Williams v. Streator Township High School District 40

2021 IL App (3d) 200460-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: August 27, 2021
• Docket: 3-20-0460
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2021 IL App (3d) 200460-U

Order filed August 27, 2021 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

SCOTT WILLIAMS, as the father and next ) Appeal from the Circuit Court best friend of TAYTUM WILLIAMS, ) of the 13th Judicial Circuit, a minor, ) La Salle County, Illinois, ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) Appeal No. 3-20-0460 v. ) Circuit No. 18-L-2 ) STREATOR TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL ) DISTRICT NO. 40, ) Honorable ) Joseph P. Hettel, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding.

____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Holdridge and Schmidt concurred in the judgment. ____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶1 Held: Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to reconsider summary judgment order where evidence was insufficient to sustain an allegation of willful and wanton conduct by school district.

¶2 Plaintiff, Scott Williams, as the father and next best friend of Taytum Williams, filed suit

against defendant, Streator Township High School District No. 40 (Streator), for injuries his

daughter sustained while operating a machine in the high school’s technology lab. The trial court granted defendant’s summary judgment motion based on the Local Governmental and

Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/3-108 (West

2020)) and denied Williams’ motion to reconsider. Williams appeals from the order denying his

motion to reconsider, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that the high

school did not engage in willful and wanton behavior. We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 In January 2017, Taytum Williams was a high school freshman at Streator. On January 9,

she was in the technology lab assisting with a presentation for incoming eighth grade students. The

presentation involved high school students demonstrating how to use various pieces of equipment

in the lab (modules) to make a screwdriver. Taytum was assigned to the electric circuit board

module.

¶5 During the presentation, another student, Ellie Magana, asked Taytum to help her with the

module she was demonstrating, an injection molding machine. The molding machine made a

plastic handle for the screwdriver. To operate the molding machine, the student demonstrator filled

a funnel with plastic beads, which were melted inside the machine. The student then pulled a lever

and melted plastic was extruded through a nozzle into a mold. Ellie explained to Taytum that the

machine was not filling the handle mold completely with plastic. She told Taytum that she had

reported the problem to the teacher, David Marvin, but the machine was still malfunctioning. Ellie

and Taytum walked to Marvin’s desk and informed him again that the machine was not filling the

mold properly. He told them to look at the machine and tell him what was causing the problem.

¶6 Taytum returned to the machine and attempted to fix it. She removed the mold template

and pulled the lever to see if the machine would extrude plastic. The machine poured out a small

amount of plastic, creating a round disk approximately the size of a quarter. Taytum grabbed a pair

2 a pliers sitting nearby and picked up the disk. As she moved the disk from the work area to the

garbage can, hot plastic dripped from the disk and fell onto her right hand, burning her thumb and

knuckles.

¶7 Williams, Taytum’s father, filed a negligence complaint against Streator on behalf of his

daughter. Streator’s motion to dismiss based on the Tort Immunity Act was granted, and Williams

was allowed to replead. In his amended complaint, Williams claimed, in part, that the high school

willfully and wantonly directed Taytum to use equipment known as faulty or malfunctioning,

failed to supervise the use of the molding machine, and failed to inform Taytum of safety

instructions.

¶8 In her deposition, Taytum testified that she took Intro to Technology with Marvin in the

fall of her freshman year and received an “A.” During the class, she used most of the machines in

the lab and spent two weeks using the injection molding machine. She also received in-class

instruction as to the proper safety precautions for using the lab equipment. Students were told to

wear safety googles when operating the technology machinery, but not gloves, aprons, or helmets.

¶9 Taytum stated that on the day of the presentation, she remembered how to use the molding

machine from the fall semester. She described it as a “fairly easy machine.” Taytum testified that

when she reported the problem to Marvin, he told her to “see what [she] could do with it.” Marvin

did not give her specific instructions about how to deal with the problem. Taytum was not

concerned about getting hurt when she went back to work with the machine. She could have asked

Mr. Marvin to assist her or to fix the machine, but she did not. She “just decided to see if [she]

could do something with it.”

¶ 10 During his deposition, Marvin described the molding machine as “quirky.” He testified that

most of the time the machine was problem free, but sometimes heated plastic came out of the

3 machine at different rates, depending on the temperature. He stated that Taytum had taken

“Foundations to Technology” in the fall of 2016 and had received training on the molding machine

for couple of weeks. At the beginning of the semester, students were instructed not to place their

hands underneath the machine and that safety glasses were mandatory.

¶ 11 Marvin testified that Taytum and the other students were asked to help with the

presentation that day because they understood how to work with the machines. During the

presentation, some students expressed a concern about the molding machine. Marvin told them to

look at the machine and report back to him, but they did not return. It was his understanding that

the problem had been resolved. Marvin noted that the molding machine had not required any

repairs prior to the presentation.

¶ 12 After Taytum’s accident, Marvin looked at the machine and did not observe any problem.

It continued to operate as usual during the next round of demonstrations. Marvin testified that as

of December 2, 2019 (the date of his deposition) the school still uses the molding machine and it

continues to function properly. The machine has not required any repairs or maintenance since

Taytum’s injury.

¶ 13 Based on the parties’ depositions, Streator moved for summary judgment, claiming that

Marvin’s conduct did not rise to the level of willful and wanton behavior. Williams responded to

the motion, arguing that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the high school’s

conduct was willful and wanton. Streator filed a reply, disagreeing that a genuine issue existed and

citing Marvin’s December 2, 2019, deposition.

¶ 14 The trial court entered an order granting the motion for summary judgment and dismissing

the case with prejudice. The order stated that the court would reconsider its decision if Williams

submitted a transcript of Marvin’s deposition.

4 ¶ 15 Williams filed a timely motion to reconsider and a copy of the deposition transcript.

Following a review of Marvin’s testimony, the trial court denied the motion.

¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 17 Williams appeals the denial of his motion to reconsider the summary judgment ruling. He

claims the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that Marvin’s conduct did not constitute

willful and wanton behavior.

¶ 18 A. Standard of Review

¶ 19 Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits on file,

construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, establish that there is no genuine

issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735

ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2020). The purpose of a motion to reconsider a summary judgment ruling

is to bring to the court’s attention newly discovered evidence, changes in the law, or errors in the

court's previous application of existing law. Landeros v. Equity Property & Development, 321 Ill.

App. 3d 57, 65 (2001). “Newly discovered” evidence is evidence that was not available to the

parties prior to the hearing on the summary judgment motion. Id. A trial court’s decision to grant

or deny a motion for reconsideration lies within the court’s discretion and will not be reversed

absent an abuse of that discretion. American National Trust Co. v. Kentucky Fried Chicken of

Southern California, Inc., 308 Ill. App. 3d 106, 120 (1999).

¶ 20 B. Willful and Wanton Conduct

¶ 21 Section 3-108 of the Tort Immunity Act grants public schools immunity for failing to

supervise an activity on or the use of school property. 745 ILCS 10/3-108(a) (West 2020). Willful

and wanton conduct, however, is an express exception to that immunity:

5 “(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, neither a local public entity nor a

public employee who undertakes to supervise an activity on or the use of any public

property is liable for an injury unless the local public entity or public employee is

guilty of willful and wanton conduct in its supervision proximately causing such

injury.” Id.

The Act defines willful and wanton conduct as “a course of action which shows an actual or

deliberate intention to cause harm or which, if not intentional, shows an utter indifference to or

conscious disregard for the safety of others or their property.” Id. § 1-210.

¶ 22 Willful and wanton conduct differs from negligence in that it “ ‘requires a conscious choice

of a course of action, either with knowledge of serious danger to others involved in it or with

knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable [person].’ ” Burke v. 12

Rothschild’s Liquor Mart, Inc., 148 Ill. 2d 429, 449 (1992) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts

§ 500 (1965)). To state a cause of action for willful and wanton conduct by a public school or its

employee, the plaintiff must plead and prove the basic elements of a negligence claim and must

further allege a deliberate intention to cause harm or a conscious disregard for the student’s

welfare. Brooks v. McLean County Unit District No. 5, 2014 IL App (4th) 130503, ¶ 38. Proof of

willful and wanton conduct, in the absence of evidence of prior injuries, requires some evidence

that the activity is generally associated with a risk of serious injury. Barr v. Cunningham, 2017 IL

120751, ¶ 21; see also Murray v. Chicago Youth Center, 224 Ill. 2d 213, 246 (2007); Hadley v.

Witt Unit School District 66, 123 Ill. App. 3d 19, 23 (1984).

¶ 23 Illinois courts have held that school employees who exercise some precautions to protect

students from injury, even if those precautions are insufficient, are not guilty of willful and wanton

conduct. Barr, 2017 IL 120751, ¶ 24; see also Lynch v. Board of Education of Collinsville

6 Community Unit District No. 10, 82 Ill. 2d 415, 430-31 (1980). For example, in Barr, a student

suffered an eye injury when he was struck with a ball in physical education class. Barr, 2017 IL

120751, ¶ 3. The plaintiff and 11 other students were playing floor hockey using plastic sticks and

a “squishy” safety ball under the supervision of the physical education instructor. The ball bounced

off the plaintiff’s stick and hit him in the eye. None of the students were wearing safety googles

even though they were available. The instructor testified that she did not require safety goggles for

floor hockey because she thought the equipment was safe. She had not witnessed a safety ball

striking a student in the face prior to the injury that day. No other student has suffered a serious

injury prior to the plaintiff’s injury. Id. ¶ 7. Our supreme court upheld a directed verdict in the

defendants’ favor. The court concluded that, given the absence of prior injury and the

implementation of some safety features, the teacher’s failure to require students to wear goggles

did not establish a conscious disregard for the student’s safety. Id. ¶¶ 18, 24.

¶ 24 In this case, the complaint alleged that Marvin’s failure to supervise and provide adequate

safety equipment amounted to willful and wanton conduct. However, in response to Streator’s

summary judgment motion, Williams’ failed to provide any evidence demonstrating a deliberate

intention to cause harm or a conscious disregard for Taytum’s safety. Williams did not introduce

any evidence that Marvin knew or had reason to know that the molding machine was a serious

danger to others. Students had conducted numerous demonstrations using the molding machine

that day without incident. In addition, the evidence presented showed that some safety precautions

had been implemented. Taytum testified that she received safety training and instruction on the

injection molding machine during the previous semester. She also testified that the school provided

safety goggles. In addition, Marvin testified that he instructed the students to wear safety goggles

and not place their hands under the molding machine. Taytum, herself, testified that the machine

7 was easy to use and that she was not worried about an injury when she removed the mold and

pulled the lever on the machine. In her words, she “just decided” to see if she could fix it. In light

of the safety precautions imposed and without any evidence of a prior injury, no triable issue of

fact exists as to whether Streator is guilty of willful and wanton conduct.

¶ 25 Williams cites Hadley generally and insists that the willful and wanton standard does not

require a previous injury or knowledge that an injury is imminent. In Hadley, a student filed suit

against a teacher and the school district after he injured his eye in a high school industrial arts

class. Hadley, 123 Ill. App. 3d at 20. The students were assigned woodworking projects during

class. Instead of working on the assigned project, the plaintiff and some other students attempted

to pound a piece of scrap metal through a hole in a work bench. The teacher saw the students

hammering the scrap metal prior to the injury but did not tell them to stop or to put on safety

goggles. A few minutes later, a shard of metal flew into the plaintiff’s eye, causing permanent

damage. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the school, and the appellate court

reversed, finding that the instructor’s failure to act after noticing that the students were engaged in

a dangerous activity might constitute willful and wanton conduct. The court ruled that a genuine

issue of material fact existed and the issue should have gone to the jury. Id. at 23.

¶ 26 Here, unlike Hadley, there was no evidence that the molding machine is inherently

dangerous or that Marvin was aware of the dangerous activity prior to Taytum’s injury. In response

to the summary judgment motion, Williams failed to introduce evidence of any specific dangers

associated with the molding machine in the technology lab or that it was otherwise an inherently

dangerous piece of equipment. Moreover, Williams did not assert that Marvin witnessed Taytum

reaching underneath the machine and failed to stop her from doing so.

8 ¶ 27 Viewing the pleadings and depositions presented in the light most favorable to Williams,

no genuine issue of material fact exists. The evidence failed to establish a course of action showing

a deliberate intention to harm Taytum or an utter indifference or conscious disregard for Taytum’s

welfare. Even assuming, arguendo, that Marvin’s deposition (presented as supplemental evidence

in support of the motion to reconsider) was newly discovered evidence, it failed to create a triable

issue. Marvin’s deposition provides no evidence that he was aware that the molding machine was

dangerous or that a prior injury had occurred that would have put a reasonable person on notice of

the risk of serious injury. In this case, none of the deposition testimony raised a substantial factual

dispute as to whether Streator’s conduct was willful and wanton. We therefore conclude that the

trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Williams’ motion to reconsider.

¶ 28 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 29 The judgment of the circuit court of La Salle County is affirmed.

¶ 30 Affirmed.