Birdsong, Judge.
Eddie J. Williams was convicted of five counts of robbery by intimidation and one count of an attempt to do the same and sentenced to serve 20 years. He brings this appeal enumerating four errors. Held:
1. In his first enumeration of error, Williams contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the fruits of a search of appellant’s automobile without a warrant. The facts show that an attempted robbery of a photo processing stand had just occurred. A description of the auto, an almost correct sequence of the numbers of the auto tag, and of the single male occupant of the auto, had all been broadcast as a police alert. Within a few minutes and only a short distance from the scene of the attempted robbery, cruising police officers observed a vehicle fitting the description, with those tag numbers and containing a single male of the description broadcast. The car was stopped, the appellant Williams arrested, and his car searched. Evidence was found that corresponded with items used by the robber in the attempted robbery.
Under the facts above delineated, we experience no difficulty in concluding that the officers had probable cause to stop the auto and arrest the occupant. It is settled law that an officer at the time of a lawful custodial arrest may, without a warrant, make a full search of the person of the accused (United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218 (94 SC 467, 38 LE2d 427)), a limited area within the control of the person arrested (Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (89 SC 2034, 23 LE2d 685)), and of an automobile in his possession at the scene of the arrest for the discovery and preservation of criminal evidence (Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (92 SC 1921, 32 LE2d 612)). See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (90 SC 1975, 26 LE2d 419, 428).
We are aware of our earlier decisions in Love v. State, 144 Ga. App. 728, 736 (242 SE2d 278) and Hardwick v. [853]*853State, 149 Ga. App. 291 (254 SE2d 384). However, we conclude that neither of those cases is controlling in view of the facts of this case. In Loue, supra, the defendant Love was away from his car which was parked outside a motel and Love was arrested, on probable cause, on the second floor of the motel. The car was immobile, not under the control of the defendant, but was under the control of the police who could have obtained a warrant prior to the search. Thus, there existed no exigent circumstances to conduct a warrantless search, nor could the probable cause for the arrest furnish those exigent circumstances. There was no serious contention by the police that the search of Love’s car was incident to the arrest. That decision rejects any premise of a search of an auto incident to an arrest.
In the Hardwick case, supra, the defendant Hardwick met an undercover agent at a public place to effect a drug sale. Hardwick indicated that the drugs were in his car which was parked outside the building. This court held that probable cause existed to arrest Hardwick in the building but that had the arrest occurred therein, as in the Love case, no exigent circumstances would exist since the car was immobile, not within the control of the defendant and could be secured by the police until a warrant could be obtained. The decision went on further to hold that to allow the defendant Hardwick to go to his car to move it to a more secluded place to effect the sale, was a subterfuge to create an exigent situation thereby improperly attempting to authorize a warrantless search. This court would not countenance such a subterfuge.
In this case, we are faced with the situation of a fleeing felon, fortuitously observed by a cruising police officer, who on probable cause, stopped and arrested the appellant Williams. Williams was in his car driving away from the scene. The search of the car was immediate and incident to the arrest. Under such circumstances, the warrantless arrest and search was proper. Code § 27-207 (a); Newman v. State, 237 Ga. 376, 380 (228 SE2d 790); Taylor v. State, 149 Ga. App. 30, 31 (1) (253 SE2d 428). This is true even though appellant had been arrested and removed to a nearby police car. Phillips v. State, 233 Ga. 800, 802-803 (213 SE2d 664). The first enumeration is [854]*854without merit.
2. In his second enumeration, appellant urges that the trial court erred in denying a motion to sever the six counts inasmuch as the conduct described extended over a 45-day period. Williams misconceives the law of severance. As to each count, the same individual was generally described by physical appearance, the same type of establishment was involved in each incident, the same technique was utilized in each robbery, and the same car was involved in each. The prime issue in the case was one of identity. The evidence of identity, though relating to different victims, was inextricably intertwined in all the various offenses charged. We conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion in the interest of justice for the trial court to refuse a motion for severance of the trial of the multiple charges where the crimes alleged were part of a continuous course of criminal conduct extending over a relatively short time, and from the nature of the entire course of conduct, it would be almost impossible to present to a jury evidence of one of the crimes without also permitting evidence of the others. Stewart v. State, 239 Ga. 588, 589 (238 SE2d 540); Henderson v. State, 227 Ga. 68, 76 (179 SE2d 76). We find no merit to this enumeration.
3. Appellant urges that the trial court erred in failing to grant a motion for directed verdicts of acquittal as to Counts 1, 2, and 5. In essence, Williams argues that the evidence of identification is inadequate to warrant conviction on those counts.
Our responsibility on appeal is not to weigh the evidence and give a de novo opinion on where the greater weight of the evidence lies but merely to determine if there is sufficient evidence to authorize the trial court’s judgment. Ridley v. State, 236 Ga. 147 (223 SE2d 131); Proctor v. State, 235 Ga. 720 (221 SE2d 556). The evidence of the primary issue was in conflict, the jury resolved that issue against the appellant and there was some evidence adequate to support the verdict of the jury. Griffin v. State, 237 Ga. 532 (228 SE2d 908); Dunn v. State, 141 Ga. App. 853 (1) (234 SE2d 687). This enumeration lacks merit.
4. In his final enumeration of error, Williams urges that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of yet [855]*855another robbery by intimidation in another county but under nearly identical circumstances, and within the same general time frame. Evidence may be admitted to prove other like crimes by the accused so nearly identical in method as to earmark them as the handiwork of the accused. McCormick on Evidence 447, 449, § 190 (2d Ed., 1972); Thomas v. State, 239 Ga. 734, 736 (4) (238 SE2d 888); Smith v. State, 142 Ga. App. 1, 3 (234 SE2d 816). We find no error in the admission of this evidence.
Submitted January 15, 1979
Decided July 10, 1979
Rehearing denied July 24, 1979. Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Birdsong, Judge.
Eddie J. Williams was convicted of five counts of robbery by intimidation and one count of an attempt to do the same and sentenced to serve 20 years. He brings this appeal enumerating four errors. Held:
1. In his first enumeration of error, Williams contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the fruits of a search of appellant’s automobile without a warrant. The facts show that an attempted robbery of a photo processing stand had just occurred. A description of the auto, an almost correct sequence of the numbers of the auto tag, and of the single male occupant of the auto, had all been broadcast as a police alert. Within a few minutes and only a short distance from the scene of the attempted robbery, cruising police officers observed a vehicle fitting the description, with those tag numbers and containing a single male of the description broadcast. The car was stopped, the appellant Williams arrested, and his car searched. Evidence was found that corresponded with items used by the robber in the attempted robbery.
Under the facts above delineated, we experience no difficulty in concluding that the officers had probable cause to stop the auto and arrest the occupant. It is settled law that an officer at the time of a lawful custodial arrest may, without a warrant, make a full search of the person of the accused (United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218 (94 SC 467, 38 LE2d 427)), a limited area within the control of the person arrested (Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (89 SC 2034, 23 LE2d 685)), and of an automobile in his possession at the scene of the arrest for the discovery and preservation of criminal evidence (Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (92 SC 1921, 32 LE2d 612)). See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (90 SC 1975, 26 LE2d 419, 428).
We are aware of our earlier decisions in Love v. State, 144 Ga. App. 728, 736 (242 SE2d 278) and Hardwick v. [853]*853State, 149 Ga. App. 291 (254 SE2d 384). However, we conclude that neither of those cases is controlling in view of the facts of this case. In Loue, supra, the defendant Love was away from his car which was parked outside a motel and Love was arrested, on probable cause, on the second floor of the motel. The car was immobile, not under the control of the defendant, but was under the control of the police who could have obtained a warrant prior to the search. Thus, there existed no exigent circumstances to conduct a warrantless search, nor could the probable cause for the arrest furnish those exigent circumstances. There was no serious contention by the police that the search of Love’s car was incident to the arrest. That decision rejects any premise of a search of an auto incident to an arrest.
In the Hardwick case, supra, the defendant Hardwick met an undercover agent at a public place to effect a drug sale. Hardwick indicated that the drugs were in his car which was parked outside the building. This court held that probable cause existed to arrest Hardwick in the building but that had the arrest occurred therein, as in the Love case, no exigent circumstances would exist since the car was immobile, not within the control of the defendant and could be secured by the police until a warrant could be obtained. The decision went on further to hold that to allow the defendant Hardwick to go to his car to move it to a more secluded place to effect the sale, was a subterfuge to create an exigent situation thereby improperly attempting to authorize a warrantless search. This court would not countenance such a subterfuge.
In this case, we are faced with the situation of a fleeing felon, fortuitously observed by a cruising police officer, who on probable cause, stopped and arrested the appellant Williams. Williams was in his car driving away from the scene. The search of the car was immediate and incident to the arrest. Under such circumstances, the warrantless arrest and search was proper. Code § 27-207 (a); Newman v. State, 237 Ga. 376, 380 (228 SE2d 790); Taylor v. State, 149 Ga. App. 30, 31 (1) (253 SE2d 428). This is true even though appellant had been arrested and removed to a nearby police car. Phillips v. State, 233 Ga. 800, 802-803 (213 SE2d 664). The first enumeration is [854]*854without merit.
2. In his second enumeration, appellant urges that the trial court erred in denying a motion to sever the six counts inasmuch as the conduct described extended over a 45-day period. Williams misconceives the law of severance. As to each count, the same individual was generally described by physical appearance, the same type of establishment was involved in each incident, the same technique was utilized in each robbery, and the same car was involved in each. The prime issue in the case was one of identity. The evidence of identity, though relating to different victims, was inextricably intertwined in all the various offenses charged. We conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion in the interest of justice for the trial court to refuse a motion for severance of the trial of the multiple charges where the crimes alleged were part of a continuous course of criminal conduct extending over a relatively short time, and from the nature of the entire course of conduct, it would be almost impossible to present to a jury evidence of one of the crimes without also permitting evidence of the others. Stewart v. State, 239 Ga. 588, 589 (238 SE2d 540); Henderson v. State, 227 Ga. 68, 76 (179 SE2d 76). We find no merit to this enumeration.
3. Appellant urges that the trial court erred in failing to grant a motion for directed verdicts of acquittal as to Counts 1, 2, and 5. In essence, Williams argues that the evidence of identification is inadequate to warrant conviction on those counts.
Our responsibility on appeal is not to weigh the evidence and give a de novo opinion on where the greater weight of the evidence lies but merely to determine if there is sufficient evidence to authorize the trial court’s judgment. Ridley v. State, 236 Ga. 147 (223 SE2d 131); Proctor v. State, 235 Ga. 720 (221 SE2d 556). The evidence of the primary issue was in conflict, the jury resolved that issue against the appellant and there was some evidence adequate to support the verdict of the jury. Griffin v. State, 237 Ga. 532 (228 SE2d 908); Dunn v. State, 141 Ga. App. 853 (1) (234 SE2d 687). This enumeration lacks merit.
4. In his final enumeration of error, Williams urges that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of yet [855]*855another robbery by intimidation in another county but under nearly identical circumstances, and within the same general time frame. Evidence may be admitted to prove other like crimes by the accused so nearly identical in method as to earmark them as the handiwork of the accused. McCormick on Evidence 447, 449, § 190 (2d Ed., 1972); Thomas v. State, 239 Ga. 734, 736 (4) (238 SE2d 888); Smith v. State, 142 Ga. App. 1, 3 (234 SE2d 816). We find no error in the admission of this evidence.
Submitted January 15, 1979
Decided July 10, 1979
Rehearing denied July 24, 1979.
King & Dotson, Larry King, for appellant.
Robert E. Keller, District Attorney, James W. Bradley, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Judgment affirmed.
Quillian, P. J., McMurray, P. J., Underwood and Carley, JJ., concur. Banke, J., concurs specially. Deen, C. J., and Smith, J., dissent. Shulman, J., not participating.