Williams v. Pratt Institute

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Williams v. Pratt Institute

212 A.D.2d 692, 623 N.Y.S.2d 154

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 21, 1995

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 212 A.D.2d 692 (Williams v. Pratt Institute) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Williams v. Pratt Institute, 212 A.D.2d 692, 623 N.Y.S.2d 154 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1995).

Pincite

Opinion

—In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for tortious interference with and breach of contract, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Hurowitz, J.), dated June 25, 1993, which denied his motion to vacate a previous order of the same court, dated April 28, 1992, granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint upon his default in opposing the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in declining to vacate its prior order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint where the plaintiff waited more than a year in moving for this relief and failed to proffer any excuse for his dilatory conduct or to establish that his claims had any merit (see, CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; see also, Long Is. Trust Co. v PTI Intl. Corp., 166 AD2d 504). Ritter, J. P., Pizzuto, Friedmann and Goldstein, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

—In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for tortious interference with and breach of contract, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Hurowitz, J.), dated June 25, 1993, which denied his motion to vacate a previous order of the same court, dated April 28, 1992, granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint upon his default in opposing the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in declining to vacate its prior order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint where the plaintiff waited more than a year in moving for this relief and failed to proffer any excuse for his dilatory conduct or to establish that his claims had any merit (see, CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; see also, Long Is. Trust Co. v PTI Intl. Corp., 166 AD2d 504). Ritter, J. P., Pizzuto, Friedmann and Goldstein, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

212 A.D.2d 692, 623 N.Y.S.2d 154, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-pratt-institute-nyappdiv-1995.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack