Williams v. Pollard

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 22, 2025
• Docket: 24-3582
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 22 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN WESLEY WILLIAMS, No. 24-3582 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:21-cv-00055-RSH-DTF v. MEMORANDUM* MARCUS POLLARD, Warden; R. BUCKEL, Chief Deputy Warden; O. NAVARRO; KATHLEEN ALLISON, Secretary, CDCR; CONNIE GIPSON, Deputy Director, CDCR,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Robert Steven Huie, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 17, 2025**

Before: PAEZ, CHRISTEN, and KOH, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner John Wesley Williams appeals pro se from the

district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). defendants failed to protect him from COVID-19. We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Jones v. Royal Admin. Servs., Inc., 887

F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2018). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants

Allison, Gipson, Pollard, and Buckel because the undisputed evidence shows that

the policies they promulgated and implemented were reasonable responses to the

COVID-19 pandemic, and Williams failed to raise a genuine dispute of material

fact as to whether they participated in or directed any alleged constitutional

violation. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844 (1976) (explaining that

prison officials do not violate the Eighth Amendment, even if they actually knew

of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety, if they responded reasonably to the

risk); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1206–08 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that a

supervisor may be liable under § 1983 only if the supervisor was personally

involved in the constitutional violation or if there is “a sufficient causal connection

between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation”).

We do not consider the district court’s summary judgment for defendant

Navarro because Williams failed to raise this issue in the opening brief. See Eberle

v. City of Anaheim, 901 F.2d 814, 817-18 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that an appellant

waives an issue by failing to raise it in the opening brief).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Williams’s motion

2 24-3582 to appoint an expert because it properly determined that an expert was not

necessary for the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine the facts at

issue. See Fed. R. Evid. 702(a); Walker v. Am. Home Shield Long Term Disability

Plan, 180 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 1999) (standard of review).

Williams’s request for judicial notice, set forth in his notice of appeal, is

denied.

AFFIRMED.

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