Williamson & Adams, Inc. v. McMahon-McEntegart, Inc.

256 A.D. 313, 10 N.Y.S.2d 37, 1939 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4719
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedMarch 3, 1939
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 256 A.D. 313 (Williamson & Adams, Inc. v. McMahon-McEntegart, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Williamson & Adams, Inc. v. McMahon-McEntegart, Inc., 256 A.D. 313, 10 N.Y.S.2d 37, 1939 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4719 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1939).

Opinion

Callahan, J.

This action is brought by the plaintiff, a subcontractor, to foreclose a mechanic’s lien in the sum of $1,338.84.

The defendant-appellant, McMahon-McEntegart, Inc., as general contractor, entered into a contract to erect a church for the Church of the Good Shepherd of the Archdiocese of New York, as owner.

The defendant-appellant, the AOtna Casualty and Surety Company of New York, furnished a completion bond which provided for the payment by the general contractor of all bills for labor and material entering into the construction of the church.

The general contractor sublet the metal furring, lathing and plastering to Empire Plastering Company, a partnership consisting of John Wilson and James Maiorany, and the Empire, in turn, sublet the furring and lathing to plaintiff.

The building has been completed and both plaintiff and Empire have performed all the work required under their contracts. There is $1,400 in the hands of the owner applicable to the contract, and $623.27 in the hands of the general contractor.

The contract was entered into in 1935, and the work was not completed until 1937. In the course of the work, and in about the month of October, 1936, Mr. Wilson, of Empire, advised plaintiff that he needed money with which to meet certain plastering payrolls. Plaintiff’s officer thereupon had a talk with the general contractor, who advised plaintiff that if plaintiff advanced the payrolls requested by Empire and obtained an order, the general contractor would accept the order. Plaintiff thereupon advanced to Empire the amount of various payrolls. All of the moneys so advanced were paid to Empire’s laborers. The latter fact is not denied by the general contractor. The general contractor received requisitions from Empire containing these payments and in its own requisitions on the owner included, as a payment by it, the identical payrolls.

On November 6, 1936, plaintiff obtained an order from Empire directing the general contractor to pay to plaintiff $5,538.17 out [315]*315of the first moneys due or to become due to Empire. The amount of the order was made up of $3,071.27 due plaintiff for labor and materials under its contract, and $2,466.90 advanced for payrolls by plaintiff to Empire up to the date of the order. Said order was duly filed and served on the general contractor. Later, a second order was obtained under like circumstances, which was also duly filed. This order was for the sum of $575.50, representing further payroll advances.

The total amount of plaintiff’s contract was $5,596.44. The total amount of its advances to Empire for payrolls was $3,042.40. As against the aggregate of these two sums ($8,638.84), plaintiff received three payments totaling $7,300. The first was a payment in the form of a check of the general contractor to Empire for $2,500, which was indorsed to plaintiff and applied on account of the contract between plaintiff and Empire. The general contractor thereafter drew two checks directly to the order of the plaintiff. On November 17,1936, it gave the first check which was for $4,000. The check bore a notation “ a/c Empire Plastering Co., a/c Good Shepherd Church.” As it was for a larger sum than the balance then due on plaintiff’s contract price, at least part of the money was paid in recognition of plaintiff’s order. At the time plaintiff received said check, it was instructed by one of Empire’s partners to apply $2,466.90 thereof in payment of payroll advances, and the balance on the lathing contract, which plaintiff did. Later the general contractor paid to plaintiff a check for $800, bearing a similar notation to that on the $4,000 check. Plaintiff applied $575.50 of the $800 check in repayment of payroll advances, and the balance of $224.50 on account of its contract. This application was likewise made at the direction of a member of the Empire partnership. If the moneys so received were properly applied, a balance of $1,338.84 remained due plaintiff for labor performed and materials furnished, for which amount plaintiff filed its hen on January 29, 1937.

The general contractor claims that the moneys received were required to be first applied to plaintiff’s contract price, and that if they had been so applied, no lien would exist.

It appears that after November 17, 1936, the general contractor, through an arrangement with Maiorany, one of the partners of Empire, took over the payments of all moneys due from Empire to the latter’s laborers and materialmen. After that date, although Empire performed its contract work, the general contractor took upon itself the payment of all of Empire’s bills, receiving Maiorany’s express permission to charge each item to Empire’s account.

Other than plaintiff’s, no hens or assignments have been filed against the improvement. The time for filing hens has expired.

[316]*316Prior to the time that plaintiff filed, its orders with the general contractor, the general contractor had endeavored to have plaintiff accept orders from Empire which contained no provision that plaintiff was to be repaid out of the first moneys due Empire. Plaintiff refused to accept these orders and obtained orders granting it the priority in payment indicated.

After the filing of plaintiff’s orders with the general contractor, the latter submitted requisitions to the owner and received moneys which were more than sufficient to pay all of plaintiff’s orders, but it refused to pay the balance now claimed by plaintiff, paying instead the claim of other subcontractors, laborers and material-men of Empire for work done long after the filing of the plaintiff’s orders. It also repaid to itself, out of moneys so received from the owner, advances it had made to Empire after the plaintiff’s advances were made and after plaintiff’s orders and its lien were filed.

There are outstanding bills in favor of other unpaid creditors of Empire in the sum of $1,011.85. None of these creditors of Empire, however, have filed liens, nor have they been made parties to this action, nor does it appear that their claims antedated that of the plaintiff. There is no proof that any of these bills represent claims for daily or weekly wages.

The contention of the general contractor is that, by reason of section 36-b of the Lien Law, plaintiff held the funds received by it,, which were known to be derived from the improvement, in trust for the payment of claims arising out of the improvement, and that the statute required the plaintiff to apply all moneys so received to the contract price in preference to the repayment of payroll advances.

Section 36-b, in so far as applicable, provides: The funds received by a subcontractor from an owner or contractor or subcontractor for the improvement of real property are hereby declared to constitute trust funds in the hands of such subcontractor to be applied first to the payment of the claims of the subcontractors, laborers and materialmen, arising out of the improvement.”

It is the plain intent of the section that if a subcontractor receives moneys from an improvement and there are any claims of his subcontractors, laborers or materialmen which have not been paid, the recipient of the moneys is required to hold such money in trust for the payment of such claims.

In so far as the evidence in this case discloses, no such claim against plaintiff has ever existed. The plaintiff completed its work and the time for filing of liens has expired.

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Bluebook (online)
256 A.D. 313, 10 N.Y.S.2d 37, 1939 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4719, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williamson-adams-inc-v-mcmahon-mcentegart-inc-nyappdiv-1939.