Williams v. Shinn

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedFebruary 3, 2020
Docket2:17-cv-01834-DWL
StatusUnknown

This text of Williams v. Shinn (Williams v. Shinn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Williams v. Shinn, (D. Ariz. 2020).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Irvin Darryl Williams, Sr., No. CV-17-01834-PHX-DWL (JFM)

10 Petitioner, ORDER

11 v.

12 Charles L Ryan, et al.,

13 Respondents. 14 15 Pending before the Court are Magistrate Judge Metcalf’s report and 16 recommendation on dispositive motions (“the R&R”) (Doc. 108) and Petitioner’s 17 objections to the R&R (Doc. 110). For the following reasons, the Court will overrule 18 Petitioner’s objections and adopt the R&R. This outcome means the Court will also deny 19 Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 102) and grant Respondents’ motion to 20 amend (Doc. 105). 21 I. Background 22 The Court adopts the background details set forth in the R&R, which can be 23 summarized as follows. This is a habeas corpus proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In 24 June 2017, Petitioner filed his initial petition. (Doc. 1.) In October 2017, Petitioner filed 25 an amended petition, which asserts 26 grounds for relief. (Doc. 17.) 26 On May 29, 2018, Respondents filed a limited answer. (Doc. 37.) In several 27 instances, Respondents only raised procedural defenses. For example, with respect to 28 Ground Six of the amended petition—Petitioner’s claim that the state suborned perjury 1 during his trial—Respondents’ sole response was that “[a]lthough the record reflects that 2 Petitioner presented these claims during his direct appeal, . . . he failed to fairly present 3 them as federal constitutional claims. . . . Accordingly, Petitioner’s claims are procedurally 4 defaulted and barred from federal habeas review . . . .” (Id. at 23.) 5 On February 25, 2019, Judge Metcalf advised the parties that he had tentatively 6 concluded that some of Respondents’ proffered procedural defenses were insufficient and 7 thus directed Respondents to supplement their answer and the record. (Doc. 76.) One of 8 the grounds as to which Judge Metcalf ordered supplementation was Ground Six. (Id. at 9 19-22.) 10 On May 31, 2019, Respondents filed their supplemental answer. (Doc. 87.) 11 Unfortunately, Respondents failed to include, in this 99-page document, any additional 12 discussion concerning Ground Six. (Id.) 13 On August 16, 2019, Petitioner filed a “motion for summary judgment.” (Doc. 102.) 14 In a nutshell, Petitioner argued that because Respondents failed to address the merits of 15 Ground Six in their supplemental answer, “[t]here is no genuine dispute as to any material 16 fact regarding the knowing use of perjured testimony that in this case requires reversal.” 17 (Id. at 1.) 18 On September 26, 2019, Respondents filed a document entitled “Motion for leave 19 to amend supplemental answer/Respondents’ opposition to Petitioner’s motion for 20 summary judgment.” (Doc. 105.) In it, Respondents explained that, “due to an apparent 21 oversight or technical error, the filed supplemental answer did not contain the response to 22 Ground Six that was present in the non-filed draft of the supplemental response.” (Id. at 23 2.) Thus, Respondents requested leave to amend their supplemental answer to address 24 Ground Six. (Id. at 2-3.) Alternatively, Respondents urged the Court to deny Petitioner’s 25 summary judgment motion because (1) the relief sought by Petitioner would effectively 26 amount to a default judgment, which is impermissible in a habeas proceeding, and (2) 27 Petitioner is not, in any event, entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56 because there 28 is still a disputed issue concerning exhaustion. (Id. at 3-4.) 1 On November 5, 2019, Judge Metcalf issued the R&R. (Doc. 108.) First, the R&R 2 recommends that Petitioner’s summary judgment motion be denied because (1) summary 3 judgment is “inappropriate” in a habeas proceeding because “the summary judgment rules 4 are generally ill fitted to habeas cases,” and (2) Petitioner is effectively seeking a default 5 judgment, yet the relevant case law—Gordon v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1990), and 6 Blietner v. Wellborne, 15 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 1994)—makes clear that default judgment is 7 inappropriate in the habeas context. (Doc. 108 at 2-3.) Second, the R&R recommends that 8 Respondents’ motion to amend be granted because Rule 15(a)(2) provides that leave to 9 amend should be freely granted, the proposed amendment isn’t futile, Petitioner hasn’t 10 suffered undue prejudice from the delay (“out of the 28 months this case has been pending, 11 only 133 days can be attributed to delay by Respondents in filing briefs”), and Respondents 12 acted promptly upon learning about the oversight. (Id. at 4-6.) 13 On November 25, 2019, Petitioner filed his objections to the R&R. (Doc. 110.)1 14 II. Legal Standard 15 A party may file written objections to an R&R within fourteen days of being served 16 with a copy of it. Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases 8(b) (“Section 2254 Rules”).2 17 Those objections must be “specific.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) (“Within 14 days after 18 being served with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file 19 specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.”) (emphasis 20 added). District courts are not required to review any portion of an R&R to which no 21 specific objection has been made. See, e.g., Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985) 22 (“It does not appear that Congress intended to require district court review of a magistrate’s 23 factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party 24 objects to those findings.”); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.

25 1 On November 26, 2019, Respondents—apparently not realizing that the November 5, 2019 ruling by Judge Metcalf was an R&R, not a final ruling on their motion to amend— 26 filed their supplemental answer concerning Ground Six. (Doc. 109.) 27 2 Although Petitioner’s objections were docketed 20 days after the R&R was issued, Petitioner asserts that he received the R&R on November 8, 2019 and mailed his objections 28 to the Court on November 20, 2019. (Doc. 110 at 8.) Thus, the objections will be considered timely. 1 2003) (“[T]he district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and 2 recommendations de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.”). 3 III. The Objections To The R&R 4 Petitioner raises four objections to the R&R. (Doc. 108.) 5 First, Petitioner challenges the R&R’s bottom-line conclusion that his summary 6 judgment motion should be denied. (Id. at 1-3.) Although Petitioner doesn’t quarrel with 7 the R&R’s observation that summary judgment is “generally ill fitted to habeas cases,” he 8 contends this “does not mean that they cannot fit any habeas case and does not mean it 9 does not fit this habeas case.” (Id. at 1.) Petitioner also contends that Blietner is 10 distinguishable because it addressed “the failure to request an extension, not the continued 11 failure to deny allegations.” (Id. at 2.) Finally, Petitioner argues that Respondents’ 12 oversight has resulted in a delay of months, not weeks. (Id. at 3.) 13 This objection will be overruled. Petitioner has not identified any case granting 14 habeas relief to a prisoner by way of a grant of summary judgment under Rule 56. 15 Moreover, and as discussed infra, the Court agrees with the R&R’s conclusion that 16 Respondents’ motion for leave to amend should be granted.

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Related

Thomas v. Arn
474 U.S. 140 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Willie Gordon v. Robert Duran
895 F.2d 610 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)

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Bluebook (online)
Williams v. Shinn, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-shinn-azd-2020.