Williams v. Trujillo

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: April 11, 2022
• Docket: 2:18-cv-03239
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 DaJuan Torrell Williams, No. CV-18-03239-PHX-MTL (CDB)

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Ernesto Trujillo, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Before the Court is Plaintiff DaJuan Williams’ appeal (Doc. 216) from the 16 Magistrate Judge’s December 17, 2021 Order denying his Motion Requesting 17 Appointment of Counsel and to Reopen Discovery (“Motion Requesting Appointment of 18 Counsel”) (Doc. 207) and Motion for Leave to File a First Motion for Summary Judgment 19 as a Matter of Law as to Claims in His FAC (“Motion for Leave to Move for Summary 20 Judgment”) (Doc. 208). For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s appeal is denied. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this prisoner civil rights case. On June 26, 2019, the 23 Court ordered Defendants Trujillo, Ryan, Days, and Bowers (collectively, “Defendants”) 24 to answer Counts I and II of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint and dismissed all other 25 claims and Defendants without prejudice. (Doc. 26.) The Court subsequently issued a 26 scheduling order requiring discovery motions to be filed by March 13, 2020 and dispositive 27 motions to be filed by May 13, 2020. (Doc. 43 at 1–3.) The deadline for filing dispositive 28 motions was extended multiple times, ultimately to November 2, 2020. (Doc. 146.) 1 On the Court’s November 2, 2020 deadline, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary 2 Judgment. (Doc. 163.) Both Plaintiff and Defendants filed motions requesting extensions 3 of time to respond and reply. (See Docs. 182, 190, 192.) The Court issued an Order in favor 4 of Defendants Bowers and Days on Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim. (Doc. 199). 5 The rest of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was denied without prejudice to 6 file a second summary judgment motion. (Id.) In January 2022, Defendants filed their 7 Motion for Summary Judgment on Count I. (Doc. 219.) Plaintiff filed a response. (Doc. 8 223.) 9 In November 2021, Plaintiff filed a Motion Requesting Appointment of Counsel. 10 (Doc. 207.) The next day, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Move for Summary 11 Judgment. (Doc. 208.) The Magistrate Judge denied both motions. (Doc. 213.) Plaintiff 12 objected to the Magistrate Judge’s Order and filed this appeal. (Doc. 216.) 13 II. LEGAL STANDARD 14 When a party objects to the ruling of a magistrate judge in a non-dispositive matter, 15 the district judge must consider the party’s “objections and modify or set aside any part of 16 the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see also 28 17 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). An order is “clearly erroneous” if the Court has a “definite and firm 18 conviction that a mistake has been committed.” See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 19 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). “An order is contrary to law when it fails to apply or misapplies 20 relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.” Jadwin v. Cnty. of Kern, 767 F. Supp. 21 2d 1069, 1110–11 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting DeFazio v. Wallis, 459 F. Supp. 2d 159, 163 22 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)). 23 III. ANALYSIS 24 Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s Order on four grounds, categorized by 25 him as “due process,” “discovery,” “motion for summary judgment,” and “appointment of 26 counsel” concerns. 27 A. Due Process 28 Plaintiff first objects to the Magistrate Judge’s Order on the grounds that the 1 Magistrate Judge “deprive[d him] of due . . . process” by her “customary practice of 2 ignoring any facts or evidence pertaining to anything that may be considered ‘favorable’ 3 towards Plaintiff’s claims, arguments, or case.” (Doc. 216 at 1–2.) 4 To show bias, a party must demonstrate that the “alleged bias and prejudice 5 . . . stem[s] from an extrajudicial source and result[s] in an opinion on the merits on some 6 basis other than what the judge learned from his [or her] participation in the case.” U.S. v. 7 Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966). To be successful, an allegation of bias must be 8 grounded in something more than adverse rulings in the case. Id. Defendants assert that 9 Plaintiff “points only to actions that [the Magistrate Judge] has taken in this case.” (Doc. 10 222 at 2.) In response, Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge must be biased against 11 him because she “is known to him and his family where she was the prosecutor of record 12 when [he] was first sent to prison in 1996 and was responsible for sending a number of his 13 family members to prison through the years as a prosecutor in the Coconino County 14 Attorney’s Office.” (Doc. 225 at 2.) Plaintiff provides no evidence to support this assertion, 15 and the Court could not find any in the record. Plaintiff further claimed that the Magistrate 16 Judge “is acquainted with [his] mother . . . who[] worked out of the Access Offices in the 17 Coconino County Courthouse from 1989 to 1996.” (Id.) Again, the Court was not able to 18 find record evidence to support this claim. But even if the Magistrate Judge and Plaintiff’s 19 mother did work in the same courthouse, such evidence alone is insufficient to demonstrate 20 bias. See Swank v. Ingle, No. C-94-2981 MHP, No. 1997 WL 285130, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 21 1997) (holding that the trial judge’s mere professional acquaintance with a family member 22 of the victim was insufficient “to establish a reasonable inference of bias resulting in 23 prejudice”). 24 Plaintiff claims that the Magistrate Judge has “bias and prejudice [that] extend[s] to 25 all prisoners.” (Id. (emphasis in original.)) In support of this assertion, Plaintiff vaguely 26 asserts research he has conducted “into her background and other cases,” and her past 27 career as a state and federal prosecutor. (Id.) Such vague claims are, again, insufficient to 28 demonstrate bias. See Davis v. Sacramento Cnty. Dist. Att’y’s Off., 76 F.3d 385, 385 n.1 1 (9th Cir. 1996) (declining to address plaintiff’s “vague and general allegations concerning 2 the district judge’s bias”). 3 Plaintiff also claims that his due process rights were violated because he was not 4 provided the opportunity to respond to Defendants’ briefs. (Doc. 216 at 1–2.) The 5 Magistrate Judge issued an order one day after Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Motion 6 for Leave to Move for Summary Judgment was filed. (Doc. 212.) Plaintiff incorrectly 7 asserts that violated LRCiv. 7.2(d) because he was not afforded seven days to reply. (Doc. 8 216 at 1–2.) But the Magistrate Judge may control briefing, and here determined that a 9 reply was not necessary. Plaintiff additionally contends that he never received Defendants’ 10 Response to Plaintiff’s Motion Requesting Appointment of Counsel. (Doc. 209.) 11 Defendants followed all procedural requirements, including providing a certificate of 12 service, thus complying with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(d). (See Doc. 209 at 4.) 13 Defendants and the Court did all that was required of them to provide Plaintiff with a copy 14 of the document. Thus, none of Plaintiff’s due process objections demonstrate that the 15 Magistrate Judge’s decisions were clearly erroneous or contrary to law. 16 B. Discovery 17 Next, Plaintiff asserts that the Magistrate Judge erred in denying his request to 18 reopen the discovery record. (Doc. 216 at 2–3.) The Magistrate Judge stated that Plaintiff 19 “[did] not identify what additional discovery might reveal, or specify exactly what 20 discovery he seeks.” (Doc. 213 at 5.) Plaintiff objects to this summarization. (Doc. 216 at 21 2–3.) He claims that he “cited a number of pleadings in his motion at issue (Doc. 208 at 1) 22 and particularly, [he] specifically emphasized Doc. 167.” (Id.) Plaintiff noted that in his 23 Objections to the Defendants’ Rule 26(a)(1) Second Supplemental Disclosure Statement 24 and Request for Prohibited Use of “Untimely” Disclosure Evidence Pursuant to Rules 25 26(a)(3)(B) and 37(c)(1), he argued that Defendants exhibited “bad faith in disclosing 26 evidence that he had previously sought through discovery and which was never produced.” 27 (Id. at 3.) 28 Plaintiff’s Motion is devoid of any statements identifying what additional discovery 1 would disclose. (See Doc. 207 at 5–6.) Further, Plaintiff’s additional requests for discovery 2 in the motion are exceptionally vague. He requests “production of documents and 3 evidence” and the chance “to submit additional interrogatories” and “request depositions 4 of specific ‘non-defendant’ witnesses.” (Id. at 6.) Even liberally construed, these requests 5 are too vague to constitute valid discovery requests and were made 16 months past the 6 Court’s June 28, 2020 deadline. (See id., Doc. 130.) Moreover, Plaintiff had ample 7 opportunity to complete discovery within the Court-appointed timeframe. (See e.g., Docs. 8 97, 98, 101, 109.) The Magistrate Judge did not err. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s objection is 9 overruled. 10 The only specific request that Plaintiff made was to ask Defendants to “submit a 11 disclosure statement of any new or additional witnesses and/or evidence they intended to 12 submit in their second motion for summary judgment.” (Id.) But as the Magistrate Judge 13 noted, Defendants will not be permitted to include any new witnesses or evidence in their 14 second motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 213 at 5.) Thus, that issue is moot. None of 15 Plaintiff’s discovery objections demonstrate that the Magistrate Judge’s decisions were 16 clearly erroneous or contrary to law. 17 C. Motion for Summary Judgment 18 Plaintiff next argues that he lacked “a fair and impartial discovery process and a full 19 and fair opportunity to move for summary judgment.” (Doc. 216 at 4.) This, according to 20 Plaintiff, was due in part to the fact that he “did/does not know what a ‘cross-motion’ for 21 summary judgment was/is,” and that neither “[t]he [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] nor 22 the [Local Rules of Civil Procedure] contemplate rules or procedures for filing ‘cross- 23 motions for summary judgment’ and the term is not mentioned in either rules or 24 procedures.” (Id.) Plaintiff further objected to the Magistrate Judge limiting his ability to 25 file a new motion for summary judgment to his remaining claims, instead of “all of the 26 claims in his [First Amended Complaint].” (Id. at 5.) 27 Plaintiff’s assertion that he did not have an opportunity to move for summary 28 judgment on all his claims is incorrect. Plaintiff initially had the opportunity to move for 1 summary judgment prior to the dispositive motion deadline. (Doc. 146.) No mechanism of 2 the Court prevented him from doing so. He also had the opportunity to file a cross-motion 3 for summary judgment in response to Defendants’ first motion for summary judgment. 4 (Doc. 163.) Plaintiff contends that it is unreasonable to hold his failure to file a cross- 5 motion for summary judgment against him because it is “an unspoken-unwritten rule.” 6 (Doc. 216 at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).) To the contrary, the Federal Rules of 7 Civil Procedure clearly set forth the requirements for filing a motion for summary 8 judgment; the addition of the word “cross” does not change how the motion is filed 9 procedurally. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Though the Court must construe pro se pleadings 10 liberally, “pro se litigants are bound by the rules of procedure.” Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 11 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus, Plaintiff’s failure to file a cross-motion is not the Magistrate 12 Judge’s error. 13 Plaintiff further asserts that, “[e]ven if [he] theoretically had a full and fair 14 . . . opportunity to move for summary judgment . . . the Court’s sua sponte determination 15 that the Defendants are entitled to a ‘second’ opportunity [to move for summary 16 judgment] . . . [is] contrary to law.” (Id. at 4 (emphasis in original).) Plaintiff’s assertion is 17 incorrect. “[T]he district court has discretion to entertain successive motions for summary 18 judgment.” Hoffman v. Tonnemacher, 593 F.3d 908, 909 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the 19 district court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted the defendants to file two 20 motions for summary judgment prior to trial and a third motion for summary judgment 21 following a mistrial). The court controls the timing of motions for summary judgment. Id. 22 at 911. Moreover, “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 does not limit the number of 23 motions that may be filed . . . .” Id. 24 Plaintiff now contends that the Magistrate Judge should permit him to file a motion 25 for summary judgment on all the claims in his First Amended Complaint, rather than on 26 his remaining claims. The Magistrate Judge’s Order at Doc. 213 allowed Plaintiff to move 27 for summary judgment on his remaining claims. As discussed above, Plaintiff already had 28 the opportunity to move for summary judgment on all his claims, and all but two have 1 finally been decided. (Doc. 26.) The Court will not permit the disposed-of claims to be 2 relitigated. 3 Plaintiff provides several other reasons to support his argument that he lacked a fair 4 opportunity to move for summary judgment. (Id. at 3–4.) At least one of the reasons is 5 proven false by the record: Plaintiff claims that the Magistrate Judge “denied every request 6 for extensions made by [him].” (Id. at 3.) But after Defendants filed their first Motion for 7 Summary Judgment (Doc. 163), the Magistrate Judge granted three of Plaintiff’s requests 8 for extensions of time to file his responsive brief. (Docs. 172, 179 and 183). Indeed, all of 9 Plaintiff’s requests for extensions of time to respond to Defendants’ summary judgment 10 motion were granted. (Id.) Plaintiff’s other reasons are general claims of poor prison 11 conditions against the Yuma County Detention Center and its employees. (Doc. 216 at 3– 12 4.) Those allegations—withholding mail and limiting access to legal work—are outside the 13 scope of this litigation. (Id.) Accordingly, none of these objections show that the Magistrate 14 Judge’s Order was clearly erroneous or contrary to law. 15 D. Appointment of Counsel 16 Finally, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s refusal to appoint counsel on the 17 basis that “[t]he record does not reflect that [the Magistrate Judge] gave any consideration[] 18 to any of the circumstances articulated in Plaintiff’s motion . . . . Further, the record 19 intrinsically reflects that [she] gave no consideration to the likelihood of success on the 20 merits as to Plaintiff’s claims.” (Id. at 6 (emphasis in original).) 21 The Ninth Circuit “has long held that there is ‘no constitutional right to counsel in 22 a civil case.’” Adir Int’l, LLC v. Starr Indem. and Liab. Co., 994 F.3d 1032, 1038–39 (9th 23 Cir. 2021) (quoting U.S. v. 30.64 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situated in Klickltat Cnty., 24 Washington, 795 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1986)). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), 25 though, the court may appoint counsel for a litigant proceeding in forma pauperis. 26 Agyeman v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 390 F.3d 1101, 1103–04 (9th Cir. 2004). “The 27 decision to appoint such counsel is within ‘the sound discretion of the trial court and is 28 granted only in exceptional circumstances.’” Id. at 1103 (quoting Franklin v. Murphy, 745 1 F.2d 1221, 1236 (9th Cir. 1984)). A finding of exceptional circumstances requires a 2 consideration of the plaintiff’s (1) likelihood of success on the merits and (2) ability to 3 articulate his claims in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. Id. Neither 4 factor is dispositive, and both must be viewed together. Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 5 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). 6 Plaintiff incorrectly argues that the Magistrate Judge did not consider the test’s 7 second prong—the plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims in light of the complexity of 8 the legal issues involved. In fact, the Magistrate Judge expressly concluded that Plaintiff 9 “has not displayed an inability to articulate his claims in light of the complexity of the legal 10 issues involved.” (Doc. 213 at 6.) Plaintiff correctly observes that the Magistrate Judge 11 omitted the first prong—the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits. (Doc. 216 at 6.) 12 But this omission is not error. The Magistrate Judge was not required to analyze the first 13 prong because she disposed of the issue on the second prong. The two-prong test is 14 conjunctive; a failure to satisfy one prong necessarily establishes a failure to demonstrate 15 extraordinary circumstances. See Hopkins v. Bustos, 785 Fed. Appx. 379, 381 (9th Cir. 16 2019). 17 Nonetheless, the Court will independently apply the two-prong test and conclude 18 that Plaintiff’s case does not present exceptional circumstances warranting the appointment 19 of counsel. See Siglar v. Hopkins, 822 Fed. Appx. 610, 611–12 (9th Cir. 2020) (conducting 20 its own two-prong analysis and affirming the district court’s denial of plaintiff’s request 21 for the appointment of counsel). The Court will begin its analysis with the second prong, 22 as it is independently dispositive. 23 The Magistrate Judge concluded Plaintiff had not demonstrated an inability to 24 articulate his claims in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. (Doc. 213 at 6.) 25 Plaintiff’s arguments for being unable to articulate his claims are almost exclusively 26 founded upon the fact of his incarceration. (Doc. 207 at 3–5.) This is insufficient and says 27 nothing of the complexity of the legal issues involved. See e.g., Jefferson v. Heisner, No. 28 CV-21-00054-TUC-RM, 2021 WL 2323067, at *1 (D. Ariz. May 24, 2021); Assyd v. 1|| Mattos, No. CV-17-00507, 2019 WL 8375946, at *1 (D. Ariz. Dec. 2, 2019); Morgal v. Maricopa Cnty. Bd. Of Sup’rs, No. CIV 07-0670-PHX-RCB, 2012 WL 3028336, at *3 (D. 3|| Ariz. July 24, 2012) (“[U]ndoubtedly plaintiff's confinement has hampered his ability to 4|| conduct further factual investigation, but that does not establish the complexity of the 5 || issues or otherwise show exceptional circumstances.”). Further, Plaintiff was capable of 6|| defending against a motion for summary judgment without the assistance of counsel. As || the Magistrate Judge indicated, this demonstrates Plaintiff's ability to articulate his claims. (Doc. 213 at 6.) 9 As for the first prong, Plaintiff has demonstrated a minimal likelihood of success on 10 || the merits. As mentioned, two of Plaintiff's claims have survived a motion for summary 11 |} judgment. This fact evidences at least some likelihood of success. Cobler v. U.S., No. CV- 19099348-TUC-RM, 2022 WL 625704, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 25, 2022); Beitman v. Corizon || Health Inc., No. CV-17-03829-PHX-JAT, 2020 WL 8571771, at *2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 10, 2020); Hollis v. Sloan, No. 2:08-cv-2674 GEB KJN P., 2012 WL 5304756, at *6 (E.D. Cal. || 2012). Still, because Plaintiff failed to satisfy the second prong, the Court finds that there || are no exceptional circumstances which justify appointing counsel for Plaintiff. The 17 || Magistrate Judge’s decision to deny Plaintiff's motion for the appointment of counsel was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law. 19] IV. CONCLUSION 20 Accordingly, 21 IT IS ORDERED denying Plaintiff's Objection (Doc. 216) to the Magistrate || Judge’s December 17, 2022 Order (Doc. 213). 23 Dated this 11th day of April, 2022. 24 Mi Chak T. Sibude Michael T. Liburdi 27 United States District Judge 28

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