Williams v. Scott

Appellate Court of Illinois

Williams v. Scott

70 Ill. App. 51, 1897 Ill. App. LEXIS 429

CourtAppellate Court of Illinois

DecidedApril 15, 1897

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 70 Ill. App. 51 (Williams v. Scott) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Williams v. Scott, 70 Ill. App. 51, 1897 Ill. App. LEXIS 429 (Ill. Ct. App. 1897).

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Opinion

Mr. Justice Gary

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The appellant was the proprietor of the Park Gate Hotel during the "World’s Pair season of 1893, and engaged the appellee as steward at $200 per month a little before May 1, 1893. At the end of June, 1893, the appellant discharged the appellee. So far there is no dispute on the facts. The case of the appellee is that he was engaged for a term—the World’s Fair season—to end November 1, 1893, while the appellant insists that the engagement was only for a month on trial at $200. As the appellee worked two months, the month on trial seems to cut but little figure in the controversy. On trial implies that something was depending upon the result of the trial.

The preponderance of the evidence is with the appellee as to the terms of the engagement.

That there was any cause given to the appellee for the discharge is not proved, and it is clear that it was against his will, while he was ready, able and willing to continue in the service. He vainly endeavored to find employment during: the next four months.

He sued, and has recovered $500.

Errors, if any there be, in the. admission or rejection of evidence which could have had no effect upon the result, need not be considered.

It was his duty to make efforts to earn what he could after his discharge, and such efforts do not defeat his action, though his declaration does aver “ that at the time of his discharge and from thence until the expiration of the period of his employment he was ready, able and willing,” etc. The words “ and from thence until the expiration of the period of his employment ” are surplusage, which need not be proved. 1 Greenl. Ev., Sec. 51.

The appellee might have sued the day he was discharged, and the trial not coming on until the term of service had ended he would have been entitled to recover his whole salary, less what he could have earned. Mount Hope Cem. Ass’n v. Weidenmann, 139 Ill. 67.

In such an action continued readiness could not have been averred, which proves that such an averment was needless.

The judgment is affirmed.

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Mr. Justice Gary

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The appellant was the proprietor of the Park Gate Hotel during the "World’s Pair season of 1893, and engaged the appellee as steward at $200 per month a little before May 1, 1893. At the end of June, 1893, the appellant discharged the appellee. So far there is no dispute on the facts. The case of the appellee is that he was engaged for a term—the World’s Fair season—to end November 1, 1893, while the appellant insists that the engagement was only for a month on trial at $200. As the appellee worked two months, the month on trial seems to cut but little figure in the controversy. On trial implies that something was depending upon the result of the trial.

The preponderance of the evidence is with the appellee as to the terms of the engagement.

That there was any cause given to the appellee for the discharge is not proved, and it is clear that it was against his will, while he was ready, able and willing to continue in the service. He vainly endeavored to find employment during: the next four months.

He sued, and has recovered $500.

Errors, if any there be, in the. admission or rejection of evidence which could have had no effect upon the result, need not be considered.

It was his duty to make efforts to earn what he could after his discharge, and such efforts do not defeat his action, though his declaration does aver “ that at the time of his discharge and from thence until the expiration of the period of his employment he was ready, able and willing,” etc. The words “ and from thence until the expiration of the period of his employment ” are surplusage, which need not be proved. 1 Greenl. Ev., Sec. 51.

The appellee might have sued the day he was discharged, and the trial not coming on until the term of service had ended he would have been entitled to recover his whole salary, less what he could have earned. Mount Hope Cem. Ass’n v. Weidenmann, 139 Ill. 67.

In such an action continued readiness could not have been averred, which proves that such an averment was needless.

The judgment is affirmed.

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70 Ill. App. 51, 1897 Ill. App. LEXIS 429, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-scott-illappct-1897.

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