Williams v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedMarch 4, 2022
Docket17-255
StatusUnpublished

This text of Williams v. Secretary of Health and Human Services (Williams v. Secretary of Health and Human Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Williams v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, (uscfc 2022).

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 17-255V Filed: February 7, 2022 UNPUBLISHED

SYLVESTER WILLIAMS Special Master Horner Petitioner, v. Interim Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

Respondent.

Joseph Alexander Vuckovich, Maglio Christopher & Toale, P.A., Washington, DC, for petitioner. Althea Walker Davis, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.

DECISION AWARDING INTERIM ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS 1

On August 17, 2021, petitioner moved for an award of interim attorneys’ fees and costs. (ECF No. 83.) On August 31, 2021, respondent filed a response deferring to the special master regarding the amount and appropriateness of an award of interim fees and costs. (ECF No. 84.) The following day, petitioner filed a reply. (ECF No. 85.) Petitioner requests $121,050.00 to be paid for attorney’s fees with an additional $48,362.27 to be paid for other costs for a total of $169,412.27. For the reasons discussed below, I award petitioner $168,362.27 in interim attorneys’ fees and costs.

I. Procedural History

Petitioner filed his petition for compensation on February 22, 2017, alleging that his autoimmune hepatitis (“AIH”) was caused by the hepatitis B vaccine he received on June 30, 2015. (ECF No. 1.) This case was originally assigned to Special Master

1 Because this decision contains a reasoned explanation for the special master’s action in this case, it will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims’ website in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002. See 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). This means the decision will be available to anyone with access to the Internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If the special master, upon review, agrees that the identified material fits within this definition, it will be redacted from public access.

1 Millman on February 23, 2017. (ECF No. 4.) This case was reassigned to my docket on June 6, 2019. (ECF No. 56.) Petitioner filed medical records between March 7, 2017 and September 1, 2021. (ECF Nos. 7, 18, 34, 65, 75, 86.) Respondent filed his rule 4(c) report recommending against compensation on September 28, 2017. (ECF No. 12.) Following the government’s Rule 4(c) report, the parties submitted several rounds of expert reports between January 30, 2018 and August 5, 2021. (ECF Nos. 24, 41, 42, 54, 61, 65, 66, 71, 79, 82.) Thereafter, petitioner filed the instant motion. (ECF No. 83.)

II. Awards of Interim Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Section 15(e)(1) of the Vaccine Act allows for the special master to award “reasonable attorneys' fees, and other costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 300aa–15(e)(1)(A)–(B). Petitioners are eligible for an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs if they are entitled to compensation under the Vaccine Act, or, even if they are unsuccessful, if the special master finds that the petition was filed in good faith and with a reasonable basis. Avera v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

Additionally, the Federal Circuit has concluded that interim fee awards are permissible and appropriate under the Vaccine Act. Shaw v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 609 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352. In Avera, the Federal Circuit stated, “[i]nterim fees are particularly appropriate in cases where proceedings are protracted and costly experts must be retained.” 515 F.3d at 1352. In Shaw, the Federal Circuit clarified that “where the claimant establishes that the cost of litigation has imposed an undue hardship and there exists a good faith basis for the claim, it is proper for the special master to award interim attorneys’ fees.” 609 F.3d at 1375; see also Chinea v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 15-95V, 2019 WL 3206829 at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. June 11, 2019) (citing Knorr v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 15-1169V, 2017 WL 2461375 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 17, 2017)) (observing three factors that have been considered when exercising discretion to award interim attorney’s fees: (1) whether the fee request exceeds $30,000, (2) whether the expert costs exceed $15,000, and (3) whether the case has been pending for over 18 months.)

In light of the above, I exercise my discretion to allow an award of interim fees and costs. This petition was filed nearly five years ago. In that time, petitioner has incurred significant costs relative to securing medical records and expert support for his claim. The amounts sought for fees and costs exceed the $30,000.00 and $15,000.00 figures cited in Chinea. Moreover, respondent has not objected, but instead deferred to my discretion as to whether the standard for an interim award of fees and costs is met in this case.

III. Amount of Reasonable Fees and Costs

The determination of the amount of reasonable attorneys' fees is within the special master's discretion. See, e.g. Saxton v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Special Masters have “wide latitude in determining the reasonableness of both attorneys’ fees and costs.” Hines v. Sec’y of Health & Human

2 Servs., 22 Cl. Ct. 750, 753 (Fed. Cl. 1991). Moreover, special masters are entitled to rely on their own experience and understanding of the issues raised. Wasson v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 24 Cl. Ct. 482, 483 (Fed. Cl. 1991) aff’d in relevant part, 988 F.2d 131 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (per curiam). However, petitioner “bears the burden of establishing the hours expended” and the reasonableness of the requested fee award. Id. at 484. Notwithstanding that respondent has not raised any specific objections to petitioner’s fee application, “the Special Master has an independent responsibility to satisfy himself that the fee award is appropriate and [is] not limited to endorsing or rejecting respondent’s critique.” Duncan v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99- 455V, 2008 WL 4743493 (Fed. Cl. 2008); see also McIntosh v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 139 Fed Cl. 238, 250 (2018) (finding that the special master “abused his discretion by failing to independently review the petitioner’s counsel’s motion for attorneys’ fees and reimbursement of case costs to determine if the requested fees and costs were reasonable.”). Furthermore, “the Special Master [has] no additional obligation to warn petitioners that he might go beyond the particularized list of respondent’s challenges.” Duncan, 2008 WL 4743493.

Special Masters use the lodestar approach to determine what constitutes reasonable attorneys’ fees under the Vaccine Act. Avera, 515 F.3d at 1347. The lodestar approach involves first determining “an initial estimate of a reasonable attorneys' fee by ‘multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.’” Id. at 1347–48 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)).

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