Williams v. Shinn

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided February 3, 2020·No. 2:17-cv-01834-DWL·Unknown

Opinion

Irvin Darryl Williams, Sr., No. CV-17-01834-PHX-DWL (JFM)

Petitioner, ORDER

v.

Charles L Ryan, et al.,

Respondents. Pending before the Court are Magistrate Judge Metcalf’s report and recommendation on dispositive motions (“the R&R”) (Doc. 108) and Petitioner’s objections to the R&R (Doc. 110). For the following reasons, the Court will overrule Petitioner’s objections and adopt the R&R. This outcome means the Court will also deny Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 102) and grant Respondents’ motion to amend (Doc. 105). I. Background The Court adopts the background details set forth in the R&R, which can be summarized as follows. This is a habeas corpus proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In June 2017, Petitioner filed his initial petition. (Doc. 1.) In October 2017, Petitioner filed an amended petition, which asserts 26 grounds for relief. (Doc. 17.) On May 29, 2018, Respondents filed a limited answer. (Doc. 37.) In several instances, Respondents only raised procedural defenses. For example, with respect to Ground Six of the amended petition—Petitioner’s claim that the state suborned perjury during his trial—Respondents’ sole response was that “[a]lthough the record reflects that Petitioner presented these claims during his direct appeal, . . . he failed to fairly present them as federal constitutional claims. . . . Accordingly, Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas review . . . .” (Id. at 23.) On February 25, 2019, Judge Metcalf advised the parties that he had tentatively concluded that some of Respondents’ proffered procedural defenses were insufficient and thus directed Respondents to supplement their answer and the record. (Doc. 76.) One of the grounds as to which Judge Metcalf ordered supplementation was Ground Six. (Id. at 19-22.) On May 31, 2019, Respondents filed their supplemental answer. (Doc. 87.) Unfortunately, Respondents failed to include, in this 99-page document, any additional discussion concerning Ground Six. (Id.) On August 16, 2019, Petitioner filed a “motion for summary judgment.” (Doc. 102.) In a nutshell, Petitioner argued that because Respondents failed to address the merits of Ground Six in their supplemental answer, “[t]here is no genuine dispute as to any material fact regarding the knowing use of perjured testimony that in this case requires reversal.” (Id. at 1.) On September 26, 2019, Respondents filed a document entitled “Motion for leave to amend supplemental answer/Respondents’ opposition to Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment.” (Doc. 105.) In it, Respondents explained that, “due to an apparent oversight or technical error, the filed supplemental answer did not contain the response to Ground Six that was present in the non-filed draft of the supplemental response.” (Id. at 2.) Thus, Respondents requested leave to amend their supplemental answer to address Ground Six. (Id. at 2-3.) Alternatively, Respondents urged the Court to deny Petitioner’s summary judgment motion because (1) the relief sought by Petitioner would effectively amount to a default judgment, which is impermissible in a habeas proceeding, and (2) Petitioner is not, in any event, entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56 because there is still a disputed issue concerning exhaustion. (Id. at 3-4.) On November 5, 2019, Judge Metcalf issued the R&R. (Doc. 108.) First, the R&R recommends that Petitioner’s summary judgment motion be denied because (1) summary judgment is “inappropriate” in a habeas proceeding because “the summary judgment rules are generally ill fitted to habeas cases,” and (2) Petitioner is effectively seeking a default judgment, yet the relevant case law—Gordon v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1990), and Blietner v. Wellborne, 15 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 1994)—makes clear that default judgment is inappropriate in the habeas context. (Doc. 108 at 2-3.) Second, the R&R recommends that Respondents’ motion to amend be granted because Rule 15(a)(2) provides that leave to amend should be freely granted, the proposed amendment isn’t futile, Petitioner hasn’t suffered undue prejudice from the delay (“out of the 28 months this case has been pending, only 133 days can be attributed to delay by Respondents in filing briefs”), and Respondents acted promptly upon learning about the oversight. (Id. at 4-6.) On November 25, 2019, Petitioner filed his objections to the R&R. (Doc. 110.)1 II. Legal Standard A party may file written objections to an R&R within fourteen days of being served with a copy of it. Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases 8(b) (“Section 2254 Rules”).2 Those objections must be “specific.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) (“Within 14 days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.”) (emphasis added). District courts are not required to review any portion of an R&R to which no specific objection has been made. See, e.g., Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985) (“It does not appear that Congress intended to require district court review of a magistrate’s factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party objects to those findings.”); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.

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Related

Thomas v. Arn
474 U.S. 140 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Willie Gordon v. Robert Duran
895 F.2d 610 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)