Williams v. Rancho Cordova Police Dept.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: September 8, 2021
• Docket: 2:19-cv-02345
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CARLOS WILLIAMS, No. 2:19-cv-02345-TLN-KJN 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO and RANCHO CORDOVA POLICE 15 DEPARTMENT, 16 Defendants. 17 18 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Carlos Williams’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for 19 Leave to Amend the Complaint. (ECF No. 19.) Defendants County of Sacramento1 (the 20 “County”) and Rancho Cordova Police Department (“RCPD”) (collectively, “Defendants”) have 21 filed oppositions. (ECF Nos. 20, 21.) Plaintiff has filed a reply. (ECF No. 22.) After carefully 22 reviewing the briefing set forth by the parties, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for 23 Leave to Amend the Complaint. (ECF No. 19.) 24 /// 25 /// 26

27 1 County of Sacramento notes in its opposition that it has been erroneously sued as the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department. (ECF No. 20 at 1.) The Court recognizes these errors 28 on the docket and directs the Clerk of the Court to make all corrections to the docket as necessary. 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2 2 This case arises out of alleged excessive force and wrongful arrest perpetrated by police 3 officers employed by Defendants on March 23, 2019. Plaintiff alleges police officers attacked 4 him and his brother outside his home, causing severe injuries to the face, back, neck, and head. 5 (See ECF No. 1 at 6–9.) Plaintiff filed this action on October 4, 2019 in Sacramento County 6 Superior Court, and RCPD removed it to this Court on November 20, 2019. (See id.) On 7 October 15, 2020, Plaintiff filed the instant motion. (ECF No. 19.) On October 29, 2020, 8 Defendants filed oppositions. (ECF Nos. 20, 21.) On November 5, 2020, Plaintiff filed a reply. 9 (ECF No. 22.) 10 II. STANDARD OF LAW 11 Granting or denying leave to amend a complaint rests within the sound discretion of the 12 trial court. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). When a court issues a pretrial scheduling 13 order that establishes a timetable to amend the complaint, Rule 16 governs any amendments to 14 the complaint. Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1294 (9th Cir. 2000). To allow for 15 amendment under Rule 16, a plaintiff must show good cause for not having amended the 16 complaint before the time specified in the pretrial scheduling order. Id. This standard “primarily 17 considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, 18 Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). The focus of the inquiry is on the reasons why the 19 moving party seeks to modify the complaint. Id. If the moving party is able to satisfy the good 20 cause standard under Rule 16, it must next demonstrate that the proposed amendment is 21 permissible under Rule 15. Id. 22 Under Rule 15(a)(2), a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s 23 written consent or the Court’s leave. However, “[t]he court should freely give leave [to amend] 24 when justice so requires,” bearing in mind “the underlying purpose of Rule 15 ... [is] to facilitate 25 decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 26 2 The Court need not recount all background facts of the instant case here, as they are set 27 forth fully in the Court’s July 15, 2021 Order granting in part Defendants’ Motion to Consolidate. (ECF No. 25.) The additional factual and procedural background is taken from the instant 28 motion. (See ECF No. 19.) 1 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Whether leave to amend should be granted is generally 2 determined by considering the following factors: (1) undue delay; (2) bad faith or dilatory motive 3 on the part of the movant; (3) repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously 4 allowed; (4) undue prejudice to the opposing party by allowing amendment; and (5) futility of 5 amendment. See Foman, 371 U.S. at 182; Allen v. City of Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 373 (9th 6 Cir. 1990)). Of these considerations, “it is the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party 7 that carries the greatest weight.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 8 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). “Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining 9 Foman factors, there exists a presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” 10 Id. (emphasis in original). A proposed amendment is futile “only if no set of facts can be proved 11 under the amendment to the pleadings that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim or 12 defense.” Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. 13 Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011). However, denial of leave to amend on 14 this ground is rare. See Netbula, LLC v. Distinct Corp., 212 F.R.D. 534, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 15 Ordinarily, “courts will defer consideration of challenges to the merits of a proposed amended 16 pleading until after leave to amend is granted and the amended pleading is filed.” Id. 17 III. ANALYSIS 18 Plaintiff seeks to amend his Complaint to: (1) name Deputy Peace Officers Nathan Daniel, 19 Joseph Zalec, and Derek Hutchins as individual defendants; (2) clarify that his two claims under 20 the Fourth Amendment contain the municipal liability theory under Monell v. Dep’t of Social 21 Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); and (3) add a Bane Civil Rights Act (“Bane Act”) claim for 22 conduct after Plaintiff filed his Complaint. (See ECF Nos. 19, 19-3.) Plaintiff argues good 23 causes exists for leave to amend because: there has been no undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory 24 motive; his Monell claim relates back to his original Complaint and is within the statute of 25 limitations; and his Bane Act claim was timely exhausted under the California Tort Claims Act 26 (“CTCA”). (See ECF No. 19.) 27 The County opposes Plaintiff’s motion on the basis that it is premature, arguing that an 28 amended complaint filed before the Court’s ruling on the then-pending motion to consolidate will 1 lead to confusion.3 (See ECF No. 20.) The County does not address any other issues. (See id.) 2 RCPD also opposes Plaintiff’s motion, asserting Plaintiff fails to satisfy “good cause” for 3 amendment under Rule 16(b)(4) because Plaintiff has not demonstrated diligence. (ECF No. 21 4 at 4–7.) As to Rule 15, RCPD maintains that amendment is futile and will unduly prejudice 5 RCPD. (Id. at 7–15.) 6 The Court will first evaluate whether Plaintiff has met the “good cause” standard under 7 Rule 16 and then turn to an analysis of the Foman factors raised by Plaintiff to determine whether 8 amendment is permissible under Rule 15. 9 A. “Good Cause” 10 Although Plaintiff concedes he could have added the individual defendants earlier, he 11 explains he wanted to wait for further discovery to determine which additional individuals should 12 be named. (ECF No. 19 at 6.) Plaintiff also asserts he delayed while waiting to see if this case 13 was going to be consolidated with his brother’s related case (No. 2:20-cv-00598-TLN-KJN) 14 arising from the same incident, which might have required filing a different type of amended 15 complaint or rendered the instant motion moot. (Id.; ECF No. 22 at 3.) In opposition, RCPD 16 argues each of the individual defendants Plaintiff seeks to add could have been discovered before 17 Plaintiff filed his Complaint and after discovery began. (ECF No. 21 at 5.) RCPD emphasizes 18 Plaintiff indicated in the Joint Discovery Plan (filed in March 2020) that he would seek leave to 19 amend to add the officers, but did not do so until October 2020. (Id.) RCPD further contends 20 Plaintiff has not shown diligence in seeking to add the Monell allegations, especially since 21 municipal liability is premised “on a purported failure to train the deputies and/or an 22 unconstitutional policy at the time of the incident.” (Id. at 6 (emphasis in original).) RCPD 23 maintains Plaintiff also does not explain the delay in bringing the Bane Act “harassment 24 campaign” claim, even though the alleged harassment began as early as November 2019 — which 25 means Plaintiff knew about the claim for almost a year. (Id.) 26 /// 27 3 On July 15, 2021, the Court granted in part Defendants’ Motion to Consolidate only with 28 respect to discovery (see ECF No. 25), which renders the County’s argument moot. 1 The Court finds the question of diligence to be a close call. Plaintiff’s counsel is also 2 counsel in the Related Case, which was filed on March 18, 2020 and specifically names the 3 individual officers Plaintiff seeks to add as defendants now. (See No. 2:19-cv-00598-TLN-KJN, 4 ECF No. 1.) Defendants are correct that Plaintiff’s additional Monell allegations could have been 5 added sooner and that Plaintiff does not adequately explain why his Bane Act “harassment 6 campaign” claim was not brought sooner, especially since it was rejected by the City of Rancho 7 Cordova as untimely (see ECF No. 19-4). Plaintiff does not elaborate on this any further in his 8 reply. (See ECF No. 22.) However, the Court also sees no reason not to believe Plaintiff’s 9 counsel’s explanation for the delay — namely, counsel was waiting on the Court’s ruling for the 10 motion to consolidate which might have rendered the instant motion moot. In light of the 11 minimal prejudice to Defendants (as will be detailed further below) and Rule 15(a)’s liberal 12 amendment policy, see Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609, the Court finds good cause exists to allow 13 Plaintiff to amend his Complaint. 14 B. Foman Factors 15 Having established good cause exists under Rule 16, the Court turns to the parties’ 16 arguments under Rule 15.4 RCPD argues Plaintiff’s proposed amendments are futile, there has 17 been undue delay, and allowing amendment would cause prejudice to Defendants.5 As will be 18 discussed, the Court finds the Foman factors support granting leave to amend. See Foman, 371 19 U.S. at 182. 20 ///

21 4 The Court notes here that because Plaintiff seeks to set out a “transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the [initial] pleading” with respect to the alleged 22 “harassment campaign,” such amendment or supplementation is governed by Rule 15(d). See 23 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. However, because “[t]he legal standard for granting or denying a motion to supplement under Rule 15(d) is the same as the standard for granting or denying a motion under 24 Rule 15(a),” the Court does not distinguish the two in its analysis. See Yates v. Auto City 76, 299 F.R.D. 611, 614 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (citing Athena Feminine Techs., Inc. v. Wilkes, No. C 10-4868 25 SBA, 2013 WL 450147, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lyon v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 308 F.R.D. 203, 214 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (applying the 26 five Foman factors to a Rule 15(d) motion). 27 5 The parties do not discuss the factors of bad faith or repeated failure to cure deficiencies 28 by amendments previously allowed, and therefore the Court declines to address them. 1 i. Futility of Amendment 2 RCPD argues amendment is futile. (ECF No. 21 at 7–13.) Specifically, RCPD maintains 3 Plaintiff’s Monell claim fails to allege facts to establish a failure to train or unconstitutional policy 4 and his Bane Act claim fails to allege facts to show RCPD interfered with a statutory or 5 constitutional right. (Id.) The Court will address each claim in turn. 6 a) Monell Claim 7 To bring a Monell claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) he possessed a constitutional right of 8 which he was deprived; (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) the policy amounts to deliberate 9 indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the moving force behind 10 the constitutional violation. Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 11 Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1992); City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 12 378, 389–91 (1989)). There must also be a “direct causal link” between the policy or custom and 13 the injury. Id. (citing McDade v. West, 223 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2000)). “Absent a formal 14 government policy, [a plaintiff] must show a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes 15 the standard operating procedure of the local government entity . . . so persistent and widespread 16 that it constitutes a permanent and well settled . . . policy.” See Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 17 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, a single incident will 18 typically not suffice to demonstrate existence of a policy. McDade, 223 F.3d at 1141. Further, a 19 failure to train or supervise can also amount to a “policy or custom” sufficient to impose liability 20 under § 1983 “where a municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant respect evidences 21 a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of its inhabitants.” City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389. 22 Here, despite Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants are “liable under the theory of [m]unicipal 23 [l]iability set forth in Monell . . . in that they maintained customs, policies, or practices that 24 allowed and/or caused the underlying constitutional violations, and themselves violated the 25 constitution” (ECF No. 19-3 at 10, 12), Plaintiff does not describe or identify any formal, official 26 policy that was either wrongful or wrongfully ignored by the police officers. (See id.); see also 27 Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. With respect to the two 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims (Claims Two and 28 Three), Plaintiff alleges no facts to suggest his case is more than a “single occurrence of 1 unconstitutional action by a non-policymaking employee.” (See ECF No. 19-3); see also 2 McDade, 223 F.3d at 1141. Plaintiff’s claims instead seem to arise from the one alleged incident 3 on March 23, 2019. (See ECF No. 19-3.) Even with the additional allegations regarding the 4 “harassment campaign,” Plaintiff has still failed to identify an actual custom, policy, or practice 5 of the RCPD, or any past incidents of excessive force. (See id.); see also Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918 6 (“Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must 7 be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has 8 become a traditional method of carrying out policy.”). Plaintiff therefore fails to demonstrate 9 how the alleged injury results from a “permanent and well settled practice.” Trevino, 99 F.3d at 10 918. Plaintiff similarly fails to allege sufficient facts to connect the actions of the individual 11 officers to any policy or “possible inadequate training or supervision.” Anderson, 451 F.3d at 12 1070. The Court therefore cannot discern any “direct causal link” between the alleged policy and 13 Plaintiff’s alleged injury. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to allege 14 the existence of a policy (or deficiencies in training amounting to a policy) reflecting “deliberate 15 indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” Id. 16 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Monell claims as pleaded in the 17 proposed First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 19-3) are insufficient to state a claim. However, 18 the Court cannot conclusively find there are “no set of facts” that can be proven by amendment to 19 constitute “a valid and sufficient claim.” Miller, 845 F.2d at 214. Accordingly, the Court cannot 20 determine whether amendment would be futile. 21 b) Bane Act Claim 22 The Bane Act creates a private cause of action against anyone who “interferes by threats, 23 intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the 24 exercise or enjoyment by an individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or 25 laws of the United States, or laws and rights secured by the Constitution or laws of [California].” 26 Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1. A plaintiff bringing a claim pursuant to the Bane Act “must show (1) 27 intentional interference or attempted interference with a state or federal constitutional or legal 28 right, and (2) the interference or attempted interference was by threats, intimidation or coercion.” 1 Scalia v. Cnty. of Kern, 308 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1080 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (quoting Allen v. City of 2 Sacramento, 234 Cal. App. 4th 41, 67 (2015), as modified on denial of reh’g (Mar. 6, 2015)). 3 “[T]he egregiousness required by [§] 52.1 is tested by whether the circumstances indicate the 4 arresting officer had a specific intent to violate the arrestee’s right to freedom from unreasonable 5 seizure, not by whether the evidence shows something beyond the coercion ‘inherent’ in the 6 wrongful detention.” Cornell v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 17 Cal. App. 5th 766, 801–02 (2017), as 7 modified (Nov. 16, 2017). 8 Here, Plaintiff alleges “[b]eginning in 2019,” he “experienced a pattern of police 9 harassment at his home.” (ECF No. 19-3 at 7–8.) Such events, which occurred in November 10 2019, December 2019, and January 2020, include an unmarked vehicle idling in front of his 11 home, two dead birds on his driveway, five or six screws drilled into the tread of his car parked 12 on his driveway, a police squad car creeping by his house and shining a high-powered spotlight 13 through the windows, and confirmation from a neighbor that an unmarked police car parked 14 outside of his home on at least one occasion. (Id.) While Plaintiff may sufficiently allege 15 “threats, intimidation or coercion,” it is unclear to the Court with which “state or federal 16 constitutional or legal right” Defendants allegedly interfered or attempted to interfere. Scalia, 17 308 F. Supp. 3d at 1080. 18 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim as pleaded in the 19 proposed First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 19-3) is insufficient to state a claim. However, the 20 Court cannot conclusively find there are “no set of facts” that can be proven by amendment to 21 constitute “a valid and sufficient claim.” Miller, 845 F.2d at 214. Accordingly, the Court cannot 22 determine whether amendment would be futile.6 23 6 Plaintiff also contends his Bane Act claim is within the statute of limitations period, as he 24 has filed the instant motion pursuant to Rule 15(d) (instead of a separate lawsuit) within six months of receiving the City of Rancho Cordova’s rejection letter of his government claim. (ECF 25 No. 19 at 8; see also ECF No. 19-4.) From the rejection letter that Plaintiff attaches to the instant motion, it appears this claim might be time-barred pursuant to California Government Code § 26 945. However, based on the limited information before the Court and RCPD’s mere passing 27 reference to his claim being rejected as untimely (ECF No. 21 at 6), the Court cannot say there are “no set of facts” that can be proven by amendment to constitute a valid claim. Miller, 845 28 F.2d at 214. 1 ii. Undue Delay 2 Both parties’ arguments about undue delay are made in conjunction with their arguments 3 about diligence in seeking leave to amend under Rule 16. (See ECF Nos. 19, 21, 22.) To 4 reiterate, although it is a close call, the Court sees no reason not to believe Plaintiff’s counsel’s 5 explanation for the delay — namely, counsel was waiting on the Court’s ruling for the motion to 6 consolidate which might have rendered the instant motion moot. 7 Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of granting leave to amend. 8 iii. Prejudice to Defendants 9 Plaintiff generally argues there will be no prejudice to Defendants if leave to amend is 10 granted but does not expound any further. (See ECF Nos. 19, 22.) RCPD argues in opposition 11 the Monell claims “would greatly increase the scope and breadth of the lawsuit” because those 12 claims include “entirely different facts” about “events that span the months from November 2019 13 to June 2020.” (ECF No. 21 at 13–14.) RCPD contends denial of leave to amend will not 14 prejudice Plaintiff because he can file a separate lawsuit with these claims. (Id. at 14.) RCPD 15 maintains the Bane Act claim is also subject to severance under Rule 21 because it “does not arise 16 out of the same transaction or occurrence as the March 23, 2019, subject incident.” (Id. at 14– 17 15.) RCPD finally notes that trying all of these claims together would prejudice Defendants and 18 cause jury confusion as to which entity “if any, is responsible due to the entirely vague and 19 prejudicial nature of this [Bane Act] claim.” (Id. at 15.) 20 The Court finds with respect to RCPD’s prejudice argument specifically, there is no trial 21 date set, discovery is still open, the case is in the early stages of litigation, and any possible jury 22 confusion can be mitigated with specific jury instructions. With respect to expanding the scope 23 of the instant case, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that instead of filing a separate lawsuit, his 24 Bane Act claim “should be added to this case as a matter of judicial economy and convenience.” 25 (ECF No. 19 at 8); see also Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 473 (9th Cir. 1988) (Rule 15(d) enables 26 a court “to award complete relief . . . and to avoid the cost, delay and waste of separate actions 27 which must be separately tried and prosecuted . . . [Supplemental pleadings] ought to be allowed 28 as a matter of course, unless some particular reason for disallowing them appears . . . .” (quoting 1 | New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Waller, 323 F.2d 20, 28-29 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 2 | 963 (1964)). 3 As such, this factor weighs in favor of granting leave to amend. 4 IV. CONCLUSION 5 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to 6 | Amend the Complaint. (ECF No. 19.) Plaintiff may file his First Amended Complaint not later 7 | than thirty (30) days from the electronic filing date of this Order. Defendants shall file an answer 8 | to the First Amended Complaint not later than twenty-one (21) days after the electronic filing date 9 | of the First Amended Complaint. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 | Dated: September 7, 2021 2 { J) /) 13 “ Mn Voda 14 Troy L. Nuhlep ] 15 United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28