program in a manner which conforms to the federal standards; it has no authority to amend unilaterally or invalidate federal instructions or regulations regarding the issuance of food stamps. Cf. Wilson v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 561 So.2d 660, 661 (Fla. 1st DCA1990); Fla.Admin.Code Rule 10C-3.011.
Section 273.16 of Title 7 of the Code of Federal Regulations (1992) provides that the state agency shall be responsible for investigating any case of alleged intentional violation of the food stamp program3 and ensuring that appropriate cases are acted upon either through an administrative disqualification hearing or referral to a court of appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution. 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(a)(1) (1992). The state agency shall base disqualifications on the determinations of the hearing authorities arrived at through administrative disqualification hearings or determinations reached by the appropriate courts. 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(a)(3). However, the state agency also has the options of allowing accused persons to waive their right to an administrative disqualification hearing or sign a disqualification consent agreement in cases of deferred adjudication. Id. If the state agency exercises the above options, it may base disqualifications on, in addition to administrative or court determinations, the signed waiver or consent agreement. Id.
In the instant case, HRS elected to refer appellant’s case to the Polk County Circuit Court for prosecution.4 The federal regulations instruct the agency in court-referred cases to encourage prosecutors to recommend to the courts that a disqualification penalty be imposed in addition to any other civil or criminal penalty for the violation. 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(g)(1)(h). As for imposition of disqualification penalties in court-referred cases, section 273.16(g)(2) provides that “[sjtate agencies shall disqualify an individual found guilty of intentional Program violation for the length of time specified by the court.” (Emphasis added.)
It is undisputed in the instant case that the court did not find appellant guilty— adjudication of guilt was specifically withheld. In a case of deferred adjudication of guilt, the pertinent federal regulation provides:
Deferred adjudication. Each State agency shall have the option of establishing procedures to allow accused individuals to sign disqualification consent agreements for cases of deferred adjudication. State agencies are encouraged to use this option for those cases in which a determination of guilt is not obtained from a court due to the accused individual having met the terms of a court order or which are not prosecuted due to the accused individual having met the terms of an agreement with the prosecutor. For State agencies which choose the option of allowing individuals to sign disqualification consent agreements in cases re[595]*595ferred for prosecution, the procedures shall conform with the requirements outlined in this section.
7 C.F.R. § 273.16(h) (emphasis added.)
Thus, the federal government has established the procedures to be followed in cases of deferred adjudication. By applying the statutory maxim of construction “expressio unius est exclusio alteráis,” that is, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of the other, we conclude that the federal government has excluded all other recognized procedures for disqualification in deferred adjudication cases. Cf. J.V. v. State, 516 So.2d 1133 (Fla. 1st DCA1987) (in holding that parents of child could not be deemed to have abused their child, court noted, by applying expressio unius maxim, that because statutory subsection pertaining to neglect explicitly excluded conduct based on legitimate religious belief, and because statute defining abuse did not include such conduct, parents’ conduct based on legitimate religious belief did not constitute abuse). Compliance therefore with the procedures set out in the federal regulations is necessary to ensure the accused person is properly notified of the consequences of his or her plea in regard to his or her continued eligibility for food stamps. See 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(h)(1). In that HRS declined to proceed against appellant via an administrative disqualification hearing or waiver thereof, but rather elected to refer her case for prosecution in an appropriate court, and because the court did not find appellant “guilty,” but rather withheld adjudication of guilt, absent a disqualification consent agreement signed by appellant, we hold that HRS had no authority to disqualify appellant from receiving food stamps.5
REVERSED and REMANDED with directions to restore the lost benefits to appellant. 7 C.F.R. § 273.16®.
SMITH and KAHN, JJ., concur.