Williams v. SI 1688 Realty, LLC

Opinion

Williams v SI 1688 Realty, LLC

2026 NY Slip Op 04896

August 5, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Dominic Williams, respondent,

v

SI 1688 Realty, LLC, et al., appellants.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on August 5, 2026

2025-00880, (Index No. 503124/22)

Colleen D. Duffy, J.P.

Paul Wooten

Carl J. Landicino

Susan Quirk, JJ.

The Gold Law Firm P.C., North Bellmore, NY (Karen C. Higgins and James Stewart of counsel), for appellants.

James F. Sullivan (Bergstein & Ullrich, New Paltz, NY [Stephen Bergstein], of counsel), for respondent.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Katherine A. Levine, J.), dated December 12, 2024. The order granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability and dismissing the defendants' first, third, fourth, and seventh affirmative defenses.

ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof granting those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were for summary judgment on the issue of liability on so much of the cause of action alleging negligence as was based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and on the doctrine of negligence per se predicated on a violation of Multiple Dwelling Law § 78(1) and dismissing the defendants' first, third, fourth, and seventh affirmative defenses, and substituting therefor a provision denying those branches of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants, owners and managers of a three-family dwelling in which the plaintiff resided, to recover damages for personal injuries she alleged she sustained when a portion of the bathroom ceiling in the plaintiff's apartment fell on her while she was cleaning her bathtub. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability and dismissing the defendants' first, third, fourth, and seventh affirmative defenses sounding in comparative negligence. The Supreme Court granted the motion. The defendants appeal.

"'In general, to impose liability for an injury caused by a ceiling collapsing because of a leak, a plaintiff must show that the defendant had prior notice, actual or constructive, of the leak and that the leak was never repaired'" (Toussaint v Ocean Ave. Apt. Assoc., LLC, 144 AD3d 664, 664, quoting Ellisy v Eklecco, LLC, 56 AD3d 517, 517). Here, the plaintiff established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability with respect to the defendants' failure to remedy the leak despite having actual notice thereof (see id.). The plaintiff submitted evidence that the defendant had actual notice of the defective condition well before the ceiling collapsed and, thus, that the leak existed for a sufficient length of time prior to the accident to permit the defendants to remedy it. In opposition, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see id.). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion [*2]which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability on so much of the cause of action alleging negligence as was based on the defendants' failure to remedy the leak despite having actual notice thereof.

However, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability on so much of the cause of action alleging negligence as was based on the doctrine of negligence per se predicated on the defendants' alleged violation of Multiple Dwelling Law § 78(1). A cause of action alleging negligence per se predicated on a violation of Multiple Dwelling Law § 78(1) cannot lie, as the statute imposes only a general duty to maintain a multiple dwelling and does not impose a specific duty upon a landlord (see Omre v Dorfman, 217 AD3d 874, 875; Baez v 1749 Grand Concourse LLC, 178 AD3d 520, 521-522).

The Supreme Court also should have denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability on so much of the cause of action alleging negligence as was based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. "The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence that permits an inference of negligence to be drawn solely from the happening of an accident where the plaintiff can show that: (1) the event is of the kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) the instrumentality that caused the injury is within the defendant's exclusive control; and (3) the injury is not the result of any voluntary action by the plaintiff" (Correa v Matsias, 153 AD3d 1312, 1313). Here, the plaintiff failed to establish that her bathroom ceiling and a bathtub in an upstairs apartment were within the defendants' exclusive control (see Matson v Dermer Mgt., Inc., 200 AD3d 772, 773; Correa v Matsias, 153 AD3d at 1313). The plaintiff also failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to her comparative fault, as she entered the bathroom to scrub the bathtub despite being concerned about the imminent collapse of the ceiling before it fell (see Bailey v 2732 Bainbridge Assoc., LLC, 243 AD3d 434).

For the same reason, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the defendants' first, third, fourth, and seventh affirmative defenses sounding in comparative negligence were without merit as a matter of law (see id.; Muniz v SPO Rest., LLC, 227 AD3d 1002, 1004).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were for summary judgment on the issue of liability on so much of the cause of action alleging negligence as was based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and on the doctrine of negligence per se predicated on a violation of Multiple Dwelling Law § 78(1) and dismissing the defendants' first, third, fourth, and seventh affirmative defenses.

DUFFY, J.P., WOOTEN, LANDICINO and QUIRK, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court