Williamsburg Climbing Gym Company LLC v. Ronit Realty LLC

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 5, 2022
Docket1:20-cv-02073
StatusUnknown

This text of Williamsburg Climbing Gym Company LLC v. Ronit Realty LLC (Williamsburg Climbing Gym Company LLC v. Ronit Realty LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Williamsburg Climbing Gym Company LLC v. Ronit Realty LLC, (E.D.N.Y. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -----------------------------------------------x WILLIAMSBURG CLIMBING GYM COMPANY, LLC and MEMORANDUM AND ORDER FIFTH CONCERTO HOLDCO, INC., Case No. 1:20-cv-2073 (FB) (RML) Plaintiffs,

-against-

RONIT REALTY LLC,

Defendant. ------------------------------------------------x Appearances: For the Defendant: For the Plaintiffs: ADAM STEIN MICHAEL J. LANE MATTEO J. ROSSELLI Anderson Kill & Olick, P.C. SAMUEL JUDAH BAZIAN 1251 Avenue of the Americas Stein Adler Dabah & Zelkowitz LLP New York, NY 10020 1633 Broadway Suite 46th RICHARD ANTHONY COPPOLA New York, NY 10019 Cullen and Dykman LLP 44 Wall Street, 17th Floor

New York, NY 10005

BLOCK, Senior District Judge: Plaintiffs Williamsburg Climbing Gym Company (“Williamsburg Climbing Gym”) and Fifth Concerto Holdco, Inc. (“Fifth Concerto,” together with Williamsburg Climbing Gym, “Brooklyn Boulders”) bring this suit for declaratory judgment and recission of their lease with Defendant Ronit Realty LLC (“Ronit”). The parties have cross-moved for summary judgment as to the issue of liability under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.

I. FACTS

The following facts are taken from the pleadings, the parties’ Rule 56.1 statements, and supporting documentation. They are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Fifth Concerto constructs and operates rock-climbing gyms under the brand name “Brooklyn Boulders.” It sought to open a climbing gym in Williamsburg, Brooklyn, and formed Williamsburg Climbing Gym for that purpose. On November

30, 2018, Williamsburg Climbing Gym and Ronit executed a ten-year lease (the “Lease”)1 for approximately 30,500 square feet of interior space and approximately 3,000 square feet of outdoor terrace space. The Lease provides for base rent of

$1,957,500 per year, and Ronit agreed to contribute up to $2,775,000 towards Brooklyn Boulders’ buildout of the premises. Fifth Concerto guaranteed the Lease (the “Guaranty”). Brooklyn Boulders began its buildout in November 2019. Between that time

and March 2020, Ronit remitted approximately $1,200,000 in construction contributions to Brooklyn Boulders. On March 7, 2020, then-Governor Andrew

1 Both parties have attached copies of the Lease. The Lease consists of a form lease, a rider containing specific provisions, and an amendment. Cuomo issued an executive order that required gyms to cease operations because of the COVID-19 pandemic. At that time, the leased premises were not yet open for

business. On May 1, 2020, Brooklyn Boulders informed Ronit that it was terminating the Lease based upon the doctrines of frustration of purpose and impossibility, and

delivered a letter to that effect dated May 5, 2020. Brooklyn Boulders has not paid amounts due under the Lease since May 2020. Brooklyn Boulders filed the instant suit on May 5, 2020, seeking a declaratory judgment that its termination and recission of the Lease was lawful. In response,

Ronit leveled counterclaims against Brooklyn Boulders for breach of the Lease, breach of the Guaranty, anticipatory repudiation of both the Lease and the Guaranty, and specific performance of both the Lease and the Guaranty. The parties have cross-

moved for summary judgment. II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT On a motion for summary judgment, the court must “resolv[e] all ambiguities and draw[] all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom

summary judgment is sought.” Sloley v. VanBramer, 945 F.3d 30, 36 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing Burg v. Gosselin, 591 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 2010)). Summary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings, the discovery materials on file, and any affidavits show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

The same standards are applicable to cross-motions for summary judgment: “[E]ach party’s motion must be examined on its own merits, and in each case all reasonable inferences must be drawn against the party whose motion is under

consideration.” Morales v. Quintel Entm’t, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal citation and quotation omitted). III. FRUSTRATION OF PURPOSE AND IMPOSSIBILITY “The doctrine of frustration of purpose discharges a party’s duties to perform

under a contract where a ‘wholly unforeseeable event renders the contract valueless to one party.’” Axginc Corp. v. Plaza Automall, Ltd., 759 F. App’x 26, 29 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. Gen. Douglas MacArthur Senior Vill., Inc., 508 F.2d

377, 381 (2d Cir. 1974)). For the doctrine to apply, the purpose frustrated must be “so completely the basis of the contract that, as both parties understood, the transaction would have made little sense,” in its absence, and the event frustrating performance must be “virtually cataclysmic and wholly unforeseeable.” Gap Inc. v.

Ponte Gadea New York LLC, 524 F. Supp. 3d 224, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Similarly, “impossibility . . . is a defense to a breach of contract action ‘only

when . . . performance [is rendered] objectively impossible . . . by an unanticipated event that could not have been foreseen or guarded against in the contract.’” Id. at 237 (quoting Axginc, 759 F. App’x at 29). “Economic hardship, even to the extent

of bankruptcy or insolvency, does not excuse performance under the doctrine of impossibility.” Gap, 524 F. Supp. 3d at 237 (internal quotation omitted). Both doctrines are construed “narrowly, due in part to judicial recognition that

the purpose of contract law is to allocate the risks that might affect performance and that performance should be excused only in extreme circumstances.” Kel Kim Corp. v. Cent. Markets, Inc., 70 N.Y.2d 900, 902 (1987). Neither doctrine applies here. A. Foreseeability

For either of these interrelated doctrines to apply, the intervening event must be unforeseeable. Where the parties have provided for an event in a lease, they have foreseen the possibility that it could occur. That is the case here: the Lease recognizes

and provides for instances in which “governmental law or regulations . . . prevent or substantially interfere with the required performance. . . .” Lease at § 59. Though they may not have specifically predicted the pandemic, the parties identified the possibility that government action might hinder Brooklyn Boulders’ use of the

premises, “defeating any claim that the possibility was wholly unforeseeable.” Id. at 234 (internal quotation and citation omitted). Accordingly, Brooklyn Boulders has failed to establish the first prong of either doctrine. B. Frustration or Impossibility of Performance In addition, a party claiming frustration must demonstrate that the intervening

event completely frustrated the purpose underlying the lease. “It is not enough that the transaction will be less profitable for an affected party or even that the party will sustain a loss.” Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted). And to prevail on a claim

of impossibility, a party must demonstrate that performance is “objectively impossible.” Kel Kim, 70 N.Y.2d at 902. “[W]hile New York courts excuse a party from performing obligations that are impossible to perform, . . . impossibility does not excuse performance of a contract merely because the performance would be

burdensome or unprofitable.” CAI Rail, Inc. v. Badger Mining Corp., No.

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