Williams v. Watkins

665 S.E.2d 243, 379 S.C. 530, 2008 S.C. App. LEXIS 135
Court of Appeals of South Carolina·Decided July 23, 2008·No. 4429·Published·Cited by 4 cases

Opinion

KONDUROS, J.

This appeal arises from the circuit court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Babcock Center and its employee, Nancy Watkins, on Carrie and Robert Williamses’ claims for defamation and the intentional infliction of emotional distress. On appeal, the Williamses argue the court erred in finding South Carolina’s Omnibus Adult Protection Act shields Babcock Center and Watkins from civil liability for claims stemming from their reporting the suspected abuse of a vulnerable adult. We affirm. 1

FACTS

In 1991, the Department of Social Services (DSS) placed an eight-year old, disabled child (Client) in Carrie Williams’s (Caregiver’s) licensed, therapeutic foster care home. Caregiver’s husband, Robert Williams, also lived in the home. 2 Care *533 giver subsequently contracted with Babcock Center to operate a CTH, and she continued to care for Client in her home until 2004.

On January 7, 2004, while attending a program at Babcock Center, Client told administrator, Nancy Watkins, of specific actions toward her by Caregiver’s husband. Client was now twenty-one years old, and Watkins believed the conduct Client described to her was sexually abusive. Watkins immediately notified consulting psychologist, Dr. Wilton Hellams, of Client’s disclosure. That evening, Client met with Dr. Hellams and repeated her specific allegations against Caregiver’s husband. Following the counseling session, Dr. Hellams told Watkins he found Client’s allegations to be credible. As a result, Watkins immediately moved Client to a respite-care home.

Pursuant to South Carolina law, DDSN regulations, and Babcock Center policy, the following day, Watkins reported Client’s statements to the Sheriff’s Department and the Adult Protective Services (APS) Program of DSS. Three months later, DSS notified Watkins its investigation had indicated' “there was a potential for abuse” of Client in Caretaker’s home. Upon receiving the APS report, the Center terminated its CTH contract with Caretaker.

Subsequently, Caretaker and her husband filed an action against Babcock Center and Watkins alleging defamation and the intentional infliction of emotional distress. As an affirmative defense to these claims, Babcock Center and Watkins asserted South Carolina’s Omnibus Adult Protection Act shielded them from civil and criminal liability related to reporting Client’s statements alleging sexual abuse by Caretaker’s husband. The circuit court conducted a hearing on September 23, 2005, and granted summary judgment on both actions in favor of Babcock Center and Watkins. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing the grant of summary judgment, this court applies the same standard that governs the trial court; sum *534 mary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fleming v. Rose, 350 S.C. 488, 493, 567 S.E.2d 857, 860 (2002); see also Rule 56(c), SCRCP. “On appeal from an order granting summary judgment, the appellate court will review all ambiguities, conclusions, and inferences arising in and from the evidence in a light most favorable to the appellant....” Willis v. Wu., 362 S.C. 146, 151, 607 S.E.2d 63, 65 (2004). Summary judgment is appropriate when “plain, palpable, and indisputable facts exist on which reasonable minds cannot differ.” Byerly v. Connor, 307 S.C. 441, 445, 415 S.E.2d 796, 799 (1992).

LAW/ANALYSIS

Caretaker and her husband argue the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Babcock Center and Watkins because genuine issues of material fact remain regarding their actions for defamation and the intentional infliction of emotional distress. We disagree.

The Omnibus Adult Protection Act

In 1993, South Carolina’s General Assembly enacted the Omnibus Adult Protection Act (“the Act”) to protect vulnerable adults from abuse, neglect, and exploitation. 1993 Act No. 110, § 1, codified as S.C.Code Ann. §§ 43-35-5 to 43-35-595 (Supp.2007). 3

A. Vulnerable Adults

The Act promulgated statutes designed to protect a class of adults from abuse, neglect, and exploitation. The Act defines a “vulnerable adult” as:

[A] person eighteen years of age or older who has a physical or mental condition which substantially impairs the person from adequately providing for his or her own care or *535 protection. This includes a person who is impaired in the ability to adequately provide for the person’s own care or protection because of the infirmities of aging including, but not limited to, organic brain damage, advanced age, and physical, mental, or emotional dysfunction. A resident of a facility is a vulnerable adult.

S.C.Code Ann. § 43-35-10 (Supp.2007). 4

We find Client is a “vulnerable adult” under the Act because she is over eighteen years old, unable to provide for her own care or protection, and a resident of a facility. Accordingly, Client is entitled to special protections from abuse, neglect, and exploitation.

B. Mandated Reporters

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Williams v. Watkins, 665 S.E.2d 243, 379 S.C. 530, 2008 S.C. App. LEXIS 135 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008).

665 S.E.2d 243 (Williams v. Watkins) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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