Williams v. . Thompson

157 S.E. 430, 200 N.C. 463, 1931 N.C. LEXIS 360

• Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decided: March 18, 1931
• Status: Published

Opinion

Clarkson, J.

The defendants contend: Was there sufficient evidence to sustain the finding of fact by the Industrial Commission that plaintiff’s injury, to wit, the loss of vision occasioned by gonorrhea oph-thalmia, resulted naturally and unavoidably from the dropping of gasoline into his eye?

Public Laws of North Carolina, 1929, ch. 120, known as the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act, sec. 2(f), is as follows: “Un-jury’ and ‘personal injury’ shall mean only injury by accident arising out of, and in the course of, the employment, and shall not include a disease in any form, except where it results naturally and unavoidably from the accident.”

We think there was sufficient competent evidence to sustain the findings. In this and other jurisdictions, dealing with the Workmen’s Compensation Act, a humane undertaking, the acts have been liberally interpreted. Ri ce v. Panel Co., 199 N. C., at p. 157.

In the Rice case, supra, at p. 157, we find: “Under' section 60 the findings of fact by the Commission shall be conclusive and binding.” We may add that the rulings of law by the Commission are persuasive and ought to have weight on appeal to this Court. Moore v. State, ante, 300.

The findings of fact by the Industrial Commission in a hearing before them is conclusive upon appeal when there is sufficient competent evidence to sustain the award. Southern v. Cotton Mills, ante, 165.

Under the facts and circumstances of this case we do not think there is reversible error on the question of burden of proof.

Part of the award of the Commission is as follows: “That plaintiff is entitled to 60 per cent of his average weekly wage of $16.50 ($9.90 per week) for such time as his percentage of loss of vision bears to the total of 100 weeks for the partial loss of vision in his left eye, as provided for in section 31, subsection (t), said percentage to be determined by a recognized eye specialist to be named by the Commission.”

The defendants object to the following part of the above award “said percentage to be determined by a recognized eye specialist, to be named by the Commission.”

Section 63 of the act is as follows: “The Commission or any member thereof may, upon the application of either party, or upon its own motion, appoint a disinterested and duly qualified physician or surgeon to make any necessary medical examination of the employee, and to testify in respect thereto,” etc.

By section 46 it is provided in the act, upon change of condition, Commission may modify award. We think this element in fieri and before final award defendants would be entitled to notice and hearing. The judgment of the court below is

Affirmed.